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Abstract 
This work develops the thesis that there is a strong relationship between the 
regulation of disruptive technology and the Internet-based participatory 
democracy. In other words, attempts to regulate disruptive technology have 
an impact upon the citizen’s participation in democracy. This work will 
show what this relationship is and its effects on democratic participation.  
Taking its starting point from the recent theoretical developments in 
regulation, disruptive technology and role of ICT in participatory 
democracy, this work is the application of theoretical discussions on the 
field of the Internet-based participatory democracy. These theoretical 
discussions are used in the empirical exploration of six areas: virus writing 
and dissemination, civil disobedience in online environments, privacy and 
the role of spyware, the re-interpretation of property in online 
environments, software as infrastructure and finally state censorship of 
online information. The purpose of these studies is to explore the effects of 
these social and technical innovations upon the core democratic values of 
Participation, Communication, Integrity, Property, Access and Autonomy. The overall 
research question for this thesis is therefore:  
How do attempts to regulate disruptive technology affect Internet-
based participatory democracy?  
The specific contribution of this thesis is the development of extended 
understanding of the way in which we regulate disruptive technology. This 
understanding helps us to better regulate that which is new and threatens 
that which is established. Additionally, the extended understanding in this 
field can then be applied to all domains where regulation of technology may 
occur. This thesis contributes towards a richer understanding in the research 
areas of e-democracy, technology regulation and disruptive technology.  
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1 
Introduction 
The blade itself incites to violence.  
Homer 
 
When bombs damaged the House of Commons Chamber in 1941 it was 
rebuilt exactly as it was. This was despite the fact that even then there were 
many flaws in the design of the Chamber, which is unsurprising since it had 
been the home of English Parliament since the 16th century. Churchill was 
well aware of the importance of the decision not to take the opportunity to 
renew the design. Maintaining the oblong shape of the Chamber, as 
opposed to the more modern semicircle was a political as well as an 
architectural choice.  
Here is a very potent factor in our political life. The semicircular assembly, which 
appeals to political theorists, enables every individual or every group to move 
round the centre, adopting various shades of pink according as the weather 
changes…The party system is much favoured by the oblong form of chamber. It 
is easy for an individual to move through those insensible gradations from Left 
to Right, but the act of crossing the Floor is one which requires serious attention. 
(Churchill 1952, p 150). 
This quote shows that Churchill recognized the connection between 
physical space and human behaviour and, in extension, the potential 
regulatory effects obtained by controlling or regulating the physical 
environment. To Churchill, the reconstruction of the Chamber was not one 
of architecture alone. The reconstruction of the Chamber affected the 
applied politics of the United Kingdom and its empire. If technology is to 
be understood as the teleological activity of transformation or manipulation 
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of natural resources and environments in order to satisfy human needs or 
goals (Kroes 1998) then this 500 year old Chamber is an example of 
technology which, in addition, illustrates the main point of this thesis: The 
regulation of technology is the regulation of democracy.  
The regulation of British politics through the seemingly innocuous control 
of the physical space of the Chamber shows the importance of the 
relationship between technology and democracy. In this case the regulation 
of the physical space of the Chamber enhances and supports the traditional 
party system. This example should be understood as an analogy for this 
work. This work studies the regulation of information and communications 
technology (ICT) with a focus on the democratic effects of the regulation.  
While this work could apply to all forms of ICT in particular to the area of 
information systems design since in these cases the designer becomes the 
regulator of the system by formulating rules that guide, control and regulate 
user behaviour.  
A system which delivers a strong and consistent symbolic message…may have 
the effect of creating or reinforcing norms, strengthening belief in them, and 
making it harder for people to disengage their self-controls from these norms. By 
contrast, a system which removes all personal choice may tend to weaken self-
controls, for a variety of reasons. If people are denied any autonomy, then they 
perceive that the moral responsibility lies entirely with the system, and they no 
longer retain any obligations themselves. (Smith 2000, p 170). 
Despite this more general applicability the focus of this work is the 
exemplification, discussion and analysis of the democratic effects of the 
regulation of ICT in relation to Internet-based activity. The importance of 
ICT in a democracy has been succinctly stated by Feenberg (2002, p ix) 
“Computer design is now political design.” Therefore, in extension, the 
regulation of technology is not only a technological matter but also a 
political one. 
The locus of concern for this work is the technological base, the cluster of 
technological innovations, groups of infrastructure(s), applications and 
social organizations commonly referred to as the Internet. It is important to 
keep in mind that the Internet is not one innovation but a rapid series of 
steps, innovations and collaboration within the field of communications 
technology. In addition to this the Internet as a phenomena is constantly 
technically evolving.  
The regulation of Internet-based activity has become an area of increased 
discussion and study with a particular focus on adequate forms of 
regulation, while avoiding cases of overregulation. Overregulation occurs 
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when the regulation implemented tends to not only regulate undesirable 
behaviour but additionally criminalizes or frustrates many types of legitimate 
behaviour. The impact of this undesirable side effect of legal regulation on 
democratic participation is the focal point of this thesis. Such an analysis 
must take its starting point in a definition of overregulation (intended or 
unintended) and proceed to discuss the effects of overregulation 
(positive/negative).  
Since the Internet is more than one technological system, artefact or 
innovation, that has come to be employed in a multitude of social settings, 
the lack of coordinated development is unsurprising (Castells 1996, 2001). 
The haphazard manner in which this information infrastructure (Hanseth 
1996) has evolved plays a significant role, as we shall see later in this work, 
in the way it is used, controlled and developed. In addition to this, their 
open nature and unplanned development (Ciborra 1992, Dahlbom & Janlert 
1996, Hanseth 1996), lead to a haphazard development of a so-called 
autonomous technology (Winner 1978). In other words the development of 
technology through open standards leads to a technology that lacks, or 
seems to lack, conscious control and definition. Therefore when we talk 
about the Internet we are indulging in simplification, or convenient fiction 
(Kling 2005), since we reduce the different complexities until we have a 
manageable subject matter. 
The fundamental idea of the Internet Infrastructure is the creation of a non-
discriminatory mode of transportation. This is defined as the end-to-end 
principle of the Internet Protocol (IP). It states that, whenever possible, 
communications protocol operations should be defined to occur at the end-
points of a communications system (Saltzer et al 1984). The development of 
this idea led to the creation of the communications system which was not 
concerned with the content of what was being transported as long that 
which was transported followed the correct transportation procedure. This 
has as its effect that the social interaction that is conducted via the Internet 
is in some sense freer than many alternatives since it is not constrained by 
the technology. Or, to put it another way, the constraints and enabling 
factors of the technology are non-discriminatory to the designs of the user 
(Lessig 1999).   
Since the Internet provides an open undiscriminating transportation of data 
it has the ability to be used as a platform for a seemingly endless array of 
content. With the addition of speed, the passing of content becomes more 
or less instantaneous and this brings with it the appearance of computer 
supported simultaneous interaction.  
DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGY 
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To understand how regulation is carried out within the mediated world of 
the Internet we need to understand its context and its purpose. This entails 
defining parts of the whole in the hope of understanding the whole. The 
development of understanding of the way in which we regulate disruptive 
technology helps us to understand the regulation of that which is new and 
which threatens that which is established. The results of such a study can 
then be applied to all domains where regulation of disruptive technology 
may occur. 
This work is concerned with the democratic effects of the overregulation of 
Internet-based activity. The regulation of Internet-based activity and 
technology is rapidly becoming a case of overregulation (Benkler 2006, 
Lessig 1999, Reidenberg 1998). In other words the regulation which is 
implemented tends to not only regulate undesirable behaviour but regularly 
criminalizes or frustrates many types of legitimate behaviour. To better 
understand these processes it is necessary to look at the way in which 
technology can be seen as a disruptive force and the way in which 
technology and democracy are being linked together in rhetoric and practice. 
Therefore the research question of this thesis is: How do attempts to 
regulate disruptive technology affect Internet-based participatory 
democracy?  
The specific contribution of this thesis is the development of understanding 
of the way in which we regulate disruptive technology. This understanding 
helps us to better regulate that which is new and which threatens that which 
is established. The results of such a thesis can then be applied to all domains 
where regulation of technology may occur. Specifically this thesis 
contributes towards a richer understanding in the research areas of e-
democracy, regulation and disruptive technology.  
The misalignments of technology and social thought become disruptive 
when the adherence to a certain social solution or concept remains in place 
during a period of technological change. Or, to state this in simpler terms, 
when the physical realities change while social arrangements remain static. 
At present the debate over the power of information and communication 
technology is an adequate example of a disruptive technology. This thesis 
will examine the technological challenges to six core democratic values 
(Participation, Communication, Integrity, Property, Access and Autonomy) and show 
that the technological change has far outpaced the evolution of social 
concepts in these areas and as a result the technology can be viewed as 
being a disruptive force in society.  
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The six core democratic values that have been explored in this work are not 
intended to be an exclusive list of such values. Other authors may choose to 
include other core values for a democracy. However the core values 
presented in this work perform a normative function. Without these values 
a socio-technical system cannot claim to be an IT-based participatory 
democracy. The latter concept is complicated by the fact that these values 
may be present in varying degrees.  
Therefore, for the purposes of this thesis, the literature in this field helps us 
arrive at an understanding of disruptive technology. This can be summarised 
as: technology can be viewed as being disruptive when the technological 
developments affect social behavioural norms1. These technological 
developments push users to adapt their lives and behaviour to create new 
social interactional codes of behaviour in keeping with the new technology 
in their lives.  
Since this thesis studies the effects of technology regulation upon the 
participatory democracy the concept of disruptive technology, within the 
framework of this thesis, is understood as: A technology becomes disruptive 
when it begins to affect a core value in the society or organization where the 
technology is implemented. With this definition we can at once see that 
technologies have long been disrupting society. While it is hard to choose a 
greatest, or most disruptive, technology it is relatively easy to find examples 
upon which we can build a common understanding of the issue. The steam 
engine, and with it the social, economic and technological changes it 
brought about must be seen as a disruptive technology. While it is not the 
purpose of this thesis to enter into the discussion on the role of technology 
on the industrialization of the world it is enough to point to the steam 
engine and the following industrial boom that it brought about. In addition 
it is also important to recognize that the development of technology, as well 
as the attempts to regulate, bring unintended consequences (Beck 1992, 
Kallinikos 2005, Rolland 2002, Tenner 1997). 
The study of social institutions and organization in history tends to largely 
downplay technology and the effect of technology (Mitcham 1994, White 
                                                           
1 Social behavioural norms in this work should be understood as patterns of behaviour 
that are adopted and followed by members of groups. Individuals confirm to such norms 
partly due to pressure experienced (real or imagined) from other members of the group. 
Norms are not only descriptive in that they illustrate how people within groups behave 
but they are also normative in that they dictate how group members should behave 
(Strahilevitz 2000, 2002). 
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1962). The social history of man is often viewed as the history of thought 
where the development of technology seems to play a small part in this 
evolution of mind (Latour 1999, Mitcham 1994). However to ignore the role 
of technology would not present a fair picture of social interaction since 
social relations are dependent upon a changing technological infrastructure. 
Changes in the technological infrastructure enable the users to carry out 
their activities in new ways at the same time these technologies also bring 
with them challenges to established social conventions and practices. 
Activities, which previously did not need to be regulated because they were 
technically impossible, become the subject of regulatory interest once they 
become technically possible. For example discussions on the regulatory 
prevention of human cloning did not take place in earnest before it became 
technically possible to clone living organisms (Beyleveld & Brownsword 
2001). This does not necessarily mean that our social values in relation to 
cloning have changed but rather that due to technological developments it is 
deemed necessary to attempt to regulate possible behaviour. In this way 
technology can provide an opportunity for revising established social 
structures through its implementation and use (Orlikowski & Robey 1991, 
Orlikowski 1992).    
Dahl (1989) lists criteria that mark the democratic process, such as voting 
equality, effective participation, enlightened understanding, control of the 
agenda, and inclusion of all adult members in collective decisions. For Dahl 
(1989), the violation of any of these criteria makes the whole process 
undemocratic and incompatible with the logic of political equality. For 
example, as he writes on the topic of participation:  
…to deny any citizen adequate opportunities for effective participation means 
that because their preferences are unknown or incorrectly perceived, they cannot 
be taken into account. But to not take their preferences toward the final outcome 
equally into account is to reject the principle of equal consideration of interests. 
(Dahl 1989, p 109). 
Barnett (1997) takes a different approach when attempting to assess the 
potential contribution of new media to an effective democracy, chooses 
four components: 
…a more knowledgeable citizenry, whose understanding of issues and arguments 
is fostered by the availability of relevant, undistorted information; access to 
collective rational debate in which citizens can deliberate and develop their own 
arguments; participation in democratic institutions, whether through voting, 
membership of a party, trade union or pressure group, attendance at political 
events or through some other national or local political activity; and making use 
of the representative process by communicating with and holding accountable 
INTRODUCTION 
 
7
elected representatives (at local, national or international levels). (Barnett 1997, p 
195). 
In his discussion on political activities taking place in society, apart from 
active deliberative democracy, Waltzer (1999) offers a list of twelve key 
activities such as political education, debate, voting, campaigning, corruption 
and bargaining. The purpose of Waltzer’s list is to show that the activities 
within a democracy are not only those formally defined but also, the process 
of democracy involves many forms of interaction, some less noble than 
others.  
The core democratic values studied2 within this thesis have been identified3 
from the data collected in the case studies and a synthesis of works of 
mainstream theory of political scientists focusing on the concept of 
democracy. They will be defined and studied in greater detail in their 
individual chapters and case.  
The theories of structuration and regulation are to be considered to be the 
foundations and domain within which the continued work on this thesis will 
be carried out. After the theoretical overview the thesis turns to a more 
analytical approach of the problem domain. This analytical approach 
consists of six studies of particular problem areas where the conflict 
between regulatory method and human actor is exposed and illustrated. To 
be able to analyse these six cases further specific theories will be required to 
obtain a more clear understanding of the specific domain in which the 
discussion is being carried out. Therefore each case study, represented in 
individual chapters, will include specific theories to better acquaint the 
reader of the specific domain. This is followed by a connection to the more 
general discussion of theory on the regulation of technology. 
Disruptive Technology 
Life is organized around technology. Despite our desire to maintain control 
over our lives, the bulk of what we do with our lives has been coordinated 
and adapted by and to the technology that surrounds us (Cowan Schwartz 
1983, Norman 1990, White 1962). Therefore it should come as no surprise 
that when existing technology evolves or old technology is made obsolete 
that the phase where new technology enters our lives could be seen as being 
                                                           
2 See Theoretical Focus page 38 et seq. 
3 The method with which these particular core values were chosen is discussed further in 
Chapter three below.  
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disruptive. The disruption occurs when the technology, which is introduced 
effects the social arrangements around which we build our lives (Lyytinen & 
Rose 2003a, 2003b).  
While, in many cases, a disruptive technology can be seen as a technology 
that replaces the incumbent technology one must not forget that this 
replacement also displaces the social organization around the displaced 
technology (White 1962, 1972). Printing presses replaced the scriptoria and 
also change the role of the scribe (Eisenstein 1979). Railways replaced canals 
and also changed the way in which the social organization around the canals 
functioned. Railroads did not only make an impact on the barge pilot but 
also on the bargeman, lock keeper, canal owners, canal-side innkeepers, 
barge builders, waterway engineers and the horse trade (most barges were 
horse drawn) (Hadfield 1959). This process is not only one of historical 
interest. Examples of disruptive technologies are all around us. It is, in fact, 
a continual process. Digital cameras are replacing photographic film, flash 
drives replace floppy disks, DVD players replace VHS players. Each change 
brings social and economic effects to a larger or smaller degree. This 
disruption brings with it new possibilities of communication and control as 
well as disruption (Beniger 1986, Yates 1989). 
The result of this disruption of social behavioural norms leads people to 
adapt their lives and behaviour to create new social interactional codes of 
behaviour in keeping with the new technology in their lives (Cowan 
Schwartz 1983, White 1962, 1972). At the same time (or more often later) 
the disruption caused by the new technology causes the regulator to react. 
The latter is not necessarily the state legislator but can also be any entity 
with the power to act (there may also be several such entities acting 
concurrently). 
Disruption is often seen as being a negative force. In a sense it is. 
Disruption affects the status quo and therefore those who profit from the 
status quo see the force as a negative. Even those who do not profit from 
the status quo may view disruption as a negative force since change is a 
movement from the known to the new, or unknown. This thesis views 
disruption as an inevitable agent of change and sees change as playing an 
important role in society.  
In recent work the concept of disruption is being used to explain 
organizational change and innovation. Undoubtedly the most popular use of 
the term disruptive technology has been presented by Christensen (1997) in 
his book The Innovator’s Dilemma. Christensen defines a disruptive technology 
as a new technological innovation (product or service) that will eventually 
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overturn the dominant technology in the market sector. While this 
description has been effective in bringing the concept of disruptive 
technologies into the more general debate of the role of technology it has 
also changed our concept of technology, since it limits our general view of 
disruptive technologies to being one of a less economically viable 
technology. The role of Christensen (1997) is therefore a double-edged 
sword since he brings the concept or term of technology as a disruptive 
force into our consciousness but he also manages to limit the discussion to a 
very specific concept. Christensen does this knowingly and openly and this 
is reflected in the sub-title, which refers to the failure of great firms. By 
taking this position Christensen affirms his position as being situated within 
the study of theories of industrial innovation (Christensen & Bower 1996, 
Foster 1986, Teece 1986, Utterback 1996, von Hippel 2005).  
Within the information systems (IS) field there has been a growing interest 
in the concept of disruptive technology which can in part be explained by 
the rapid changes in technology which have occurred in the IS discipline. 
Among those working to develop a theoretical framework of understanding 
for the concept of disruptive technology are Lyytinen and Rose (2003a, 
2003b).  One of their observations is that the traditional form of innovation 
has been developer driven (push) as opposed to market demand (pull). On 
the effect of this they write: 
While theories that lean solely on push-side explanations are simplified versions 
of technological determinism, IS research to date has been flawed in terms of 
being dominantly engaged with the pull-side analysis. This has lead IS researchers 
to largely neglect the importance of push-side forces in continued IS innovation 
and in understanding waves of IS innovation. (Lyytinen & Rose 2003a, p 308). 
The goal of Lyytinen and Rose is to build a theoretical framework to help 
understand the idea of disruptive IT innovation. Their view of the 
disruptive effect is like an “earthquake” (Lyytinen & Rose 2003a), which 
strikes with little warning and cannot be ignored. The long-term effects are 
radical and force those affected to alter their lives. To Lyytinen and Rose 
(2003a) the effects of disruptive technology are both radical and pervasive. 
In this way they are comparable to the paradigm shifts as described by 
Kuhn (1962). 
Disruptive technology is a difficult concept. It is something that occurs and 
re-occurs. The technological infrastructural base in society does not remain 
the same and one of the important aspects of this change is that society 
must be aware that it takes place. This awareness is not always pleasant. 
Kontio (2004) posits in his work that through an adaptation of the theories 
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of Lyytinen and Rose a model can be built to understand the internal 
organizational effects of a technology. Once this is done the company has a 
choice of whether to adopt the technology or not depending upon the 
effects. To a degree Kontio may be right but it is important to understand 
that due to the complexity involved, any understanding the future effects of 
a technology is illusory. The idea that a disruptive technology can be chosen 
or rejected is to fail to understand the nature of disruptive technology. 
Lyytinen & Rose (2003b) offer this definition: 
We define a disruptive IT innovation as a necessary but not sufficient 
architectural innovation originating in the IT base that radically and pervasively 
impacts systems development processes and services. To avoid technological 
determinism we use the terms necessary and not sufficient in the definition to 
clarify the conditions under which specific changes in the technology base can 
become disruptive. (Lyytinen & Rose 2003b, p 563). 
Certain elements of a technological change can be more or less disruptive. 
The level of disruption may effect to a greater or lesser degree different 
areas in society (organizations, academic disciplines etc). However within 
the IS discipline disruption is described as an occurrence which can be said 
to occur “...when a constellation of linear growths in computing 
capability…eventually overwhelm current computing metaphors.” (Lyytinen 
& Rose 2003a, p 310). That which is overwhelmed is the metaphor4 with 
which we understand the discipline; it is in other words the overwhelming 
of our understanding of our surroundings and basis of knowledge.  
Therefore the idea of disruptive technology that can be drawn from these 
sources adequately matches the use of the terminology in this work. The 
metaphor of the earthquake is dramatic, and yet poignant in the sense that 
everything changes for those who are involved. The innovative effects of 
Internet technology since the mid 1990s have created a technology of 
disruption and its effects are being felt in the whole digitalized world. 
As previously stated, the purpose of this work is to study how the attempts 
to regulate disruptive technology affect Internet-based participatory 
democracy. This work will expand upon the concept of disruptive 
technology by exemplifying the manner in which such technology drive 
subtle but important social change in the manner of the earthquake 
metaphor. This is to say that the effects of technical change and its 
                                                           
4 Lakoff and Johnsson (1980) have eloquently shown the importance of metaphors as 
going beyond mere language tropes and being the basis of our knowledge and 
understanding of the world. 
INTRODUCTION 
 
11
regulation tend to disrupt the, previously established, social norms that 
make large parts of our democratic social interaction.  
This work studies the social interaction which takes place via Internet 
technologies. These technologies are, as we shall see, viewed positively as 
being potentially valuable for the participatory democracy. The basic, or 
simplified, discourse concerning the technology in relation to democracy 
claims that the potential for increased interaction provides a greater level of 
democratic participation.  However, as this thesis will show, occasions of 
overregulation occur when attempts to regulate the abuses are made.  
Besides the practical applications of disruptive technology as a critical lens 
upon social change and its regulation this work will contribute both to the 
understanding of the term, its implementation and its development in the 
field of IS theory. These goals are achieved by the case studies and their 
analysis collected in this work. 
Information Technology and Democracy 
All forms of government depend ultimately upon their legitimacy among the 
population they are set to rule (Dahl 1989, Harrison 1993, Pateman 1970, 
Sartori 1987). Democracy depends upon a high level of acceptance among 
the population since democracy is the rule of the people. In real terms today 
this means that democracy is a form of government where policies are 
directly or indirectly decided upon by the will of the majority of the 
population. Besides being a form of government the concept is in itself an 
ideology and the choice of democracy or the comparison between states on 
the level of democracy and democratization is political (Dahl 1989, Harrison 
1993). The origins of the democracy lie in the form of government practiced 
by the Athenians in the fifth century BCE where the process of direct 
democracy was called demokratia or rule of the people. This Athenian 
practice gave Athenians the right (and duty) to participate5 in the processes 
of the state (this included, but was not limited to legislation, judicial activity 
and foreign policy). This participation was direct and therefore not through 
representatives. The understanding of democracy we have today is based 
upon interpretation of Athenian democracy and the subsequent 
developments (theoretical and practical) that have taken place largely in the 
18th century (Dahl 1989, Harrison 1993, Sartori 1987). 
                                                           
5 Since participation was limited to free (non-slave), adult males, whose both parents 
were Athenian born, political participation remained in the hands of a minority (Harrison 
1993).    
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According to Mill (1965 [1848]) in an efficient democracy it is not enough 
for the government to be structured democratically but even large parts of 
the social system must be similarly organized for democracy to be effective.  
A democratic constitution, not supported by democratic institutions in detail, but 
confined to the central government, not only is not political freedom, but often 
creates a spirit precisely the reverse. (Mill 1965 [1848], p 944). 
One method of achieving this goal is to attempt to a large degree create a 
participatory democracy. The goal of participatory democracy is to go 
beyond universal suffrage, the right to select leaders and influence the state. 
Its goal is to achieve a self-managing society. The goal of participatory 
democratic theory includes maximum input (participation) from the public. 
The result of this participation is not limited to policies (decisions) but also 
the development of the social and political capacities of the individuals 
involved in the process (Pateman 1970).  
Participatory democratic theory takes its starting point from two important 
assumptions. Firstly that people are capable of understanding, expressing 
and finding solutions for their problems. Secondly, effective solutions 
require the participation of the people who will be affected by them, without 
necessarily being dependent on authorities and experts (Oppenheimer 
1971). Participation can be given many meanings. In the context of 
participatory democratic theory, participation refers to the normative 
process of shared decision-making and governance between government 
(decision-makers) and citizens (Dahl et al 2003). Cook and Morgan (1971) 
observe that participatory democracy implies two broad features in patterns 
of decision-making: (i) decentralization or dispersion of authoritative 
decision-making whereby authority to make certain decisions is displaced 
such that authority is brought closer to those affected by it, and (ii) direct 
involvement of amateurs in the making of decisions. They clarify that 
amateurs in this setting are individuals who do not carry credentials as 
formally trained experts; they are laymen and not professional participants 
(Cook & Morgan 1971). 
It is important to recognize that in-group decision-making a social “ranking” 
is formed within the groups where non-experts tend to defer to experts 
even in questions concerning topics where the experts are not expert. (Beck 
1992, O’Neil Lane 2005). This form of referral to experts is also visible in a 
participatory democracy where experts (often assumed to be society’s 
scientific and technical elites) play an increasingly influential role in the 
decision-making process (Fiorino 1990). Expert perceptions of technical 
problems (such as the potential for risk associated with a human subjects 
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research protocol) are judged to be more rational than the “subjective” 
perceptions of the less technically sophisticated public (Fiorino 1990).  
An underlying assumption of participatory democratic theory is that citizens 
are not isolated beings, and that social organizations play an important 
“educative” role in teaching them how to interact and work together and 
how to act socially as well as politically. Citizens are socialized to learn 
democratic norms by participation in social groups, workplaces, and other 
forums (Coke Ellington 2004, Pateman 1970). Therefore the right to 
participate in the democracy brings with it several advantages. Rosenbaum 
(1978) goes so far as to argue that public participation is necessary for 
democratic functionality through its role in ensuring political equality and 
popular sovereignty. Others argue that the importance of participation lies 
in the knowledge that such participation is a requirement to uncover the 
public will (Dienel 1989, Gauthier 1986). Participation is also an important 
factor in ensuring that the citizens have a possibility to protect their interests 
and influence the outcome of decisions and policy (Rosenbaum 1978, Van 
Valey & Petersen 1987) In addition to this, participation plays an important 
role in the enhancement and development of personal and social life 
(Daneke et al 1983, Rosenbaum 1978). 
One of the major stumbling blocks for developing a larger participation in 
the democratic process has been one of logistics (Dahl 1989, Pateman 
1970). The communications required for large-scale participation have not 
been in place and therefore the present day processes of democracy can be 
seen as a compromise between theory and technological limitations. The 
technological limitations have been the difficulties in building a public 
sphere were two-way communication can take place (Castells 1996, Dahl 
1989, Pateman 1970). Habermas’ (1989) concept of the public sphere was to 
allow the participants (citizens) to discover the general will or common 
interest. The society that supports such a public sphere will require of its 
citizens to participate in it. The purpose of this participation is both to 
enable the uncovering of the general will and the civic education of the 
citizens (Barber 1984). This approach to government, therefore, does not 
solely concern itself with resource allocation but is also concerned with the 
uncovering, communicating and addressing the interests of the public 
(Barber 1984). In order to activate the citizen to participate to such a degree 
the institutions must be designed to facilitate individual autonomy and 
participation in the common cause (Barber 1984, Habermas 1989).  
The role of user participation has a long-standing tradition within 
Scandinavian information systems development (Bjerknes et al 1987) at an 
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early stage technology was understood to be important in the role of 
empowering the worker. Workplace development projects such as the 
UTOPIA project (Ehn 1989) were early examples of the belief of the 
potential empowerment inherent in technology. While the goal of the 
UTOPIA project was the democratic organization of work (Bjerknes & 
Bratteteig 1995), the dissemination of technology within society was to 
change the way in which our democratic participation was undertaken. The 
basic concept can be simplified with the idea: Once the infrastructure of 
empowerment is in place the users will use it (Norris & Curtice 2004). 
It is important to be clear that the Internet is not an inherently democratic 
technology. Technology itself is neutral and therefore can be used both for 
democratic and non-democratic purposes. The desire to equate 
communications technology with democracy is not unique to the Internet 
(Winner 2005). Many communications technologies have been celebrated as 
being democratic but it is important to remember that communication alone 
is not enough of a base for a democracy. Winner (1986) writes:   
But democracy is not founded solely (or even primarily) upon conditions that 
effect the availability of information. What distinguishes it from other political 
forms is a recognition that the people as a whole are capable of self government 
and they have a rightful claim to rule. As a consequence, political society ought to 
build institutions that allow or even encourage a great latitude of democratic 
participation. How far a society must go in making political authority and public 
roles available to ordinary people is a matter of dispute among political theorists. 
But no serious student of the question would give much credence to the idea that 
creating a universal gridwork to spread electronic information is, by itself, a 
democratizing step. (Winner 1986, p. 110). 
From the mid 1990s the diffusion of Internet technology has presented the 
technological infrastructure necessary to conduct experiments with cost-
efficient large-scale participatory democratic projects. The study of such 
systems has grown in parallel with the technology. Grönlund (1994) 
presents his study of public computer systems were he blends traditional 
arguments from Rousseau and Mill and contemporary sources such as 
Pateman and argues for traditional participatory democracy supported by 
computer and network technology. His arguments concern public computer 
systems, which he defines as systems designed to act as an interface between 
organizations and their clients. Grönlund (1994) recognizes that such 
systems are more than simply technological innovations but must also be 
seen as being valuable components in the communicative process between 
the organization and the client. Grönlund’s systems impact upon what he 
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defines as the societal dialogue. He notices that this is particularly true of 
public agencies.  
Grönlund was early in Swedish academia in pointing out that public 
computer systems would play an important role in public dialogue and that 
this use would also change the way in which this dialogue would be 
conducted. This change would not only be based upon technical change but 
would also involve social and organizational changes. These changes in 
communication will also place demands on the designers of the computer 
systems that mediate the communication to ensure that democratic 
participation is supported (Grönlund 1994).  
For the Internet the year 1994 may be considered to be early. This is not so 
much in relation to the technological maturity but rather in relation to the 
technological dissemination in society. Up until this point the results of 
studies of the democratic effects of Internet technology could only be 
representative of a limited number of users and these users should be 
considered to be early adopters of technology. Such constraints limit the 
universality of the results of the democratic effects being studied. The 
technological roots of Internet stretch back to the ARPANET project 
launched in the 1960s. It gained popular appeal in 1991 with the 
development of the World Wide Web (WWW) application and the opening 
of the Internet for commercial purpose in 1994/1995 (Castells 1996). 
Therefore discussions on the social impact of this technology prior to 1995 
can be considered to be early studies.  
These technical developments led many to predict positive or negative 
impacts on democracy. Up until the mid 1990s the work was mainly positive 
techno-optimism as the authors presented little grounds for their stance, the 
position towards the impacts of technology on democracy during the later 
half of the 1990s was that it would have little effect or that it may even 
cause harm to democracy (DiMaggio et al 2001). In a review of the literature 
of the time Bimber (1998) writes that there are two positions being taken (i) 
populistic predictions about the empowerment of technology, and (ii) 
proposals for improving the community building role of technology.  
Bimber (1998) argues that neither position had an objective basis for the 
views they put forward. In an effort to revisit this study Johnsson and 
Bimber (2004) are more optimistic towards the ability of technology to 
empower citizens and user groups. While they do not see Internet 
technology as revolutionizing politics they do maintain that it has the effect 
of reinforcing individual groups in fragmented, hyperpluralistic societies. 
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E-government and E-democracy 
There is a fundamental difference between electronic government and 
electronic democracy even if the terms have a substantial overlap. Electronic 
government is the ability of the state to achieve savings by automating 
decision-making processes, preferring online information and allowing 
certain forms of citizen-state communication to take new forms. An 
example of a technology that has been harnessed to facilitate the latter is the 
mobile telephone text messaging (SMS). In Sweden citizens who file simple 
tax returns can do so via SMS while in the UK experiments have been 
conducted in voting for local government elections via SMS (Norris 2004). 
Ciborra (2005) maintained that electronic government in practice entailed 
applying ICT to the transactions between state and citizen and re-defining 
the boundaries between state and market. Electronic democracy is not about 
streamlining or economizing the state by alternative forms of 
communication. It is about empowering the user in her ability to directly 
participate in the general democratic process (Kahn & Kellner 2004).  
Democracy supported by information technology has many names, the 
most common are “e-democracy”, “digital democracy”, “cyber democracy” 
and the curious term “virtual democracy”. These terms presuppose a 
positive connection between technology and democracy. Information 
technology is expected to have a positive effect on democracy by providing 
a greater degree of citizen insight and participation. This will be achieved by 
an expansion of the public sphere through the use of technology. This 
vision is also reflected in political manifestos, policy documents scientific 
texts and the public debate (Beckman 1995, Ilshammar 2002). Techno-
optimism is not a new feature. Ilshammar (2002) has shown that the gap 
between technology and rhetoric is not particular to Internet technology.  
In attempting to clarify the terminological confusion which sometimes 
seems to exist in this field the article by Chadwick and May (2003) have 
analysed the forms of interaction between state and citizen in the United 
States, Great Britain and the European Union and arrived at three models of 
interaction (managerial, consultative and participatory). According to 
Chadwick and May (2003) an e-government regime can be identified by a 
high level of “managerialism” which is the focus on the effectivisation and 
rationalization of government services (both within government and 
communication between citizens – government) through the 
implementation of ICT. This view focuses on the development and 
application of ICT services and the development of technology in society. 
The e-government approach also entails “… a general absence of user 
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resource issues, such as ability to receive and interpret information.” (p 272) 
Therefore the e-government, or “Managerial Model”, is the use of ICT to 
improve on previously existing technologies either by reducing transaction 
costs or increasing communications speed (Chadwick & May 2003). This e-
government model is a potentially dramatic shift in state – citizen 
interaction, however Chadwick and May (2003, p 273) point out: 
Though we argue that change is not likely to enhance democracy, even if taken 
on its own rather limited terms, it is still clear that the public sector is being 
altered by e-government innovations. 
The “Consultative Model” is, in contrast to the previous model, a pull 
technology where ICT is used to facilitate the communication of citizen 
opinions to the government. In this model the citizen’s opinions are seen as 
being the basis of a more informed public policy. The infrastructure 
provided by ICT creates the possibility of citizen involvement in 
government policy beyond the established voting system where 
representatives are chosen.  
Chadwick and May’s (2003) third model is the participatory model. This 
model goes beyond the “vertical flows of state-citizen communication” (p 
280) and provides based upon “…complex, horizontal, and multidirectional 
interactivity” (p 280). This model accepts that, while states are heavily 
involved in facilitating political discussion and interaction they are not alone 
in this role. There are many other organizations with a role in political 
interaction within a civil society.    
For the purpose of this work the term e-democracy will refer to the process 
of democratic communication between stakeholders (e.g. citizens, 
government bodies, NGOs, corporations) for the purpose of participating 
in society. The term e-government will refer to the use of technology by 
government to make governmental communication (whether inter-
departmental or government-citizen) more efficient. This division between 
e-government and e-democracy is reflected in government policies (as 
discussed below) and European Union information technology initiatives. 
The eEurope 2002 Action Plan (eEurope 2000) was geared at creating a 
larger degree of participation; its express goal was the “…participation for 
all in the knowledge based society” (p 18). A key objective in this goal was 
that the European Union should become the most competitive and dynamic 
knowledge-based economy with improved employment and social cohesion 
by 2010. The plan focuses on areas such as cheaper Internet access, e-
commerce, e-services, online government and intelligent transportation. 
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Though very little is said of actual IT-based participatory democracy 
(Anttiroiko 2001). 
To put it bluntly, the EU refers to “access” as critical mass, “participation” to 
consumption processes, “dialogue” to opportunity to make inquiries via Internet, 
and “transparency” to official documents available in e-format on the Internet. 
This suggests how eEurope and the entire Union deal with democracy. The 
techno-economic message is usually surprisingly explicit, though sometimes it is 
bundled with expressions suggestive of genuine democracy and participation. 
(Anttiroiko 2001, p 34). 
These goals have been reiterated in the eEurope 2005 action plan (eEurope 
2002) “An information society for all” which stated among other things that 
access to public information implies addressing the specific requirements of 
“people with special needs, such as persons with disabilities or the elderly” 
(p 11). These European Union goals are also reflected in the Swedish 
national goals presented in the Proposition 1999/2000:86 entitled “Ett 
informationssamhälle för alla” (An information society for all) (Proposition 
1999). While there is a focus on user competence the main thrust of these 
governmental documents focus on the development of a robust information 
infrastructure. The goal of achieving participatory democracy is translated 
into the development of technological infrastructure.   
The new millennium brought with it a certain amount of disenchantment 
since the differences between the promises and the realities of information 
technology supported democracy were becoming clearer (DiMaggio et al 
2001). A governmental investigation could state that information technology 
democracy projects thus far had been focused upon increasing information 
supply. Projects aimed at supporting active participation and influence in 
democratic processes are few and far between and have thus far have had 
limited content. Many of the democratic projects also lacked a long-term 
concerted effort aimed at increasing democracy (Demokratiutredningen 
2000). The report goes on to state that while there is a great deal of interest 
in technology and democracy in Sweden, the projects, which have been 
conducted, have neither problematised between conflicting democracy 
ideals nor analyzed the results (Demokratiutredningen 2000). The report 
continues by warning that all too routine uses of information technology 
will not provide for an increased participation in the democratic process. 
The report recommends the development of information technology so that 
it is developed into a tool for democracy and not remain a routine tool of 
governmental organization (Demokratiutredningen 2000).   
The stated goal is to achieve a participatory democracy. This goal regularly 
loses something in implementation, where it becomes the creation of 
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electronic government, or the transfer of organizational forms and 
technology into the process of public administration. The general view 
seems to be one where this transfer will not require policy changes or a 
more fundamental approach to participation in society. Most experiments in 
digital participation have arrived at the realization that it is a complex affair 
requiring many competencies and financial support (Ranerup 1999, 2001). 
Since this work is more interested in what it defines as the participatory 
democracy as opposed to the processes of electronic government it is 
important to understand the role of technology in the participatory 
democracy. While some scholars argue that the presence of Internet 
technology is enough to motivate the user to become politically active 
(Norris 2001, 2004) others argue that the technology alone will not create 
the politically active user (Bimber 2001). This thesis argues neither view. 
The argument in this thesis concerns the way in which the use of technology 
is affected by the regulation of technology and therefore the argument of 
whether technology creates participation or not falls outside the scope of 
this work at the same time it is important to recognize that this is a closely 
related topic to thesis. Additionally many e-democracy theorists focus 
relationship the individual and the state or conceptions of deliberative 
democracy (Noveck 2005) in doing so they forget about the needs of the 
users or groups of users who are actively using the technology to participate 
with each other in IT-based participatory democracy.  
Therefore if studying the amount of technology available to the users tells 
us very little about the state of IT-based participatory democracy, then what 
shall one study? Watson and Mundy (2001) suggest that the implementation 
of e-democracy requires a careful plan. This stance is re-iterated by 
Grönlund et al (2003) who argue that the way ahead in developing a viable 
democracy where active participation is supported by technology depends 
upon development in two main strategies. The first strategy concerns the 
need for an overall governmental approach to IT democracy. This involves 
a change where separate governmental offices taking decisions based upon 
economic incentives cannot define the development of IT democracy. The 
second strategy involves a concerted effort in the development of 
technology to enable participation in democratic processes and decisions. It 
must be stressed (Grönlund et al 2003) that simply choosing one of these 
two strategies is insufficient in that it will not move the situation forward 
towards the desired goal.  
While not wanting to enter into a nominalist debate there is a need to 
additionally clarify the position of this thesis towards that which is being 
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studied. The object being studied is the IT-based participatory democracy 
this should be understood as the use of ICT for democratic processes such 
as for deliberative and participatory aims. Implementations of e-democracy 
projects include virtual town hall meetings or citizen consultations and the 
use of discussion boards on party websites and in municipalities (Chadwick 
& May 2003). Rather than study the democratic effects of a particular 
organized technology in this manner this thesis chooses to arrange the work 
around six core democratic values, namely: Participation, Communication, 
Integrity, Property, Access and Autonomy. 
Central to the understanding of the nature of the IT-based participatory 
democracy is its interconnectedness. This entails that when something 
occurs in one part of the IT-based participatory democracy it can potentially 
become an experience shared by all. The novelty with this level of 
interconnectedness is that conventional methods of control by isolating the 
problem are no longer available (Kallinikos 2005). This is not to say that all 
events will affect all users equally but rather that the potential of containing 
problems to certain geographic areas, ICT artefacts, user groups, ethnic 
groups etc is shrinking. Another view of the issue of interconnectedness 
(Kallinikos 2005) is the largely conceptual inability to separate technical and 
ideological choices carried out in situations that typically have been 
understood to be design choices. Therefore technical design choices should 
not be seen as being solely technical in nature since they have real 
repercussions on the implementation and experience of the IT-based 
participatory democracy.  
The focus in this work is on the use of Internet as an integral part of the 
creation of an IT-based participatory democracy. As examples in this work 
will show, the use of the Internet in supporting this goal challenges 
established conventions and therefore the technology becomes a disruptive 
force. One reaction demonstrated in this thesis is the impulse to control this 
disruption by attempting to regulate it. However, as this work will show, this 
regulation often results in the suppressing of applications of technology that 
would have been beneficial and fundamental to the participatory democracy.  
Thesis Structure 
This section brings the introduction of this work to a close. With the next 
section, the theory, the main work of this thesis begins by explaining both 
the theoretical foundations and starting point of this work. This section is 
followed by an overview of the fundamental methodology applied during 
the course of this thesis. The purpose of this has been to bring forward the 
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case studies, which are both the empirical foundations of this work and the 
practical examinations of theory in practice.  
The case studies, which are the main empirical foundation of the entire 
research project presented here, have been carried out between 1999-2005. 
The main bulk of the results have been published in academic journals 
during 2003-2005. These articles have been substantially reworked to 
become the chapters of this book.   
Core Democratic Value Published 
Participation 
(Expanded in Case 1) 
Klang, M. (2004) “Civil Disobedience Online”, Journal of Information, 
Communication & Ethics in Society, Volume 2: Issue 2: Paper 2, Troubador 
Publishing. 
Communication 
(Expanded in Case 2) 
Klang, M. (2003) “A Critical Look at the Regulation of Computer Viruses” 
International Journal of Law and Information Technology, Vol 11 No 2, 
Oxford University Press. 
Integrity 
(Expanded in Case 3) 
Klang, M. (2004) “Spyware – the ethics of covert software”, Ethics and 
Information Technology, Issue 3, September 2004 pp. 193-202, Kluwer.  
Property 
(Expanded in Case 4) 
Klang, M. (2004) “Avatar: From Deity to Corporate Property”, Information, 
Communication & Society, Volume 7, Number 3 pp 389- 402, Routledge. 
Access 
(Expanded in Case 5) 
Klang, M. (2005) Free Software & Open Source: The Freedom Debate and its 
Consequences, First Monday, volume 10, number 3 (March 2005) 
Autonomy 
(Expanded in Case 6) 
Klang, M. (2006) “Virtual Censorship: Controlling the Public Sphere”, IFIP-
TC9 HCC7 Social Informatics: An Information Society for All?, Nova Gorica 
(Slovenia), Gorizia (Italy), September 21-23. 
Table 1: Previously Published Studies 
To be able to draw wider conclusions from the individual cases, which are 
represented in the empirical work, the main theoretical foundations will be 
applied and discussed in relation to the specific results of each of the cases. 
This analysis will provide the material from which conclusions can be drawn 
about the effects of the regulation of disruptive technology and its 
unintended democratic side effects. This analytic section will provide the 
material from which the implications of the regulation of disruptive 
technology can be drawn. This work will then be summarized with a focus 
on the salient details in the final section of this thesis, which will present the 
reader with the conclusions of this project. 
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2 
Theory 
Pray for the welfare of the government, since if not for the fear of it, a person would 
swallow his fellow man alive.  
Rabbi Chanina 
 
This section will provide an overview of theories of structuration, regulation 
and technology regulation. The choice of structuration theory is intended to 
provide a context within which regulatory activity takes place. It is also 
meant to provide the reader with the image that the researcher views the 
actions and reactions between the regulator and the regulated as a constant 
discussion and movement between the structure (represented by the 
regulator) and the actor (represented by the regulated). However it is 
important that this is understood as an image, a metaphor, a simplification. 
The actor is not passively regulated and nor is the structure behaving 
autonomously. The actors form and define the structure in the same way as 
the regulated create the regulator. Without the regulated there could be no 
regulator. Structuration theory is used in this work as an analytical tool. This 
work does not intend to primarily contribute to the development of 
structuration theory. The primary contribution of this work is towards the e-
democracy field and to the discussions and development of technology 
regulation and the implications of disruptive technology.   
The view, stated above, that there could be no regulator without the 
regulated reveals the researchers position on regulation. The simple 
command and control structure posited by the early regulatory theorists is 
too much of a simplification to be able to provide academic research with a 
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meaningful basis from which to develop our understanding. The position of 
this work is that regulation is every force or external controls exerted upon 
those to be regulated (Fuller 1964). Therefore regulation can be state or 
non-state, intended or unintended, legal or economic and so on. 
The purpose of this thesis is to look at and understand the democratic 
effects of the regulation of Internet-based activity. The regulation of 
Internet-based activity and technology is rapidly becoming a case of 
overregulation (Benkler 2006, Lessig 1999, Reidenberg 1998). In other 
words the regulation which is implemented tends to not only regulate 
undesirable behaviour but regularly criminalises or frustrates many types of 
behaviour which, from a democratic point of view, are legitimate. To be 
able to meaningfully discuss this issue we must first come to understand 
what regulation is and how it is carried out. To arrive at an understanding of 
these issues we must therefore carry out a theoretical exploration of the role 
of regulation within society. Therefore, this section begins by showing the 
role of structuration theory in forming the way in which individuals interact 
with the structures that surround them prior to looking at theories on 
regulation, from the classical to present day regulatory theory. This brief 
look at the theory of regulation will be concluded with the theories 
employed in the regulation of the Internet.  
The main ideas in the theory of structuration have been developed by 
Anthony Giddens (most pointedly in 1984). The theory in itself is not a 
specific information systems (IS) theory but rather a general theory of social 
organization. The theory has been widely and successfully adapted and used 
within the IS field (DeSanctis & Poole 1994, Orlikowski 2000). The theory 
of structuration is mainly an attempt to reconcile a theoretical dichotomy of 
social systems that views the individual either as being acted upon or as an 
autonomous agent. It is an attempt therefore to combine the objective 
understanding of society as an objectively definable structure and the 
objective viewpoint of the autonomous actor. This is done not by seeing 
these two views as conflicting but rather as two halves of a duality both 
effecting and being effected by each other. Therefore adopting the theory of 
structuration involved taking a balanced position and attempting to treat 
structure and agency equally.  
Structuration is a theory of social organization that explains change and 
stability in a social system over time. Since the theory originally presented by 
Giddens does not deal with power relationships it does not show in detail 
how technology regulates us – it has been necessary to apply the theory in 
manner beyond its original form.  
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Structuration theory has been further developed and adapted in research 
fields such as the IS research field. The approach of IS scholars has been to 
argue that structuration provide an analytical tool needed to explain 
regulation (Monteiro & Hanseth 1995) while focusing on and theorizing the 
IT artefact (Orlikowski & Iacono 2001). The advantage to structuration is 
that it moves beyond technological determinism and social constructivism. 
This adapted IS structuration theory argues that an individual’s actions are 
neither determined by technology, nor are they capable of constructing 
technology. Technology constrains and enables individual action while also 
being a product of individual action. Technology is developed and also 
affects our activities. Structuration theory recognizes that individuals design 
technologies that enable action – these same technologies also constrain 
action.  
The structure of which the theory speaks consists of the “Rule-resource 
sets, implicated in institutional articulation of social systems” (Giddens 
1984, p 377). Giddens envisioned the structures as being virtual or “memory 
traces” rather than physical representations social agreements. In a 
development of Giddens’ theories (Orlikowski 1992, Orlikowski & Robey 
1991) adaptations to the theory have been made in order to encompass 
more than these memory traces by studying the role of technology in social 
interaction. In so doing the theory becomes “…well-suited for the 
understanding of information technology and its interaction with 
organizations (Orlikowski & Robey 1991, p 164).   
In line with these adaptations to structuration theory the structure becomes 
many of the normative elements within a society. These normative elements 
can be clear rules or laws. They may be physical barriers such as walls, 
bollards or doors however they may also consist of more virtual norms such 
as social rules which we adhere to as a group. It is however important to 
note that these structures are fixed over periods of time and can be 
identified outside the individual actor. These normative elements are part of 
Giddens (1984) duality of structure in that they are both created by human 
action and regulate future action.    
Within these structures we find reflexive social actors monitoring, evolving 
understandings of and adapting to structural conditions. Despite this 
evolution, actors tend to develop routines, which provide a sense of 
continuity and security and an ability to plan and carry our social activities. 
Giddens (1984) maintains that the actors have the power with which to 
shape their own actions however the complexity of social interaction makes 
it difficult to predict unintended consequences.  
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The flow of action continually produces consequences which are unintended by 
actors, and these unintended consequences also may form unacknowledged 
conditions of actions in a feedback fashion. Human history is created by 
intentional activities but is not an intended project; it persistently eludes efforts to 
bring it under conscious direction. (Giddens 1984, p 27).  
The duality pointed out by Giddens (1984) is that the structures are created 
by actors and the structures are what give similar social practices a 
systematic form. Once in place the structure constrains the actors, Giddens 
(1984) downplays the limiting power of structural constraints and points to 
both the fact that structures are actor-controlled and that the structures also 
may enable actors to carry out practices, which they otherwise would be 
unable to do. This therefore is what is known as the duality of structure and 
agency. There can be no agency without structures and yet there can be no 
structures without the agents which create them.  
In this thesis the theory of structuration launched by Giddens (1984) and 
later developed and adapted (DeSanctis & Poole 1994, Orlikowski 1992, 
Orlikowski 2000, Orlikowski & Robey 1991) is used as an outer framework 
with which to study the role of power within social systems.  
This adapted structuration theory understands that technology enables, 
forms and limits the actors’ choices and actions. This should not be seen as 
a one-way relationship. It is the actors themselves who constitute the 
structures. The particular focus of the thesis will be the way in which the 
regulatory bodies use their power to regulate technology use. In addition to 
this the studies within this thesis will also look at how Internet technology is 
used to augment communicative interaction. The focus on regulation is 
important since it shows the way in which the formalized structures of law 
and regulation are adapted to the change in human behaviour vis-à-vis new 
technology. The enabling aspect of the new technology shows actor 
empowerment, which creates and invigorates interaction between human 
actors. The actions of the regulator contain a well-defined pattern of 
problem identification, analysis and attempts to control actors’ behaviour 
through changes in legislation.  
The reaction of the regulator towards the new forms of interaction among 
human actors which is provided by technology is particularly interesting 
since the behaviour clearly shows attempts by the legislative body to control 
what is, de facto, an increasingly difficult situation to control. The 
difficulties of control, however, do not deter the states from exercising the 
control mechanisms they maintain. Giddens (1984) felt that the study of 
power should not be carried out half-heartedly. He writes that the study of 
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“Power cannot be tacked on, as it were, after the more basic concepts of 
social science have been formulated. There is no more elemental concept 
than that of power.” Giddens (1984, p 283) did not mean that the study of 
power was more important than other social considerations however it 
should not be given a secondary position within an analysis.  
This thesis looks at the regulators use of power through the regulatory 
structures. The study of the creation and adaptation of regulation shows the 
interaction within structures and between structures and actors. The 
reactions towards regulation shows the human actors desire to adapt and 
negotiate the new social orders being created. This creation is the expression 
of power, it is the way in which the state attempts to achieve goals and, in 
the best scenario, guide society toward certain well-defined goals.  
Despite its forceful role power is not “inherently divisive” however due to 
the way in which power is divided in society there will naturally be decisions 
and actions by the regulator that are inherently forceful in the way in which 
they define and sanction actions of groups within society. These can be seen 
as social power struggles were groups act in ways to either mitigate the 
negative effects of regulation or attempt to create a strong enough 
powerbase from where unwanted regulation (in other words undesirable 
structures) may be altered. A focus in this thesis will therefore be on the 
modalities of control between actors-actors and actors-structures in society. 
Regulation 
The concept of regulation may currently be narrowed down to three 
accepted theories or descriptions of the phenomenon (Baldwin et al 1998). 
These are presented in the current literature of the field as (i) regulation is 
the presentation of rules and their subsequent enforcement usually by the 
state, (ii) regulation is any form of state intervention in the economic activity 
of social actors, and (iii) regulation is any form of social control whether 
initiated by a central actor such as the state or not. This latter description 
includes all forms of acts whether they are intended to be regulatory or not.  
Often discussions on regulation will bring together both formal procedural 
methods of regulation and include them together with strategies of 
regulation (cf. Braithwaite & Drahos 2000). This approach tends to be more 
pragmatic to its nature but has the difficulty in that the more complexity it 
involves in presenting a true representation of regulation in a given time and 
place the less likely any such representation can be considered to be useful 
as generalisable theory to be applied anywhere outside the specific arena.  
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The modern regulatory debate begins with the work of John Austin, in 
particular The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (1998 [1832]), which is an 
attempt to free the concept of law from the precepts of religion and 
morality. He does this by taking an analytical approach to the law (as 
opposed to, for example, historical or sociological). Austin’s project was an 
attempt to define law in a morally neutral descriptive manner. This approach 
to law enabled Austin to present the foundations of what has become the 
command (and control) theory of law.  
Law was basically, according to Austin, a command issued by a sovereign. 
Austin makes the focus of regulation an expression of desire from the 
sovereign backed up by a credible threat, or use, of force. Therefore 
regulation becomes the command and control structure. The sovereign 
issues commands (expresses desires) and the subjects must obey if they are 
not to be subjected to the control mechanisms available to the sovereign.  
As Austin was concerned with removing value judgments from the concept 
of regulation he does not attempt to discuss the sovereign or the legitimacy 
of the sovereigns use of force. For Austin the sovereign was an individual or 
an entity with control over a geographical space and the people within that 
territory. Austin makes one qualification in that the sovereign is the 
“unobeying obeyed”, this refers to the fact that the sovereign is supreme 
and has no superiors that command him/her/them. Aside from this 
qualification the sovereign need not be legitimized in any form, it is enough 
that the sovereign has the power to make credible threats. If the threat of 
punishment is convincing then the subjects will obey.  
Since Austin’s presentation of the command and control structure of 
regulation devoid of legitimacy, morality and the concept of good and bad 
regulation the discussion has been active. The main thrusts of these 
discussions have been fundamentally in agreement with each other and 
represent an incremental growth in our understanding of the process of 
regulation.  In The Concept of Law, Hart (1994) writes about the concept of 
regulation: 
In any large group general rules, standards and principles must be the main 
instrument of social control, and not particular directions given to each individual 
separately. If it were not possible to communicate general standards of conduct, 
which multitudes of individuals could understand, without further direction, as 
requiring from them certain conduct when occasion arose, nothing that we now 
recognize as law could exist. (p 124). 
Therefore Hart posits that the fundamental building blocks of any 
regulatory regime are the communicable rules, standards and principles in 
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society. This therefore entails a communication between the sovereign and 
the subjects. The focus of the discussion has become a question of how 
rules are to be made as to facilitate their understanding, enforcement and 
compliance. The main focus of this body of work has been on the concept 
associated with command and control regulation, which can be best described as a 
system of statutory rules backed by sanctions (Black 1997). The 
fundamental idea is to create regulation which is “compliance oriented” 
(Baldwin 1995) these rules would be designed in such a manner as to 
promote the ease in which they could be adhered to. However it must be 
understood that the creation of regulatory rules is a process of 
simplification. The rule must take a simplified understanding of reality to 
enable large groups of regulated subjects to fall within the scope of its 
purpose. The rule is not only by its nature a simplification of an existing 
understanding of reality it is also “hostage to future developments” (Black 
1997) which may utterly change the meaning and purpose of the rule. These 
latter problems become very obvious in times of rapid technological change 
when rules based upon one presupposition of technology are suddenly 
being applied to a new technological infrastructure with very different 
results.  
An example of this process can be seen in the Swedish data protection 
legislation prior to 1997. The Data Act (Datalagen) was introduced in 1973 
and required everyone who wished to store other people’s personal data to 
apply for permission from the Data Inspection Board (Datainspektionen). The 
Data Act was in force up until 1998. Technological advances between 1973-
1998 saw the advance not only of personal computers but also of mobile 
telephones. If the law were to be slavishly enforced every mobile telephone 
with an address book would have required advance permission from the 
Data Inspection Board. The regulation become unenforceable through the 
sheer development of technology since enforcement would have required an 
inordinate level of administration.  
Recently there has been a growth in the questioning of the straightforward 
command and control structure of regulation (Baldwin 1995, Black 1997, 
2002, Braithwaite & Drahos 2000, Ellickson 1991, Maher 2002). This has 
opened up the discussion to include a more decentred perspective of 
regulation that includes more than the established rules enforced by 
sanctions approach. Black (2002) identifies five core concepts: (i) 
complexity, (ii) fragmentation, (iii) interdependencies, (iv) ungovernability 
and (v) the rejection between a clear distinction between private and public.  
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Adopting a decentralized view of regulation takes into consideration the 
complexity of interactions between social actors and social structures. 
Admitting to complexity entails a recognition that everything cannot be 
understood and that social interaction between actors and between actors 
and structures is in a state of constant development. Black’s fragmentation 
refers to the fragmentation of control. In traditional regulatory theory the 
control element of command and control was taken for granted. However 
this is too great a simplification for the model to hold true. There exists a 
great knowledge and power asymmetry between the regulator and the 
regulated. The regulator cannot be knowledgeable in all fields and all things. 
The decentred approach therefore takes as its starting point that no one 
actor has the information necessary to resolve complex problems. This can 
be further problematised by the understanding that there can be no social 
objective knowledge since information is socially constructed (Berger & 
Luckman 1967). Within regulation this therefore means that social 
subgroups and systems such as law, administration or technology create 
their views of other systems through the distorting lens of their own reality. 
Therefore the information/knowledge understanding one subsystem (such 
as law) has of another subsystem (such as technology) is the result of what 
the former system (law) has created with their own tools, experience and 
knowledge (Teubner 1993).  
The multiplicity of subsystems also provides another vision of 
fragmentation and this is the fragmentation of power/knowledge (Foucault 
1980). Since there are many different subsystems that are unable to obtain 
the dominant truth, also unable to regulate and enforce alone (Foucault, 
1991) the subsystems then become interdependent upon each other.  
The realization that there is no one great system but rather a complex 
interaction of many subsystems leads to the inevitable conclusion of system 
of ungovernability (Foucault 1991). To be able to govern the regulator must 
obtain legitimacy and support from a large number of the subgroups within 
and without of the regulatory sphere. Upon understanding the interplay of 
dependencies between actors within and between subsystems there occurs 
what Black (2002) terms “the collapse of the public/private distinction”. 
This is a re-evaluating of the formal authority of government. The 
decentered view understands regulation as something that “happens”. Not 
dependant upon formal legal sanctions being in place. Black  (1997) 
describes the rule making process as: 
…contextual, stressing the significance of the market and political context, the 
institutional and legal structure, and of the dynamics of the system itself, its 
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history, the norms and perceptions of the regulators and their awareness of the 
potential uses of rules, and the stage that their system is at in its own evolution. 
These factors interact, shaping both each other and the rule making decision. The 
rule making process is characterized by a high degree of casual complexity, 
involving the interaction and confluence of these different factors. The influence 
of some may be constant and structural, others ephemeral; some may act as 
catalysts, reacting with another to exert a particular type of influence or pressure 
at a particular time; some may always dominate, others only at particular points. 
(Black 1997, p 215). 
Therefore regulation is the product of the complex, fragmented interactions 
and dependencies of many social subsystems. Naturally the legal, 
administrative, political subsystems play an important role in the production 
but they do not dominate the regulatory discourse. We should understand 
regulation not as a hierarchical process in the hands of one elite but rather 
the product of the interactions and the webs of influence of the many 
subsystems involved in the process (Black 2002, Braithwaite & Drahos 
2000, Rhodes 1997). 
Regulating Technology 
Technology has only recently become to be seen as a separate subset 
deserving specific regulatory norms. The large-scale discussion on the role 
of regulation of technology use can be seen to have developed from the 
widespread use of information technology in general and the Internet in 
particular.  
The early beginnings of the regulation of Internet-based activity began to 
form in the early 1990s. At the time the United States Secret Service was 
attempting to prevent the spread of the so-called E911 document. The latter 
was an illegally copied document that described how the emergency 911 
systems worked. The Secret Service executed a warrant against a game 
publisher called Steve Jackson Games, a suspected recipient of the E911 
document, and removed among other things, all their computer equipment. 
Once the computers were returned, Jackson’s employees realized that all of 
the electronic mail that had been stored on the company’s electronic bulletin 
board computer, where non-employee users had sent personal messages to 
one another, had been individually accessed and deleted. Jackson believed 
his rights as a publisher had been violated and the free speech and privacy 
rights of his users had been violated. Upon hearing what had happened a 
group of technologists, realizing the implications technology has on civil 
liberties, founded the Electronic Freedom Frontier in 1990 and represented 
Jackson in a lawsuit against the United States Secret Service. The Steve 
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Jackson Games case was important since for the first time a court held that 
electronic mail deserves at least as much protection as telephone calls 
(Sterling 1994).  
Events such as these were bringing the discussion of the regulation of 
Internet-based activity into focus. The groups defending civil liberties came 
to be known as cyberlibertarianists (Winner 1997) while an alternative 
school of thought, which has come to be known generally under the name 
of cyber-paternalists (Murray 2002). A basic foundation of the 
Cyberlibertarian understanding of technology is that the communications 
protocols and online social communities of networked information 
technology create a new form of politics. Based mainly in the belief that 
Internet technology blurs our understanding of place, the cyberlibertarians 
argue that with the disappearance of the locus of action the state no longer 
has the legitimacy to either command or control. This makes both 
established institutions of power, political influence or protest groups 
obsolete. The cyberlibertarian ideal is portrayed through early writings 
entitled Cyberspace and the American Dream: A Magna Carta for the Knowledge Age 
(Dyson et al 1994), A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace (Barlow 1996) 
and Birth of a Digital Nation (Katz 1997). In his declaration Barlow (1996) 
writes: 
Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and steel, I come 
from Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On behalf of the future, I ask you of 
the past to leave us alone. You are not welcome among us. You have no 
sovereignty where we gather…We are forming our own Social Contract. This 
governance will arise according to the conditions of our world, not yours. Our 
world is different. 
Both through their titles and their content these early documents attempt to 
establish the domain of Cyberspace as being beyond the control of 
traditional government. Additionally, by attempting to emulate and echo 
traditional, historical rights documents the authors attempt to connect to 
established praxis whereby the absolute state power is curtailed, thereby 
granting online activity special privileges.  
During this period it seemed that the information environment was 
heralding the decline and fall of the State. Removing territorial limitations to 
interaction between actors the technology challenged the states claim to 
legal use of force within its territorial boundaries. The lack of centralized 
control and ungovernability led many commentators to stress the 
importance of alternative private ordering schemes (Lessig 1999), and view 
the technology as a post-national state-of-being (Johnson & Post 1996). 
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The cyberlibertarian school combines an enthusiasm for electronically 
mediated forms of living with right wing libertarian ideas on freedom, 
society and markets. From a regulatory point of view, the cyberlibertarian 
position was originally set out by Johnson and Post (1996) in their seminal 
paper entitled Law and Borders - The Rise of Law in Cyberspace. The paper posits 
the cyberlibertarian contention that traditional state sovereignty, based as it 
is upon notions with physical borders cannot function in cyberspace. People 
move seamlessly from regulatory regime to another. In some cases this 
movement is not evident to the user.  
This ability to move allows individuals to choose the regulatory regime 
which best suits their requirements. A system of regulatory arbitrage 
(Froomkin 1997) quickly develops and is seen as proof for the 
cyberlibertarians, that cyberspace is inherently unregulable by established 
hierarchical control systems (Murray 2002). The only alternative system of 
regulation is a grassroots approach relying on the consensus of the users of 
these virtual spaces (Johnson & Post 1998). Therefore the cyberlibertarian 
approach is that regulators appearing in cyberspace will act as the agents for 
individual or group interests (Murray 2002). Regulators will therefore be 
unable to regulate against the will, and tacit consent, of the regulated since 
such regulation will entail the movement or exit to alternative regulatory 
regimes.  
This early libertarian position was not without its critics. Among these we 
find Langdon Winner, who criticizes the highly individualistic approach the 
cyberlibertarians take. Winner (1997) writes:  
In sum, my suggestion is not that we need a cyber-communitarian philosophy to 
counter the excesses of today’s cyberlibertarian obsessions. Instead is a 
recommendation to take complex communitarian concerns into account when 
faced with personal choices and social policies about technological innovation. 
Superficially appealing uses of new technology become much more problematic 
when regarded as seeds of evolving, long term practices. Such practices, we 
know, eventually become parts of consequential social relationships. Those 
relationships eventually solidify as lasting institutions. And, of course, such 
institutions are what provide much of the actual framework for how we live 
together. That suggests that even the most seemingly inconsequential 
applications and uses of innovations in networked computing be scrutinized and 
judged in the light of what could be important moral and political consequences.  
Another critic of the cyberlibertarian school was Joel Reidenberg (1996, 
1998) who introduced the concept of Lex Informatica. Reidenberg argues that 
policy-makers can resolve conflicting policy problems by understanding, 
recognizing and applying the theory of Lex Informatica. According to the 
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theory of Lex Informatica, technological capabilities and system design 
choices, as well as user preferences, impose overarching default rules on 
users of cyberspace technology. Reidenberg’s work on Lex Informatica was to 
have a strong influence on the future debate of technology regulation and 
the Cyber-Paternalist position.  
While cyberlibertarians such as Perrit (1998) argued for a revised position 
taking into consideration the growing criticism of the libertarian approach to 
online regulation. Perritt (1998) argued for a relativistic position where the 
effect of the Internet on the state depended very much upon the state in 
question. Liberal democracies, for example, would be improved by the 
Internet since the freedoms of the press and speech within these states 
would be enhanced. While autocratic states would be threatened by the 
technology since it provided an element of uncontrollability. This middle 
way approach was attacked from both sides. From the cyberlibertarians Post 
(1998, p 527) argued, “…Liberal theory itself contains a set of often 
unacknowledged normative premises that pose a deeper peril for the 
institution of statehood than Perritt suggests. These premises require us to 
ask not whether a world of Realist or Liberal states comports better with the 
new realities of the Internet, but rather how these new conditions affect our 
normative justifications for the existence of the state itself.” The Cyber-
paternalists quickly pointed out that, “there is no single monolithic concept 
of sovereignty to be threatened - we already live in a world of multiple, 
overlapping, contradictory and oftentimes intensely contested 
sovereignties.” (Aoki 1998, p 443). 
Eventually the cyberpaternalist view that would come to dominate this 
young discussion, mainly in the form of the book Code and Other Laws of 
Cyberspace by Lawrence Lessig (1999). In this work Lessig (1999) challenges 
the presumption that technology has created an inherently free environment 
will remain so if governments leave it alone. Lessig observes that cyberspace 
is susceptible to control by other means and the greatest threat is the control 
of the computer code that constitutes the environment.  
Therefore when cyberlibertarians argue that the design of the Internet leads 
to regulatory arbitrage and makes established hierarchical regulation 
impossible, Cyber-paternalists argue to the contrary. They argue that the 
design is a form of hierarchical regulatory control (Lessig 1999). The 
underlying code of Cyberspace, the software it requires and even the 
protocols constituting the network act as a constitution setting out the limits 
of behaviour. In his words, “Code is Law.” Instead of finding inherent 
freedoms in the technology the paternalist sees a multitude of regulatory 
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possibilities. The question is never “if” regulation is possible, but only 
“who” regulates and “how”? The lack of state regulation leads the 
cyberlibertarian to erroneously think that Cyberspace is unregulated and 
unregulatable. This is erroneous since this presupposes a very limited view 
of regulation as one of the established state control through command and 
control mechanisms. In response to the “who” question Lessig (1999) 
replies that since code is a form of regulation then the proprietors of code 
set regulatory standards. Software developers who control code play a 
central role in the regulation of the Internet. This is not a position of 
absolute power. Those developing and controlling the software are part of a 
wider network or regulators. This network is tentatively described by Aoki 
(1998), and includes a greater role for the private sector. This private/public 
hybrid model of regulation is now clearly being applied to Cyberspace.  
Recent legislation has however re-enforced the role of the state as a 
fundamental player. Legislation such as the USA PATRIOT Act (2001) and 
the Homeland Security Act (2002), the UK Antiterrorism Act (2001), and 
the Convention on Cybercrime, clearly mark the ability and intention of the 
state to take an active part in legislating the digital domain. The 
Cyberpaternalist writers are today claiming victory showing that the state has 
never left the arena of regulation. They show that the states ability to 
regulate today proves that the state was never in danger of becoming a 
secondary actor on the regulatory scene (Birnhack & Elkin-Koren 2003, 
Bowrey 2005). 
Lessig (1999) writes on the relationship between technology and law, 
particularly in relation to digital environments. Lessig observes that the there 
are four modalities of regulation: laws, norms, markets, and architecture. 
Simply stated, law regulates through the threat of punishment, norms 
regulate through the threat of social sanctions or exclusion, markets regulate 
through price-setting mechanisms and architecture may regulate by 
physically limiting behaviour. Each of these modalities works directly or 
indirectly in combinations to regulate behaviour. By introducing the four 
modalities Lessig recognizes that the changes in any of the modalities have 
an effect on the behaviour of the regulated. Therefore this must be 
understood to mean that changes to the architecture have a direct effect 
upon our behaviour. The importance of regulation through architecture has 
been previously recognized and implemented. For example speed bumps are 
used to regulate traffic flows or in a more ominous example: the use of low 
bridges to prevent buses to certain areas of cities, which increases the 
segregation between rich (car owners) and poor (dependant upon busses) 
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(Winner 1986). Architecture takes upon a whole new importance in 
cyberspace since the environment is highly susceptible to environmental 
change.  
Lessig’s (1999) four modalities of regulation (law, markets, norms and 
architecture) act as effective regulators since they all work in a way to 
constrain certain actions. Law constrains through the threat of punishment, 
markets use pricing and price related signals to constrain, norms constrain 
through social sanctions such as exclusion or ostracism and architecture 
uses physical constraints (such as a locked door).  
 
Figure 1: Lessig (1999) Modalities of Regulation   
These modalities of regulation may effectively explain systems of regulation 
both in the physical world and in Cyberspace. The labels used by Lessig to 
explain regulation have not gone without criticism (Murray & Scott 2001). 
Murray and Scott (2001) show that Lessig’s description needs further 
development to better understand the underlying elements, which generate 
the regulatory system.  
This development of the analysis provides a clearer descriptive framework for 
understanding how control is or can be achieved and opens up the possibility for 
identifying the wide range of control systems which appear as hybrids of two or 
more modalities of regulation. (Murray & Scott 2001, p 502). 
The advantage of the developed model is that it goes beyond the simpler 
command and control understanding of regulation and approaches method 
by which a more complex analysis can be made. The developments in the 
analysis model include the study of three functional dimensions: (i) 
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standard-setting, (ii) information gathering and (iii) behaviour modification 
involved in each of Lessig’s (1999) modalities.  
Elements of a 
Control System 
Hierarchical 
Control 
Community-
Based Control 
Competition-
Based Control 
Design-Based 
Control 
Standard Setting Law or Other 
Formalized 
Rules 
Social Norms Price/Quality 
Ratio  
Inbuilt design 
features and 
social and 
administrative 
control 
Information 
Gathering 
Monitoring (by 
agencies or third 
parties) 
Social 
Interaction 
Monitoring by 
dispersed buyers, 
clients etc 
Interaction of 
design features 
with 
environment 
Behaviour 
Modification 
Enforcement Social Sanctions 
(eg ostracism, 
disapproval) 
Aggregate of 
decisions by 
buyers, clients 
etc  
As for 
information 
gathering (self-
executing) 
Table 2: Elements of Control System (Murray & Scott 2001) 
Terms such as “Law” and “Norms” are far too over-inclusive. Both “Law” 
and “Norms” refer only to a standard or director and is therefore missing 
the other essential elements of a control system (Murray 2002). These two 
modalities of control should rather be referred to as  “hierarchical control” 
and “community-based controls” (Murray & Scott 2001). The remaining 
modalities are considered to be under-inclusive and should be re-labelled. 
Markets would be better entitled “competition-based control” while 
architecture should be referred to as “design-based” control (Murray & 
Scott 2001).  
This is not a simple re-labeling of terms but an attempt to create a theory 
that will encompass the largest range of regulatory strategies and 
instruments (Brownsword 2005). The analysis of regulation within this work 
is based upon the work of Murray and Scott (2001), which has since been 
further developed by Murray (2006). This choice is motivated by the latter’s 
more nuanced understanding of regulation and its effects. This 
understanding is critical when attempting to bring together multiple case 
studies to draw conclusions on the effects of the attempts to regulate 
disruptive technology on Internet-based participatory democracy. 
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Figure 2: Murray & Scott (2001) Modalities of Regulation 
The criticism of cyber-paternalism does not remain on the level of critiquing 
the labels used in the theory. Through the critique of the cyber-paternalists 
we can see the rise of the neo-cyberlibertarian school. The proponents of 
this idea (Murray 2006) are moving towards a more complex understanding 
of the role and nature of the regulation of disruptive technologies such as 
the Internet. The domain of cyber-regulation becomes complex largely due 
to the difficulty in controlling the “physical” environment. In addition to 
this there is the complex problem of decentred or polycentred regulation 
(Fuller 1964). These latter concepts refer to the idea that regulation does not 
come from a single source. A more nuanced understanding of regulation 
must include the understanding that regulation consists of competing 
regulators, even within the same regulatory body. Therefore once we begin 
with a mature understanding of regulation to mean the enterprise of 
subjecting human conduct to the governance of external controls whether 
state or non-state, intended or unintended (Baldwin et al 1998) the 
advantage of this inclusive definition of regulation is that its takes into 
account the Law as “the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the 
governance of rules”. (Fuller 1964, p 106). These definitions provide the 
regulatory theorists with the manoeuvrability necessary to discuss regulation 
even when it appears as conflicting systems (Fuller 1964). As Fuller himself 
noted, “A possible . . . objection to the view [of law] taken here is that it 
permits the existence of more than one legal system governing the same 
population. The answer is, of course, that such multiple systems do exist 
and have in history been more common than unitary systems.” (p 123). 
Viewing regulation as polycentric legal systems (Fuller 1964) entails a 
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moving away from the traditional regulatory model of state monopoly 
(Murray 2006). This is necessary if we are to understand the complexity 
involved in the regulation of global information technologies such as the 
Internet.  
Theoretical Focus 
In the beginning of the chapter on theory the position of this work in 
relation to the theory was laid out. This began with a view of structuration 
theory being a theory used to show the social interaction between the 
regulator and the regulated. This theoretical starting point has also been 
chosen to show that regulation is a continuum, albeit which can be broken 
down into specific cases or legislative acts, that deals with the interaction of 
the actor and structure.  
In relation to regulation as a discipline this work is not dependent upon the 
formalized understanding of legal regulation in the form of laws and court 
actions. Regulation must be understood to be the exercise of power within 
social interaction. In this case regulation can take the form of inanimate 
objects. Objects do regulate social behaviour. Both Winner (1985) and 
Latour (1992) have problematised the social role of technology as regulator. 
Winner provides examples of low bridges in New York being used as 
physical barriers to class interaction. The latter example has been questioned 
more recently (Joerges 1999) however even the questioning of Winner’s 
example does not diminish the power of his conclusions. Latour (1992) 
provides us with an example of regulation by heavy doors which 
discriminate against the weak and therefore act as limitations on what we are 
capable of doing. Lessig provides several examples in his attempt to show 
that computer code regulates or acts as a modality of regulation. These are 
expanded views on the understanding of regulation and they are 
fundamental to the understanding of regulation described in this work. 
Objects do regulate our actions in the sense that they guide and control 
what we should and can do. Social actors are conditioned to obey the 
guidance of these objects (Norman 1990).  
However it is important to differentiate between the object regulating 
behaviour, in the sense of guiding, controlling or enabling, and the object 
becoming a modality of regulation. Whether it is a computer code or barbed 
wire that guides and regulates behaviour the object in itself is not regulating 
through its own will. The inanimate objects of our regulation cannot react to 
the actor’s reactions. The inanimate objects are simply tools of the regulator. 
Therefore when Lessig (1999) introduces his four modalities of regulation 
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(market, law, norms, architecture) he defines them as modalities, which have 
an effect on online liberty (in the sense of Mill 1980 [1859]). In doing this he 
is using the definition of regulation in the widest sense (Baldwin et al 1998) 
as described above and can be summarised by the formula: all manner of 
control, state or non-state, intended or unintended.   
However, there is an important distinction to be made in the four regulatory 
norms provided by Lessig. Laws, markets and norms are socially mediated 
modalities while architecture is environmental modality (Murray 2006). The 
Internet creates an environment that, due to the malleability of code, 
becomes sensitive to regulatory intervention. However, since code is an 
inanimate regulator and does not react to the actor it is extremely difficult to 
predict the effects of code-based regulation. In addition to this the fact that 
the online environment is, in some important senses, beyond regulation due 
to the fact that code regulation can be circumvented and obfuscated by 
other implementations of code, it is highly unlikely any regulatory 
intervention will successfully bring to an end any ongoing regulatory 
conflict. Simply stated: Using legal rules to attempt to control a volatile 
changeable environment is virtually impossible since the rules can only with 
difficulty define what they are set to regulate and, as this work will show, 
without clarity of definition regulation is severely frustrated.  
In attempting to grapple with the issue of regulating disruptive technology it 
is inevitable that comparisons with other regulation be made. This inevitable 
comparison leads to the question of whether technology is different? In 
other words is the phenomenon of disruptive technology so different that it 
should be treated as a special form of social interaction and no follow 
ordinary regulatory theory? This question is more often dealt with in public 
or political debate. The concept of new technological communication being 
something that requires special consideration is often repeated for new 
technologies (Kern 1983, Ilshammar 2002).  
This point of view usually recedes and new technology becomes common 
technology and is treated no differently than any other common technology. 
This development can be understood as the functional equivalency (Di Lello 
1993, Posner 1996) approach to technology regulation. This approach is an 
attempt to avoid discriminating any form of technological interaction by 
showing preferences towards a particular form of technology or 
technological standard.  
The functional equivalency approach is based on an analysis of the 
purposes, requirements and functions of the activities with a view to 
determining how those purposes or functions could be conducted within an 
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online environment. The basic premise is that the adoption of the 
functional-equivalent approach should not result in imposing on users of 
online communication more stringent standards than in an offline 
communication.  
The concept of functional equivalency came from a concern with how to 
deal with the disruptive effects of ICT. This concern was voiced by Tribe 
(1991) when he wrote that modern computer technology was changing 
established social relationships and, in particular, facilitated new forms of 
social interaction between individuals, government, and institutions. The 
disruptive effects of ICT created problems for the courts, since they are 
unable or unwilling to apply constitutional principles to these new social 
relationships (Tribe 1991). The method of applying the functional 
equivalency approach was first used in regulatory procedure by Judge 
Leisure in the case of Cubby, Inc. v CompuServe, Inc.6 CompuServe provided 
access to an online information service with access to hundreds of 
specialised databases. The question of concern to the court was whether 
CompuServe could be held criminally liable for the content in these 
databases. Stated in another way – was CompuServe a publisher (and 
therefore legally liable) or a distributor (and therefore not legally liable) for 
any criminal content in the databases? In attempting to answer this question 
Judge Leisure wrote: 
…a computerized database is the functional equivalent of a more traditional 
news vendor, and the inconsistent application of a lower standard of liability to 
an electronic news distributor . . . than that which is applied to a public library, 
bookstore or newsstand would impose an undue burden on the free flow of 
information. (Judge Leisure, Cubby v Compuserve). 
Here we can see an application of the method of functional equivalency. 
The idea is to be technology neutral and not place onerous burdens on any 
technology simply because it is not the most used technology. The goal is to 
allow the adoption of new technology without demanding that it fulfils 
more demands than its older alternatives. To put it bluntly: we live in an 
imperfect world therefore we should not expect perfection in our Internet-
based interactions. 
Therefore in implementing the functional equivalency approach we must 
analyse the online and offline to see their effects and side-effects in relation 
to the right of political participation in a democracy. This participation 
demands the freedom to communicate for without communication there is 
                                                           
6 776 F. Supp. 135, 140 (S.D.N.Y.1991) 
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no participation. The ability to communicate consists of several parts such 
as the physical or technical ability to communicate, the political right to 
communicate, the economic ability to communicate (McQuail 1984).  
Core Democratic 
Value 
Empirical Focus Regulatory Discourse Democratic Effects 
Participation  
(Case 1) 
Online 
Disobedience 
Online communication 
Discriminates against 
online participation 
Communication  
(Case 2) 
Virus Protection of property 
Discriminates against 
online communication 
Integrity 
(Case 3) 
Spyware Protection of contracts 
Failure to defend user 
integrity 
Property 
(Case 4) 
MMORPG Protection of contracts 
Disincentive for online 
participation 
Access 
(Case 5) 
Software Ideological lock-in 
Discrimination against 
non-commercial 
production 
Autonomy  
(Case 6) 
Online Censorship 
Protection of cultural 
values and norms 
Patrimony 
Table 3: Core Democratic Value, Regulation and its effects 
While it is important to use the functional equivalency approach to ensure 
that technology is not being overregulated and that there is no loss of the 
right to communicate and participate in a democracy via technological 
mediums it is important also to recognize that even regulation brings with it 
unintended consequences. Unintended consequences do not only occur 
within the domain of new technologies but are frequently present in 
regulatory decisions (Beck 1992, Kallinikos 2005, Rolland 2002, Tenner 
1997). This work will strive to exemplify and analyze the effects of 
regulatory intervention and show the effects of such intervention. 
Table three shows the core democratic values addressed in each of the cases 
in this study. Each of these values is identified as being parts of the 
foundation of the modern participatory democracy. The regulatory 
discourse can be seen as both the discussion and the cause of the discussion 
concerning the core democratic values. The effects listed here are those 
effects that the discourse has brought about to date. These are not to be 
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understood to be an exhaustive list but are the most salient feature of the 
specific discourse.  
Case 1 Participation/Disobedience 
Attempts to apply Internet-based communication for the purpose of 
democratic participation (Pateman 1970) have occasionally caused some 
alarm. In cases where the Internet has been used for political protest have 
motivated regulators to limit the ability of politically activated users to use 
Internet-based communications as an infrastructure for civil disobedience 
(Castells 1997, Pickerill 2003). The underlying regulation of such activities 
has been efficient since the ability for individuals to connect to the Internet 
is governed by contractual relations. The communication via Internet 
technology based on contractual relations is easily monitored and regulated. 
Individual access points to the Internet can be regulated through the 
contract between the user and the service provider. This creates additional 
difficulties for the creation of the Internet as a public sphere (Habermas 
1989) as will be discussed further in this work. Internet communications are 
not treated as being functionally equivalent to offline communication. The 
effect of this weak position of the user is that the ability to conduct civil 
disobedience activities online is threatened, which leads to the 
discrimination of online activities in the sense that these are not tolerated to 
the same degree as offline activities.  
Case 2 Communication/Virus 
A basic premise of participatory democracy is the ability to communicate freely 
(Schauer 1982). Case two in this work deals with the issue of computer 
viruses. Due in a large part to the simplified media discourse (Kling et al 
2005) the concept of virus is almost universally vilified. Regulatory 
structures in most areas affect an almost unified approach towards viruses 
and prohibit their creation and dissemination. However, while the concept 
of virus may easily be regulated against the definition of what has been 
regulated is insufficiently described. This causes several non-harmful virus-
like applications of software to potentially fall under this regulation. The 
reliance on the simplified view of viruses creates an inability for certain 
forms of communication thus creating a democratic deficit. The role of 
freedom of expression is vital within a participatory democracy. The 
purpose of such a right is to protect controversial expressions – 
uncontroversial expression needs no protection.  
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Case 3 Integrity/Spyware 
Case three involves the examination of the role of integrity in a participatory 
democracy (Sundström 2001). In this case study we can see the effect of 
when users experience a lack of integrity through spyware. The perceived 
lack of integrity caused concern among users. This case will discuss the 
negative effects of the lack of integrity protection for a participatory 
democracy in terms of the regulatory powers inherent in the internalisation 
of surveillance (Foucault 1979). This concern was however met with a 
regulatory inertia since the apparent legal position of the software in 
question could be disputed. This lack of concern for the users opinions vis-
à-vis integrity resulted in the creation of a market based regulatory solutions. 
These solutions came in the form of integrity protecting, spyware removal 
software.  
Case 4 Property/MMORPG 
Case four deals with the core democratic value of property (Harris 1996). This 
case examines the frontiers of intellectual property in that it looks at the 
conflict that appears in the creation of intellectual property in online 
environments. The basic disagreement surrounds the ownership of artefacts 
within massively multiplayer online role playing games (MMORPG). From 
the traditional point of view these environments are created and controlled 
by private organisations and the users are regulated by contractual 
agreement with the private organisation. Among the users there has been a 
growing belief in that they own their online characters and any artefacts they 
find within the world. This opinion is widespread among the players but is 
contrary to the contract. This case shows that there is a growing re-appraisal 
or negotiation on the way in which intellectual property originating in online 
environments should be understood. This entails that there is a re-
evaluation of the role and concept of property being driven by the users of 
MMORPG. This is tantamount to a grassroots revolution to see a user-
driven re-appraisal of one of the core values in democracy being negotiated 
in this manner.  
Case 5 Access/Software 
Another core value in a democracy is the right of access to the general 
infrastructure (Åström 2004). The study in case five demonstrates the way in 
which this right can be problematised within the digital environment. The 
case concerns the present day distinction between the development 
rationales for software. The traditional form of software (erroneously 
referred to as proprietary software) production is based upon an economic 
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rationale. In other words the motivation to make software is to make 
economic profit from the activity. The last 25 years have seen the growth of 
politically motivated software development. The latter is an attempt to build 
a digital infrastructure that grants the user a greater amount of freedom. 
Through policy documents and technological decisions there is a state bias 
towards the use of economically developed software. This bias discriminates 
against the ideologically motivated software developed in society and in 
certain cases this bias can result in state subvention of individual products, 
to the detriment of others.  
Case 6 Autonomy/Censorship 
The final core democratic value studied in this work is autonomy (Harrison 
1995). In case study six the control and censorship of online information is 
studied. The study looks at the more blatant forms of information control 
carried out by government who use technical and social means to openly 
limit information flows. In addition to this the case study also looks at the 
more subtle forms of controlling online information. The latter are more 
commonly implemented within democratic governments and can be seen as 
a delegation of regulatory practices to the service provider. The rationale for 
the limitation of online communications can be seen in the re-occurring 
moral panics (Thompson 1998) surrounding technology. Structural 
regulation of communications through the persistence of paternalistic 
information policies results in the loss of user autonomy in relation to the 
online environment. This in turn results in the discrimination of the online 
communications medium.  
As this brief overview has shown the cases in this work all reflect individual 
core values of a participatory democracy. The choice to include these core 
values has been to demonstrate the role of technological regulation. Such 
regulation can be conducted in many forms. In case one we see a direct 
legislative approach to regulation while in case five the regulation is mainly 
by technical policy. What is important to recognise is, irrespective of the 
regulatory approach, the regulation of technology is the regulation of 
democracy.  
 45 
3 
Method 
I have come to believe that the whole world is an enigma, a harmless enigma that is made 
terrible by our own mad attempt to interpret it as though it had an underlying truth. 
  Umberto Eco 
Research Process 
The research presented within this thesis began in early 1999 when the 
author began participating in studies concerning virtual online communities. 
These studies revolved around the new form of interaction dubbed the 
virtual community (Rheingold 1993, Kollock & Smith 1998). Much of the 
focus of these studies surrounded the concept of community and whether 
such a thing could exist in a technologically mediated world. At the same 
time there was a growing understanding amongst regulatory theorists that 
this technology created an interaction that did not fit easily amongst the 
established theories. The cyberlawyers (at the time names such as these were 
desirable amongst those wishing to show that they understood that the 
technology created a new form of law) argued that cyberlaw was a growing 
and important discipline. While those who disagreed at best ignored the 
topic at worst argued that this was academic dilettantism (Easterbrook 
1996).  
From these earlier studies the basic idea of looking towards regulatory 
attempts to resolve “problems” in online environments arose. The 
fundamental idea was to collect data on attempts to identify and regulation 
problems in online environments. The result of this work became the six 
studies that make up the bulk of this thesis. All these studies are studies of 
how Internet technology impacts our society in different ways. In addition 
to this end the studies also illustrate how such technology is being regulated 
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within society. This regulation is carried out both by formal structures such 
as law but even by the more ephemeral negotiations carried out by the 
actors touched by the technology. 
The data collected in these studies include the formalized structures of legal 
regulations. These are analysed both in the light of what that regulation 
claims to achieve and contrasted with the arguments of groups who feel that 
such regulation either does not achieve the desired goal, or while reaching 
the desired goal creates undesirable side-effects which negate its beneficial 
action.  
The purpose of chapter three is to explain both the general development of 
this work in the sense of which topics were explored, in what manner and in 
what order. The case studies in this thesis are presented in the chronological 
order in which the research was undertaken.  
Methods Applied Case 1: Participation 
The first case (Participation) was initiated by the Convention on Cybercrime 
in 2001 and the work was conducted during 2002. The actions of the 
structure are represented through legislative documents and preliminary 
materials. The response to the Convention is represented by the actions and 
texts of primarily two groups who conduct actions defined, by their own 
publicity, as civil disobedience. The conflict in this case study is to analyse 
the legitimate needs of the regulator with the desire of the actors to conduct 
activities of civil disobedience in online environments.  
The event that triggered the research into this area was the development of 
an online discussion which took place mainly between two groups of 
activists: The Electrohippies and The Cult of the Dead Cow. The main thrust of 
this online discussion was the attempt to define and delineate what was, and 
what could be, acceptable online political activism. The debate mainly took 
place through email discussion lists, web pages and presentations of 
ideologies in print media. The two organisations argued on the legitimacy of 
the use of denial of service as a legitimate form of online civil disobedience. 
The debate itself may be seen as a way in which different actors attempt to 
create meaning and order by arguing for the legitimacy of their actions. This 
debate was subsequently interrupted by the presentation of the Cybercrime 
Convention. As an act of regulation the Convention criminalised the act of 
denial of service, in addition to many other acts of online political activism 
that were seen as less controversial by the two groups.  
The documentary sources provided by the discussions and printed 
documents of the two groups provide the official views of the actors. This 
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material is supplemented by additional material in the form of email 
interviews carried out with representatives of the groups. Due to the nature 
of email interviews the material is less forthcoming than face-to-face 
interviews. This is due in part to the loss of additional information, such as 
the physical actions of the interviewee during the interview. Additionally 
written question and answer sessions tend to be less spontaneous which 
may have the effect that the replies tend to be more structured and thought 
through. However the interviews provide an additional richness with which 
to complement the more formal written material. 
The main source of this chapter remains the formal written sources. We are 
provided with the organised presentation of the arguments used by the 
actors involved in online political activism. This is then followed by the 
structural regulation by the Convention and the documents that surround it, 
and provide it with an environment. The main empirical work of this 
chapter has been conducted between 2000-2002. The results were originally 
published in 2004 (Klang 2004a). This work was then re-visited in 2004 to 
obtain a deeper understanding of the effects of the implementation of the 
Cybercrime Convention and the reactions of the actors involved. This 
reworked version was published in 2005 (Klang 2005a). The reworking of 
the published material to form part of this thesis entailed additional 
empirical work during 2005. The formation of this work in this manner can 
be seen as a process of validation (Hammersley 1990) since the data 
collection and analysis took place in three complete and independent cycles. 
Each cycle was informed by the proceeding cycle and the iterative effect can 
be seen as a form of triangulation of results (Silverman 2005). 
Methods Applied Case 2: Communication 
The second case appearing in this work (Communication) deals with the 
development of harsher legal regulation against the threat of damage caused 
by computer viruses. The original work in this chapter was carried out 
primarily in 2001-2002 following the raised awareness on the importance of 
defining and discussing online criminal activities due to the presentation of 
the Council of Europe’s (CoE) Convention on Cybercrime in Budapest in 
November 2001. The latter convention created a great deal of interest and 
discussion. The key conflict came from the increased demand of 
criminalisation created, amongst other reasons, by this convention. This 
increased demand of criminalisation conflicted with the lack of substantial 
definition (either technical or legal) on the nature of viruses. The 
foundational material used in this case study is mainly the regulatory 
attempts of governments to control (in this case to limit) the use of viruses. 
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The actors’ negotiation is represented by alternative approaches to the 
harmful virus. The conflict within this case is exemplified by the 
constraining effects on legislation upon legitimate uses of viruses.  
The original empirical work in this chapter was carried out primarily in 
2001-2002 following the raised awareness on the importance of defining and 
discussing online criminal activities due to the presentation Convention on 
Cybercrime. The latter convention created a great deal of interest and 
discussion. The key conflict came from the increased demand of 
criminalisation created, amongst other reasons, by this convention. This 
increased demand of criminalisation conflicted with the lack of substantial 
definition (either technical or legal) on the nature of viruses. The 
foundational material used in this case study is mainly the regulatory 
attempts of governments to control (in this case to limit) the use of viruses. 
The actors’ negotiation is represented by alternative approaches to the 
harmful virus. The conflict within this case is exemplified by the 
constraining effects on legislation upon legitimate uses of viruses. 
In this chapter two different approaches to viruses are presented within the 
framework of three jurisdictions (Sweden, United Kingdom & United 
States). In addition to this the approach put forward by the Convention on 
Cybercrime is explained. These are presentations of the attempts of the 
regulatory structure to control the phenomenon of viruses. One of the 
fundamental problems with virus legislation presented within this chapter is 
a lack of coherent definition of what it is that is being legislated.  
To enable a fruitful discussion on the role of virus regulation the chapter 
presents the views of actors who wish to develop virus-like software. It is 
important here to clarify that none of these actors present their actions as 
being harmful and therefore they believe that their actions are morally 
legitimate. 
The studied artefacts that are the basis of this chapter are the regulative 
documents that provide the legal foundations for virus regulation in three 
jurisdictions and the Cybercrime convention. These artefacts provide the 
documentary foundation and creation of the structural regulatory view of 
viruses in society. To contrast this, the chapter performs a literature review 
with the express purposes of generating alternative interpretations of the 
various roles that viruses may occupy in society. The goal with this approach 
is to provide a critical foundation upon which to interpret and study the 
actions of the regulatory structure.  
METHOD 
 
49
The main sources of this chapter are the analysis of national and 
international regulation compared with the practical implementation of 
beneficial or harmless uses of virus-like code. This work was initially 
conducted in 2001-2002, published in 2003 (Klang 2003a) updated and 
subsequently reworked to form part of this thesis in an independent 
research cycle to ensure the validity of the findings (Hammersley 1990, 
Silverman 2005). 
Methods Applied Case 3: Integrity 
The empirical work on the third case (Integrity) was conducted during 2002-
2003. In this case study the actions of the structure are represented by the 
texts of the manufacturers of spyware and the scant legal opinions being 
delivered. The activities of the actors may be seen in the private initiatives to 
produce anti-spyware software and to maintain forums that discuss whether 
certain software contains spyware. In a sense these actions of the actors can 
be seen as private regulatory behaviour.  
The main issue being studied here is the lack of reaction by the regulatory 
structure to the perceived privacy threat of spyware. This however does not 
mean that spyware exists in a regulatory void. There is no specific regulation 
of the spyware phenomenon but there is a legal position on spyware. This 
position can be found in the analysis of the legal principles of contract law. 
Therefore to be able to exemplify the regulatory position towards spyware, 
this chapter examines the basic legal principles, which provide the 
foundation for the legality of spyware.  
 The controversy of spyware is that many users protest its existence and the 
method of its implementation. The actors who are against the use of 
spyware also put forward legal arguments, which courts and regulators could 
use to prevent or curb the phenomenon. However no such regulatory action 
has been taken. These anti-spyware arguments will also be presented in this 
chapter.  
While these two positions, for and against spyware, provide the background 
theories of this chapter, the main focus is on the growing solution to the 
threat perceived in spyware. The development and implementation of 
spyware discussion forums and later the development of anti-spyware 
software provide excellent examples of market based solutions. These 
market-based solutions are a form of regulatory system that each user can 
choose to implement. Therefore the example of spyware with its element of 
regulatory choice provides an interesting example of how actors may control 
DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGY 
 50
and regulate their own technology in an attempt to gain control over their 
disruptive technology.  
This case study is based upon empirical work conducted during 2002-2003. 
It contains the study of regulatory artefacts in the form of case law and 
fundamental legal principles, the study of online forums discussing the 
development of concern against spyware and also the study of the growth of 
anti-spyware systems and their impact on the perceived threat to privacy 
caused by the technology of spyware. The results have been initially 
published in 2003 (Klang 2003b) then further reworked and for subsequent 
publication in 2004 (Klang 2004b). The case presented here is a 
development of these two publications.  
Methods Applied Case 4: Property 
The fourth case (Property), concerns the legitimate claim to ownership in 
online virtual environments. These online virtual environments are created 
by private initiatives and are developed as private property. The research 
work, which forms the basis of this case, harkens back to the original studies 
carried out in 1999 which were then revisited in 2003. The activities of the 
users of these environments may create virtual commodities of value for the 
members of these environments. These commodities are claimed to be both 
the property of their online creators and the property of the creators of the 
online environments. The regulatory structure is represented in this case 
study by the licensing agreements and the negotiations of the actors can be 
seen by the different discussions being carried out in online forums and the 
academic field of game studies. This chapter takes its starting point by 
reviewing the position of the regulatory structure as created by the actual 
virtual environment and the regulatory environment that is created by the 
legal documentation that surrounds the massively multiplayer online role-
playing game (MMORPG). This starting point is achieved by studying the 
fundamental legal position and applying it to specific position as created by 
contract law.  
This position is then juxtaposed by the views of the actors. The actors are 
the players who oppose the legal position of the regulatory structure and 
attempt to claim property rights in the avatars and artefacts that they create 
within the virtual environment. In addition to the legal documentation, case 
law and contracts, which form the regulatory structure, this case study takes 
into consideration the points of views put forward by players in online 
forums, academic publications and carries out online interviews within the 
MMORPG in addition to hosting group discussions with active players. 
These latter activities are conducted in an attempt to bring forward the 
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views of the active players who otherwise may not be heard. The research 
activities were conducted between 1999-2003 and published in 2001 (Klang 
& Roos 2001) and in 2004 (Klang 2004c). The chapter in this work is a 
revision of these early findings and the earlier publications enable a level of 
reliability and validity in the results (Hammersley 1990, Silverman 2005). 
Methods Applied Case 5: Access 
The fifth case (Access) grew from the researcher’s participation in discussions 
on the ownership of software and software standards. These discussions 
were initiated in 2003 as a part of a project on the nature of property 
standards. The purpose of this project is to compare and contrast the 
foundations of property in computer software by comparing licenses from 
proprietary software, open source and Free Software. Since the incumbent 
norm is one of proprietary software the actions of the regulator and courts 
have reflect the acts of the social structures while the activities of the Open 
Source and Free Software movements can be seen as the negotiations of the 
actors in relation to this regulation. The empirical material available in this 
area is large and the choices have been made to find representative data 
from the different positions.  
Among those against the introduction of software patents is the Free 
Software Foundation. The purpose of this chapter is to develop a greater 
understanding of the role of software in society in relation to its proprietary 
form and its distribution. Within this work the regulatory structure can be 
understood to be the established norm of software manufacture and 
delivery often known as proprietary software while the point-of-view of the 
actors is best presented by the ideology espoused by the Free Software 
Foundation.  
This work aims to explore the alternatives to proprietary software in general 
and in particular explore the differences between the approaches taken by 
those groups attempting to present alternatives to traditional proprietary 
software.  
The main part of the empirical work was conducted during 2003-2005 and 
consists of both a study of the basis of software as a form of property. This 
is then followed by a study of the alternatives to proprietary software in the 
form of Open Source software and Free Software. The study of these two 
movements is conducted both by studying their formative texts and their 
licences, which create the regulatory environment within which they exist. 
This is followed by a deeper exploration intended to better understand the 
differences between the two different movements.  
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In addition to studying the founding documents and the formative canon 
texts which surround these movements in-depth interviews were conducted 
with Free Software Foundation European representatives. Several in-depth 
interviews were conducted with the Vice-President of the Free Software 
Foundation Europe and one of the Team Members of the Free Software 
Foundation Europe. The research activities within this chapter have been 
conducted between 2003-2005 and have been published in 2005 (Klang 
2005b). These results have been revisited and subsequently reworked for 
publication in this work. 
Methods Applied Case 6: Autonomy 
The empirical work on the final case (Autonomy) included in this work has 
been carried out during 2004. This sixth case deals with the control of 
access to online information. The structural regulatory actions can be seen 
as the manner in which states attempt to control the flows of information to 
the citizens. The manner in which certain groups attempt to circumvent 
these control mechanisms is the way in which certain groups of actors 
attempt to negotiate such technological regulation in the attempt to obtain 
and disseminate information. 
To understand the structural regulation of online information through 
censorship it has been necessary to understand the manner in which 
censorship is conducted in practice among nations. This work is based upon 
the study of second hand sources in the form of regulations on censorship 
and studies of national censorship technologies. Among the different ad hoc 
studies (Deibert 2002, Zittrain & Edelman 2003) and the organisations who 
observe online censorship as a peripheral activity (e.g. Reporters without 
borders, Amnesty International). There has been a growing interest in online 
censorship studies. One such project is the Open Net Initiative, which is a 
collaboration between the University of Toronto, Harvard Law School, and 
the University of Cambridge. They have recently published reports on 
censorship activities in Saudi Arabia (2004), United Arab Emirates (2005), 
Bahrain (2005), China (2005), Burma (2005), Iran (2005) and Singapore 
(2005). The growth of these studies shows that the field is maturing and that 
a long-term field of research is being developed. 
Once the behaviour of the regulatory structure has been established through 
the studies of technological censorship systems this work then studies the 
methods available for circumventing such systems. This consists of both 
technical systems for the purpose of censorship circumvention and texts 
made available on how Internet censorship functions and the methods in 
which it can be circumvented both through technical and social methods. 
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The purpose of studying this material is to understand the actor reaction to 
the regulatory structure of censorship. The research activities have been 
carried out during 2004-2005 and are due for publication (Klang 2006). 
Case Structures Actors Qualitative Base 
Participation 
Convention on 
Cybercrime 
Explanatory text 
Doctrinal documents 
Electrohippies 
statement 
Cult statement 
Discussion lists 
Email interviews with 
ehippies representative 
Mailing lists  
Communication 
Convention on 
Cybercrime 
Explanatory text 
Legal Analysis 
Doctrinal documents 
Alternative virus uses in 
theory and practice 
Email interviews with 
alternative virus 
creators 
Integrity 
EULA Documentation 
Legal Analysis 
Doctrinal documents 
User group definitions 
of phenomenon. 
Spyware Classification 
documentation 
Spyware discussion 
forums 
Property 
EULA Documentation 
Legal Analysis 
Doctrinal documents 
Policy documentation 
Case law 
Theoretical 
presentations 
Research 
documentation 
Online forums  
Group discussions 
Online interviews 
Online survey 
Access 
EULA Documentation 
Legal Analysis 
Doctrinal documents 
Policy documents 
Position statements 
from FSF 
representatives and 
advocates 
Interviews with FSF 
representatives 
Autonomy 
EULA Documentation 
Legal Analysis 
Doctrinal documents 
Policy documents 
Test & evaluations 
Evasion documentation 
& manuals 
Email interviews with 
circumventions 
advocates 
Table 4: Data Collection 
Research Activity 
An efficient way of evaluating research methods is to attempt to discern the 
usefulness in bringing forth data to be analysed. This usefulness depends on 
how they fit with the theories in use, hypothesis to be tested and research 
field being explored (Silverman 1993). Ethnographic research, especially that 
which is based upon fieldwork in non-literate societies has focused the study 
of mainly oral cultures (Atkinson & Coffey 2004). The methodologies 
developed in this tradition have been widely used in the study of “advanced 
literate societies” where the social actors often practice advanced forms of 
documentation. While this documentation is not a form of ethnographic 
work it is important to acknowledge that many actors, organisations and 
settings studied today are to a large degree self-documenting (Atkinson & 
Coffey 2004). Despite this recognition, the social sciences have long 
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prioritised the spoken word over the written word and the written word 
over the nonverbal communication in its attempts to understand human 
action (Hodder 1994). However this priority does not adequately enable us 
to study all situations.  
Studying Internet interaction often entails the study of highly literate social 
actors. Therefore it is important to be aware of the fact that the bias towards 
oral cultures in social sciences may result in incomplete understanding of the 
social interaction. There is something intuitively wrong in studying highly 
literate settings based to a high degree upon written and nonverbal 
communication as if it were an oral culture. When studying these 
environments the researcher must pay attention to the analysis of 
documentary realities. The study of documents is important because 
documents create a version of social reality. This reality is however not 
“divorced from other levels” of social reality (Atkinson & Coffey 2004).  
In studying textually based social interaction in this way it is also important 
to be mindful of the different roles played by documents. They are 
manufactured, organized and consumed, not always in the same context 
(Prior 2004). They can also be affected by the differing intentions of the 
authors, suppliers and readers (Prior 2004). Therefore it is important to 
attempt to gain insights into the context within which the text is used. This 
means that there cannot be absolute truths in the understanding of 
meanings of texts – only interpretation. While acknowledging the 
importance of interpretation it is equally important to recognise that the 
study of artefacts or material traces (such as documents and texts) left by 
human activity provide not better nor worse understanding of human action 
– but different.  
Therefore to understand how regulation is carried out within the mediated 
world of the Internet we need to understand its context and its purpose. 
This entails defining its parts in the hope of understanding the whole. The 
development of understanding of the way in which we regulate disruptive 
technology helps us to understand the regulation of that which is new and 
which threatens that which is established. The results of such a study can 
then be applied to all domains where regulation of disruptive technology 
may occur. This may be within an organisation, a family group, a multi-
national corporation or a state.  
Researching Internet regulation requires a study of both the regulation being 
practiced on different levels, by different actors and the study of those being 
regulated online. This latter study requires following activities of online 
individuals, organisations and groups. The technology under study has the 
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effect of making organisational boundaries increasingly permeable (Dutton 
1999) as a result the study of online behaviour by necessity involves the 
study of computer-mediated communication. Studying these phenomena 
has both strengths and weaknesses (Pargman 2000, Sveningsson 2001) 
Empirical Data 
Throughout the studies conducted in this thesis the practice of observation 
was carried out. To obtain a clearer understanding of the regulated 
participation in online activities requires an understanding of both the 
requirements and goals of the human actors involved in the online activities. 
However it is important to note that while observation and participation 
provide rich empirical data it is frequently of questionable reliability since 
information collection is conducted over a limited period of time. In 
addition to this one must be mindful of Silverman’s (1993, p 9) comments 
on observation that “qualitative researchers also argue that observation is 
not a very “reliable” data collection method because different observers may 
record different observations.” Despite these weaknesses the value of 
observation and participation provide such a valuable source of rich 
information that it cannot be ignored. Therefore it must be included and 
tempered with other data to ensure that the material we base our analysis on 
is balanced. 
Whenever possible, the interviews conducted in this research were face-to-
face interviews (individually or in groups). Other interviews were carried out 
within the framework of this research in the form of email interviews and 
interviews carried out in online virtual environments.   
These last two forms of interviews differ from the face-to-face interview in 
the data collection process (Bloor 1997).  The data is shaped and formed by 
the context and circumstances in which it is collected. This factor must be 
taken into consideration in the analysis of the data since the data gathered in 
one interview form is not equivalent to the data gathered in another (Bloor 
1997). This, however, does not imply that one set of data is inferior to 
another. As Hammersley and Atkinson (1995) point out:  
What is involved in using different research methods is not the combination of 
different kinds of data per se, but rather an attempt to relate different sorts of 
data in such a way as to counteract various possible threats to the validity of 
analysis. (p 231). 
Differences between data collection in the two interview types include the 
aspects that online interviews are often low-cost and relatively 
unconstrained by time and/or space. It is however also important to be 
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aware of the information which is not included in interviews which are 
conducted in other ways than face-to-face. The non face-to-face interview 
lacks the visual or aural cues that provide additional information and can be 
used to pursue a line of questioning. However the non face-to-face 
interview does carry with it some important advantages since they allow the 
interviewees more time to reflect and to structure their responses. This may 
improve the accuracy of the responses but it does reduce the spontaneity.  
Generally speaking, this is more true of the email interview than of the 
interview conducted in real time within a virtual environment.  
Therefore, whenever possible this research has a preference towards the 
face-to-face interview. The alternative forms appear at first glance to be 
easier to conduct for both the interviewer and the interviewees. Taking 
everything into consideration the value of non face-to-face interviews 
cannot be considered to be less valuable. The different interview approaches 
have different strengths and weaknesses. In this research all interviews 
perform the same function, which is to help ensure the validity of the 
analysis.  
As previously mentioned, different methods provide different results and 
have different strengths and weaknesses. Qualitative methods are more 
promising in obtaining full answers when investigating what people actually 
do. However the methods are not without weaknesses as they provide a 
certain type of data from the subject observed or interviewed. Therefore it is 
important to remember that to conduct “a full sociological analysis cannot 
be restricted to interview data, it must also consider the material traces” 
(Hodder 1994, p 395). The main methodological thrust of this thesis is the 
study of these material traces.  
Hodder (1994) refers to the analysis of material traces as the study of mute 
evidence. This is because the study of material traces is the study of the 
artefacts that are created and left in the wake of our existence. The main 
difference between the study of artefacts and action is that the artefact exists 
beyond the moment of its creation. This endurance allows it to be 
transported in space and time. The analysis of such artefacts can therefore 
be conducted in other locations and in other times from the moment and 
location of creation and use. This is a great advantage for those wishing to 
study events without being there to witness them. However it is important 
to remember that any such study takes place without the active commentary 
of the creator and/or user of the artefact (Hodder 1994, Markham 2004).  
As Hodder (1994, p 395) puts it: “There is often no possibility of interaction 
with spoken emic “insider” as opposed to etic “outsider” perspectives.” 
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Even when such interaction is possible the motivation for why material 
traces appear to be the way they are sometimes inadequately explained. This 
may be explained in part by the theories of Argyris and Schön (1974). They 
argue that there is a distinction between an individual’s espoused theory 
(what they claim) and their “theory-in-use” (what they actually do). People 
always behave consistently with their mental models (theories-in-use) even 
though they often do not act congruently with what they say (espoused 
theories).  
Material traces are often left in online environments. These traces can be 
both voluntary and involuntary traces. Involuntary traces can be seen by 
those traces the user of online environments leaves without meaning or 
intending to. This does not mean that these traces are unwanted but only 
that they are unintended. The voluntary traces display themselves more 
clearly as communicative acts intended by the communicator to be received 
by either specified readers or groups of readers. Examples of these traces 
within the online environment can be seen in online threaded discussions 
and asynchronous discussion lists which remain online and available even 
after the communicator has gone offline.  
Material traces add an important dimension to data collection and present 
important insights not provided by face-to-face empirical data. Material 
traces allow “new light to be shed on topics…and different facets of 
problems to be explored” (Bloor 1997, p 1). Analysis of these material traces 
serves as an important method in research. Material traces cannot be viewed 
as neutral instruments, whether produced intentionally or as a by-product of 
other behaviour all material traces should be understood to represent 
reflections of values and goals of the author7.  MacDonald (2001, p 196) 
explains that: “Such creations may be regarded as ‘documents’ of a society 
or group which may be ‘read’, albeit in a metaphorical sense.” Research 
relying on material traces should be capable of acknowledging that 
“documents which are intended to be read as objective statements of fact 
are also socially produced” (MacDonald 2001, p 196). It must be recognized 
that this material is must be understood in the context of its development 
and use:  
They are produced on the basis of certain ideas, theories or commonly accepted, 
taken-for-granted principles, which means that while they are perfectly correct – 
                                                           
7 Author is a misnomer. The producer of material traces can be unaware of such 
production and therefore cannot be understood to be an author or creator in the 
traditional sense. The term is used here as a simplification. 
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given certain socially accepted norms –they do not have the objectivity of, say, a 
measure of atmospheric pressure recorded on a barometer. (MacDonald 2001, p 
196). 
A large number of documents have been used in this work. Their format 
and origin represent the diversity of the areas being studied. The primary 
documentation spans from legislation to policy document to individual and 
standard contracts. These documents are presented in a wide variety of 
formats from traditional paper to digital online versions accessible via the 
Internet. The secondary documentation includes everything from first hand 
accounts and interpretations of action to reports, research and educational 
literature. Lincoln and Guba (1985) categorise documentary artefacts loosely 
as documents or records according to their purpose, whether they have 
been created for a formal transaction (records for example licenses, 
contracts and legislation) or if they have been formulated for more personal 
reasons (documents for example diaries and letters). This categorisation, 
however, lacks the documentation created for semi-formal purposes (for 
example letters of protest, web page defacements etc). They argue that the 
less formal documents are comparable to speech and require a more 
contextualised interpretation. Hodder (1994, p 396) writes that the 
distinction is important on the basis of power and technology where: 
“Documents involve a personal technology, and records a full state 
technology of power.”  
The designations of primary and secondary should not be understood to be 
a value judgement. The primary sources are those that reflect the position of 
the formal structures created by organisations (e.g. legislation or contracts) 
while the secondary sources to a much higher degree reflect the actions of 
actors within the formal structures. Naturally this classification into primary 
and secondary is not absolute. It is intended to help understand the nature 
of the documents not to be a goal in itself.  
When working with documents the researcher must keep in mind that 
documentation does not represent an absolute or objective position. First it 
is necessary for the researcher to check the accuracy of the documents then 
the documents must be interpreted in light of “…the teller’s interests, 
perspectives, and presuppositions” (Hammersley & Atkinson 1995, p 160). 
Primary documentation such as governmental policy and legislation reflect 
the interests, perspectives, and presuppositions of the state8 while the 
                                                           
8 Who is the state? What does it represent? This term cannot be defined adequately 
within the scope of this work. 
METHOD 
 
59
secondary documentation can be said to represent the views of groups and 
individuals participating in the social debate from a position of less power, 
or at least less access to more established channels of communication.  
To obtain an adequate understanding of the complex reality it is important 
that the researcher studies a large number of texts from a plurality of 
sources to attempt to establish an understanding of the meaning of the 
communication within its context. This plurality of sources provides a 
picture of general discourse. 
Data Analysis 
The law is not a natural phenomenon but it is a socially constructed 
institution. Among socially constructed phenomenon there exists objects 
that are by their nature more easily studied since they are created in one 
finite process. Buildings such as the Empire State building are constructed 
once. When the final stone is laid it is to a large extent finished. Once 
finished it can be measured and described. Other socially constructed 
phenomena are constantly being re-interpreted and are never completed. 
Once such area is regulation. However, the fact that regulation is 
continuously being constructed and reconstructed does not mean that it is 
impossible to take a snapshot of the process. Through this the researcher 
can explain the nature of regulation as defined by a certain point of its 
development in space and time. The work represented here is an exercise in 
describing the nature of regulation in present state of Internet technology 
and its implications upon participatory democracy.  
Choice of methodology is not a matter of personal preference.9 The goal 
with this work is to see the interaction between structure and actors 
depends upon an ability to gather data that will reflect the goals, intentions 
and aspirations of the structures and the actors. This data does not present 
itself easily by using one methodological approach. Therefore this work has 
gathered data from several sources, using multiple methods over different 
time periods. This empirical evidence presented in this work attempts, 
therefore to define both a situation in place and time together with the 
regulation taking place within that definition. To make matters more 
complicated the technological base of this study is extremely malleable since 
it is made up of software and interconnected computers. The challenge 
                                                           
9 This is not to say that personal preferences do not play an important part in 
methodological consideration. 
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therefore is to present valid and reliable cases upon which an analysis can be 
based.  
The validity of each case can be seen as the accuracy with which the data 
describes the social phenomenon (Hammersley 1990). To ensure validity of 
the cases in this work the descriptions of the social phenomenon come from 
various established sources. As far as can be ascertained much of the 
descriptive material comes from legal sources or sources which may be 
considered relatively unbiased. The goal with this is to avoid the pitfall of 
anecdotalism, a practice that Silverman (2005) describes as describing reality 
from a limited or biased number of sources. When describing less official 
activities10 the material will be selected as to be so close to the source that it 
aims to describe. In addition to these methods, as far as possible, a 
triangulation (Silverman 2005) of sources will be made, so as not to rely on 
single sources of information. By using this approach and attempting to 
discuss the validity of unofficial sources the validity of the analysis presented 
herein will be enhanced.     
Another issue, related to the once above, is the question of rigour. By basing 
this work on qualitative data the reliability or rigour of the results may be 
questioned. Often such mistakes are made by those attempting to judge the 
rigour of qualitative studies using rules developed to judge quantitative 
studies. While the quantitative approach to data collection is symbolised by 
conciseness and objectivity based upon ideals of statistical analysis. The use 
of rigour in qualitative research must focus on thoroughness in data 
collection, openness towards the data and theory and a declaration of 
sources.  
To ensure sufficient rigour in the use of case studies the multiple approach 
has been taken. The multiple case study aggregates data collected from 
several sources at different times. This work is the result of the aggregation 
of six case studies collected over a four-year period. This approach provides 
a method for gathering data of interest for studying a large-scale reality, as is 
the case when studying the regulation of disruptive technology in relation to 
its democratic effects. The material gathered demonstrates the actions of the 
parties involved and enables an analysis of the interactions between the 
structures and actors (Giddens 1984). 
                                                           
10 This should be understood to mean when representatives of structures discuss 
regulation informally or “off the record”, for example in explanatory statements or 
private opinions etc.   
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Taken together this work therefore relies on the use of multiple 
methodologies and information sources. The data analysis, undertaken 
within the framework of this thesis was conducted as part of the research 
process and cannot be fixed to a specific time-period. Data analysis was 
conducted during the collection of empirical data for each case. This data 
was then additionally analysed and presented in the form of research articles, 
mainly in journals. A second round of analysis was naturally conducted 
during the compilation of this work. The latter process included both the 
addition of new data where appropriate due to new developments and the 
inclusion of feedback gathered from the responses to the publication of the 
individual studies. 
Each study provided the researcher, not only with insights to the specific 
field, but also a greater understanding of the whole research field. This latter 
greater understanding was naturally applied to the following study and the 
results were again applied to the studies that followed in a fruitful 
development. This work therefore provides the opportunity not only to 
update with factual information but also to revisit preliminary studies with a 
new experience of the research field gained from the long-term work.  
Method Summary 
In table 5 below, Trigger refers to the event that identified the topic as an 
area worthy of research. The cases presented in chapters four and five 
(Participation and Communication) were both prompted by the publication of 
the Cybercrime Convention (2001). Once proposed this convention 
provoked intense discussions both on its content and on the manner in 
which it had been produced. Two areas that were of particular interest (for 
reasons presented in their respective chapters) were acts of civil 
disobedience online and virus writing and dissemination. The motivations 
for studying chapters six and seven (Integrity and Property) grew from a 
general discussion that was taking place at the time. The rise of interest in 
spyware may be attributed to its general growth and the awareness created 
by anti-spyware propagators and software manufacturers.  
The rationale for chapter seven grew from the growth in game research and 
recent case law. The two final chapters eight and nine (Access and Autonomy) 
differ from the previous chapters since the researcher was able to follow in 
the growing political discussions, first in the protest against EU legislation 
against software patents (chapter eight) and then in the World Summit on 
the Information Society (chapter nine). Therefore the triggers from these 
final two chapters can be understood as current political developments.  
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Democratic 
Value 
Empirical 
Focus 
Trigger Time 
Research 
Activity 
Empirical 
Material 
Regulator 
Participation 
Online 
Disobedience 
Cybercrime 
convention 
2000-
2002 
Observation 
Interviews 
Convention, 
National 
Regulation 
Hierarchical 
Communication Virus 
Cybercrime 
convention 
2001-
2002 
Observation 
Discussions 
Convention, 
National 
Regulation 
Hierarchical 
Design 
Integrity Spyware 
Rising 
awareness 
2002-
2003 
Online 
forums 
Observation 
Legislation, 
Courts, 
Contracts, 
Forums 
Design 
Competition 
Property 
Online 
Environments 
Caselaw, 
Rising 
awareness 
1999-
2003 
Online 
forums & 
discussions 
Seminars 
Licensing 
agreements, 
Courts, 
Legislation 
Design 
Hierarchical 
Access Software 
EU 
Software 
Patents 
directive 
2003-
2005 
Active 
participation 
discussions 
Seminars 
Proposed 
EU 
directive, 
Opposition 
documents 
Design 
Community 
Autonomy 
Online 
Censorship 
WSIS 
process 
2004-
2005 
Discussion 
Workshops 
Forums 
Technology 
evaluation, 
Literature, 
NGO 
documents 
Design 
Hierarchical 
Community 
Table 5: Research Progress 
The heading Time in table five refers to the dates during which the main 
empirical work for this case was undertaken. It is important to point out 
that the dates imply only the main timeframe for empirical data collection 
and is not to be understood as finite dates. The studies can, in most cases, 
be seen as ongoing something which will be discussed in greater detail in the 
individual chapters. The label Research Activity refers to the main forms of 
activity that were undertaken in the process of collecting the empirical data 
during the main timeframe. This will be discussed in more detail in the 
respective chapters.  
During the data collection process documentary output from the parties 
studied were collected and analysed as part of the research process. The 
label Artefacts in the table refers to the main types of objects studied. These 
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artefacts, together with the other research activities were analysed in an 
attempt to compare the goals of the regulatory structures with their effects 
together with the actions and reactions of the actors affected by the 
regulation studied in this work. The label Regulator gives an indication of the 
modalities of regulation, which will be discussed in greater detail in their 
respective chapters. 
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4 
Participation 
Democracy is not something that you believe in, or something that you hang your hat on. 
It’s something that you do, you participate. Without participation, democracy crumbles 
and fails.  
Abbie Hoffman 
Introduction 
The Internet is used for every conceivable form of communication and it is 
therefore only natural that it should be used as an infrastructure for protest 
and civil disobedience. Special interest groups, such as environmentalists, 
have been among the early adopters of Internet technology for organisation 
and protest (Castells 2001, Meikle 2002, Pickerill 2003, Walch 1999). The 
technology brings with it the ability to carry out new forms of protest, in 
new environments and also involve changed consequences for those 
involved. These changes disrupt the way in which protests are traditionally 
carried out and provide new avenues of democratic discourse for those 
involved. The use of Internet technology for political purposes is in itself 
nothing special. The technological infrastructure, as mentioned earlier, does 
not discriminate content. Therefore, using Internet technology to conduct 
different forms of political protest is a use of technology that could have 
been easily anticipated.   
The events that triggered research into this field follow online political 
activism and political repercussions during 2000 and 2001. During this 
period an active negotiation of the role of online political activism among 
the actors themselves and the reaction to such activism by the regulatory 
structure took place. This work takes its starting point from a discussion 
held, mainly online, in 2000 between two activist groups (The Electrohippies 
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and The Cult of the Dead Cow) on the role of online activism and civil 
disobedience. Their common point of view was that both groups were 
actively involved in such activities and were attempting to negotiate the 
limits of permissible political activism online. This discussion was followed 
by the presentation of the Convention on Cybercrime11 in 2001 that can be 
seen as a reaction of the regulatory structure. The Convention threatened to 
make many of the actions carried out by political activists online illegal with 
severe criminal penalties. 
The Cybercrime Convention was developed by the Council of Europe, an 
organisation whose primary mission to strengthen democracy, human rights, 
and the rule of law, throughout its member states. Additionally it works to 
develop continent-wide agreements to standardise member countries’ social 
and legal practices while promoting awareness of a European identity based 
on shared values and cutting across different cultures. At the time of writing 
the Council of Europe, which was established in 1949, consists of 49 
member states.  
The Cybercrime Convention reflects the goals and values of this 
organisation by stating in the preamble that a proper balance needs to be 
ensured between the interests of law enforcement and respect for 
fundamental human rights. However it is agreed that this balance has not 
been achieved and that the Convention is heavily biased towards meeting 
the needs of law enforcement (Akdeniz 2005). Following state ratifications, 
the Cybercrime Convention came into force in July 2004. The next stage in 
the process is the enactment into national law by the member states of the 
Council of Europe. 
This chapter studies the use of technology regulation of online participation. 
This is carried out through an analysis of the activities of online political 
activists in relation to each other (as represented by the two groups) and to 
the regulatory structure (as represented by the Convention). The analysis is 
done by studying basic criteria found in tradition civil disobedience 
discourse and observing their applicability in online environments. The 
purpose of this chapter is to better understand the political protest activities carried out 
online and to see whether traditional civil disobedience theory embraces these new forms of 
political activism. 
Participation is recognized as a core democratic value (Pateman 1970) 
however there are disputes about which form such participation can take 
                                                           
11 Budapest, 23.XI.2001 (ETS No. 185) 
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(Månsson 2004, Vinthagen 2005). The use of Internet-based 
communications as an infrastructure for civil disobedience can be seen both 
as a development of online participation and as a threat to communication 
(Klang 2004a). To counter this threat there has been an increase in 
regulatory activity which has led to the discrimination of online 
participation. Internet-based civil disobedience is not treated as being 
functionally equivalent12 to offline civil disobedience since the regulatory 
structure demands a higher degree of obedience in online environments as 
compared with offline environments. 
Civil disobedience is a disputed concept. It is regularly seen both as 
undemocratic actions that threaten a democracy and as actions that further 
democracy (Waldman 1969, Månsson 2004).  
It is beyond the scope of this work to attempt to resolve the Gordian knot 
of civil disobedience in participatory democracies. Therefore this work will 
limit itself to broadening our understanding of the way in which the 
regulation of technology regulates democracy. Therefore this chapter will 
focus on what civil disobedience is and to see if, and how, its practice and 
regulation differ in online environments.  
Theory 
Democracy may be seen as a system of self-rule where, in practice, the 
population of a society controls the government of that society. It is rule by 
the people. Therefore the concept of democratic government is that it 
serves the people as opposed to only ruling them (Pateman 1970, Harrison 
1995). This is most commonly practiced in the form of a system of indirect 
representation whereby citizens are able, through a voting system, to choose 
who will form the government.  Seen only in this light the participatory 
elements of democracy are weak and therefore many theorists show that the 
voting system is but one form of active participation in a democracy.  
Other important elements within a democracy are all forms of 
communication and control between the government and the citizens 
(Pateman 1970). One form of communication within society is the 
regulation, law and policy decisions that make up the everyday regulatory 
structures within a society. When such examples of regulatory structures are 
created by the citizen’s ruling representatives the default position within 
democratic theory is that such regulations must be obeyed (Rawls 1963). 
                                                           
12 See Theoretical Focus page 38 et seq. 
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Political participation within a democracy can entail not obeying the 
structural regulations. As we shall see, actively opposing the rules created 
within a democratic society is a legitimate form of political participation.   
Disobedience is not a behaviour that is encouraged. Despite this, there are 
many situations where disobedience is praised as a virtue and obedience is 
punished. An example of the former can be seen in the American civil rights 
movement.  While, an example of the latter can be seen in the German 
attempts to come to terms with its history. Following the fall of the Berlin 
Wall, East German border guards have been charged with manslaughter or 
attempted manslaughter for shooting individuals attempting to defect 
(Quint 2000). Our relationship to social and legal rules is therefore not as 
clear and simple as we would like it to be. We praise the actions of those 
who have undertaken the classical acts of civil disobedience while we 
attempt to prevent, limit and punish those who would disobey today.  
Civil disobedience can be defined as: disobeying the law for a good cause. 
The reason why this may be a simplistic definition is that the good cause is a 
very elusive. The political and philosophical traditions of disobedience arise 
from the actions of Thoreau’s refusal to pay poll tax in protest of the federal 
government’s war in Mexico, support of chattel slavery and the violation of 
the rights of the native Indians. His action was based on his perceived right 
and obligation to follow his conscience. Thoreau (1993 [1849]) writes that 
he would not support a government that carries out wrongful acts. While 
this refusal to be a party to wrongful acts may be an admirable trait; it is not 
an active attempt to stem injustice, rather a method of keeping ones own 
hands clean (Singer 1973).  
A more precise definition on civil disobedience has been formulated by 
Bedau (1961) who described it as a public, non-violent political act contrary 
to law and carried out with the aim of bringing about change in law or 
policy. Later Bedau (1991) would broaden his definition to refer to illegal 
acts, “committed openly…non-violently…and conscientiously…within the 
framework of the rule of law…with the intention of frustrating or 
protesting some law, policy or decision…of the government.” While these 
definitions are an important basis for further discussion it is important to 
remember that definitions in this area are to a certain extent arbitrary and 
therefore it is not the role of the definition to control what disobedience is 
but rather form the basis for attempting to arrive at a consensus on what 
disobedience may be.  
The developments of civil disobedience are strongly connected with both 
Tolstoy’s writings on pacifist non-resistance (rather die than kill) and 
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Gandhi’s less ideologically clear but more proactive non-violence 
(Vinthagen 2005). In their most clear form the concepts of practical civil 
disobedience can be seen in the actions and writings of King (1991 [1963]). 
In his struggle we see the whole span of possible reactions to the law. From 
the strictest views that even unjust laws are to be obeyed to the moral 
obligation to reject immoral laws.  
Therefore one can sum up the situation that there is an a priori obligation to 
obey the law. However, this rule may come into direct conflict with moral 
obligations and have the ability to cause more harm. Or the duty to obey 
may be overridden in certain cases by other more stringent obligations 
(Rawls 1963). There are however objections to this view (Suber 1999). 
These objections claim that there cannot be any form of civil disobedience 
in a democratic state since the injustice is created in a “just environment” 
and can therefore be changed by democratic means – thus removing any 
need for disobedience. Much of civil disobedience has been carried out in 
democratic environments there is no requirement that disobedience be 
carried out only in a non-democratic environment. Additionally the use of 
democratic channels to correct an unjust situation may in itself create a 
situation which perpetuates the injustice since there are, in theory, no limits 
to democratic means of action. In a democratic society a minority may be 
particularly burdened by legislation despite that the majority feels the 
situation to be equitable. It is important to make the distinction that while 
the state may be democratic; it does not necessary follow that all the 
practices therein are just. Singer (1973) has defined the process of 
disobedience as one method for a minority to appeal to the majority to 
reconsider an injustice. The need for disobedience in such an appeal is 
necessary when the democratic process itself prolongs the injustice. 
Disobedience is therefore not intolerance towards the system but the view 
that the democratic process being allowed to run its course perpetuates the 
injustice. King (1991 [1963]) goes further and states that there is an 
obligation to disobey in the situation where the law is unjust: 
For years now I have heard the word ‘Wait!’…We must come to see…that 
‘justice too long delayed is justice denied.’…One may well ask, ‘How can you 
advocate breaking some laws and obeying others?’ The answer is found in the 
fact that there are two types of laws: just and unjust...One has not only a legal but 
a moral responsibility to obey just laws. Conversely, one has a moral 
responsibility to disobey unjust laws. (p 72). 
A final issue is the problem of how we can accept the disobedience of a 
certain group and not another? This type of argument is often referred to as 
the slippery slope (Volokh 2003). The fundamental idea is that we cannot 
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allow any disobedience since the moment we accept any form of 
disobedience we will rapidly progress to the bottom of the slope and be 
required to accept all disobedience. Those who argue that the slippery slope 
will lead us to anarchy would prefer that no disobedience be allowed. This is 
a simple solution which provides us with an easily remembered rule. 
However the problem of disobedience is already complex and attempting to 
simplify it with absolute rules is not an equitable solution.  
If we are to agree that there may be, in certain cases, morally justified 
disobedience then how shall these be motivated? To understand this we 
must look at four criteria: disobedience, civil, non-violence and justification. 
These criteria must be analysed and reinterpreted for application in the 
digital environment. These criteria have been chosen for their central role in 
discussions of disobedience but are not universally known as the only 
criteria worthy of discussion.   
Disobedience: This is arguably the most important criteria since without this 
there is no discussion. A tolerance for disobedience is important in a civil 
society but to accept disobedience is not an option since disobedience by its 
nature cannot be permitted. Disobedience stems from the conscious desire 
to protest a law which conflicts with “more stringent obligations” (Rawls 
1999). To comply, even with silent disapproval, does not constitute 
disobedience. To comply, after voicing disapproval, is laudable but not 
disobedience.  
Civil: Disobedience brings with it unattractive consequences such as legal 
and social reactions and therefore there is a strong urge to hide ones 
disobedience. However it is important to remember that the publication of 
the disobedience is a necessary component of the actions and provide a 
greater degree of legitimacy (King 1991, Rawls 1999, Singer 1973). In 
situations where there is risk of great personal harm it is understandable that 
the disobedience does not take place publicly, however, civil disobedience 
generally has a role of public enlightenment (Bedau 1991).  
Non-violence: Due in part to its traditions, there is a misconception that 
equates civil disobedience with non-violent action. Violence on its own does 
not invalidate an action from being civil disobedience. However, it is 
important to note that the use of violence in civil disobedience has been 
shown to take the focus off the message of protest and creates a lack of 
sympathy towards those who use it. Violence is in itself not static and there 
are different levels of violence which may be implemented. Violence can be 
seen from the prevention of others enjoyment of their private property 
(such as the sit-in), the defacement or destruction of property across to the 
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more extreme causing of bodily harm to others. In practice and in literature 
there is no acceptance, within the civil disobedience discourse, in the 
causing of physical harm to others. However often theoreticians allow for 
the prerequisite of non-violence not to include violence to property 
(Månsson 2004). Therefore civil disobedience can include a level of coercion 
or harm but stops short of violence to others.  
Justification: The classic justification of civil disobedience lies in a conflict of 
law with moral principle. Rawls (1999) is quite firm on this point, claiming 
that the protester must appeal to shared principles existing in the morality of 
the general public. Singer (1973) finds the qualification of shared values too 
limiting since the protester must appeal to a pre-existing norm. Another 
point of disagreement between Rawls and Singer is the question of the 
acceptance of punishment. While it naturally shows a great moral courage to 
be prepared to accept the punishment which stems from ones political acts 
– attempts to evade punishment on its own does not make the act less of 
civil disobedience. This is particularly true if the punishment is unduly 
harsh.  
The discussion of whether there is a duty to obey the law is rarely taken to 
this extreme. However, the question of whether there is a duty of obedience 
towards the law and the state is an active one, since the question of when 
disobedience is valid remains. Practitioners of civil disobedience tend to 
justify their actions by pointing to the fact that they are fighting a larger 
injustice and in this role they have the right, some would even claim the 
duty, to break the law. Therefore the disobedients are doing what they 
believe to be morally right despite the fact that their actions unfortunately 
come into conflict with the enforced rules.  
The modern historical developments of civil disobedience begin with the 
work of Gandhi. Spurred on by the success of Gandhi’s approach to non-
violent resistance, the methodology was adopted by King in his successful 
campaign to bring an end to racial segregation laws. The concept of 
disobedience as conceived by Gandhi and developed by King was to draw 
attention to the injustice and in this manner to commence a political 
discussion which would lead to the creation of more just society which is 
the purpose of civil disobedience (Rawls 1999). For many, the use of 
Internet-based civil disobedience was inevitable. The earliest formal 
connections seem to be made as early as 1996, when the Critical Art 
Ensemble (1996) published a book containing a chapter on the topic of 
Electronic Civil Disobedience.  
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Analysis: Actors 
In its simplest form civil disobedience involves defying the law for a good 
cause. It is therefore essentially a conflict between the law and the morality. 
The purpose of this section is to look at the use of civil disobedience in 
online environments to understand what civil disobedience is, and how it is 
implemented, as a political force in the online domain. This study will look 
at three online activities described, by the perpetrators, as acts of civil 
disobedience. These three acts are: email bombing, web defacement and 
denial of service.  
Email bombing: A number of organisations (Pickerill 2003, Klang 2004a, 
Cardoso & Pereira Neto 2004) encourage members of the public to use 
email as a form of protest. This can either take the form of sending a mass 
of emails intended to disrupt the receivers normal email use or it can be 
used to send messages of protest to key individuals. These two methods can 
also be combined. In certain cases all that is provided is the email address 
and a suggested text that can be copied into the body of the email. In other 
cases the system is automated that all an interested protester need do is to 
click on an icon. Examples of organisations, which have used email in the 
latter form expressed above, are Amnesty International, Greenpeace and 
Friends of the Earth (Klang 2004a). 
Webpage defacement: Originally a hacker was a term used for a good 
programmer but today this definition has been overshadowed by the 
definition of the hacker as a person who attempts to gain unauthorised 
access to a computer or computerised system and the information it 
contains. Simplistic and one-sided media discourses on technology are 
common (Kling et al 2005) and hacking is an excellent example of this. The 
discourse has been very much focused on the vulnerability involved in 
connecting an organisation to the Internet and on the dangers represented 
by hackers (Taylor 1999). There is also a strong connection between the idea 
of the good or white-hat hacker, electronic civil disobedience and the 
development of hacktivism (Klang 2005a). However, while the act of 
hacking, or the gaining of illegal access, is in many cases both illegal (Klang 
2005a) and not uncontroversial (Kerr 2003) it is usually the means, and not 
the goal, of an act of civil disobedience. This is not to say that those who 
carry out online civil disobedience are not considered to be hackers, by 
themselves or others (NIPC 2001), but rather that the act of hacking is only 
part of the act of disobedience since it is a necessary component of webpage 
defacement. 
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Webpage defacement entails gaining unauthorised access to a server and 
making modifications to the webpage. These modifications involve the 
addition of messages with or without the removal of the original data. 
Political webpage defacement can be carried out either to effect a political 
decision, such as an election. This was done in 1998 in Sweden, when on the 
eve of the Swedish general election the home page of the right wing 
opposition party was hacked. The page was altered and links to political and 
party information were replaced with links to pornography sites and to the 
left wing party. Defacement can also be carried out to protest government 
policy. This can be seen in the action carried out in April 2003, when the 
web page of the Irish Aviation Authority (http://www.iaa.ie) was hacked. 
The front page was replaced with the text containing the message “The 
people of Ireland demand that the Irish Government deny access to 
Shannon Airport to the U.S. military…The Irish people are told they live in 
a democratic, neutral country. Where is the democracy in the Irish 
government deciding without the vote of the people, that U.S. murderers 
have access to Shannon Airport?” The hacker also included information 
that “Nothing has Been Deleted” therefore no information was lost by the 
Irish Aviation Authority (Klang 2004a). 
Webpage defacements often tend to follow patterns of real world politics. 
Targets often follow areas of tension such as Pakistan and India or Israel 
and Palestine or individual events such as the bombing in Bali, which was 
followed by attacks from Indonesia and Malaysia against South Asian 
targets. Among the more notorious long-term use of defacement as a 
political weapon are the actions of Indian and Pakistani hackers, their 
actions are motivated by the tensions in over the disputed Kashmir territory. 
In his article Srijith (2002) studies over 700 documented Indian webpage 
defacements occurring during a period of 20 months. He points out that 
generally most defacement attacks peak after security flaws are announced 
but he also notes that the trends in India do not mirror this worldwide 
trend. According to Srijith the defacement in India is more politically 
motivated with the most prolific attackers of Indian web pages originating 
from Pakistan. This claim is further corroborated by the anti-Indian 
propaganda left on the defaced pages. 
Denial of Service: The denial of service (DoS) attack is usually described as an 
incident which prevents a legitimate user or organisation from accessing a 
systems resource or the delaying of systems operations and functions (Biegel 
2001, Gibson 2002). The incidents or attacks can be related to a specific 
network service such as email, or to the domain name of the target. 
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Attacking the domain name has the added advantage for the attacker of 
tending to diminish all the victim’s online functions since the domain name 
cannot be resolved. This means legitimate users attempting to access a web-
based service are unable to connect to the server since the server is busy 
responding to false requests for information. This is due to the fact the 
server under attack is busy responding to its attackers’ requests and is unable 
to reply to legitimate users’ requests. The legitimate user, unaware of the 
ongoing attack, will only receive an error message from her browser that the 
server is unavailable. 
Traditionally, the distributed DoS attack entailed the co-ordination of traffic 
to a designated website; this first required the marshalling of many 
protesters to be prepared at their computers to send information at a given 
time to a specific target. These attacks were complex affairs, and required a 
great deal of social cohesion and organisation amongst the protesters, who 
sat alone in front of their computers with only the virtual presence of 
others. To overcome some of these organisational problems, co-ordinating 
software may be used by protestors. Such attacks are known as co-ordinated 
point-to-point DoS attacks. In these kinds of attacks the attackers may use 
software with the same effects as that used in the point-to-point DoS 
attacks. Naturally, the more users and the more sophisticated the software, 
the more efficient the attack. The important issue with this type of attack is 
that it still requires a user to be involved in the attack, and to be efficient it 
requires the gathering of a large group of people who have the time, 
technology and will to carry out the attack. 
While there are different forms DoS attacks, such as TCP SYN flooding, 
ICMP flooding, UDP flooding and ping of death, the most common is TCP 
SYN flooding. These types of attacks that still involve the physical 
intervention of the user have sometimes been called client-side DoS, to 
differentiate them from server-side DoS. While the client-side DoS requires 
the active participation of many like-minded individuals, the server-side DoS 
has no such requirement. To be effective the serverside DoS attack requires 
only one individual and the creation of an army of zombies . In this context 
a zombie is a computer containing a hidden software program that enables 
the machine to be controlled remotely (Gibson 2002). For the purpose of 
the DoS this remote control of other people’s computers is done with the 
intent of attacking a specific victim server. 
The most efficient method of introducing software into other people’s 
computers with the capability of taking control of them at a specified date is 
either by hacking into the computer and installing the software directly, 
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spreading the program in the form of a virus, or including the code within a 
piece of desirable software which the user will download and install himself. 
Two well publicised examples of server-side DoS attacks are the Mafiaboy 
attack, where a 15 year-old known only as Mafiaboy successfully attacked 
websites operated by Yahoo, eBay and Amazon.com (Klang 2004a), and the 
13 year-old who used a DoS attack to take down a California-based 
computer security site (Gibson 2002).  
The advantage of using zombies to carry out the attack on a server is that 
the attacker does not need to disadvantage himself by persuading and co-
ordinating other users in participating in the attack. There is an added 
advantage of increased anonymity, since the attacker’s machine is not 
directly involved in the DoS attack but acts only via its unwitting 
intermediaries – the zombies. With adequate time and effort in preparation 
the number of zombies created can be sufficient to create havoc with even 
the most sophisticated of servers. Naturally, the more time spent in 
preparation, the more likely it is that the plans will be uncovered prior to the 
attack and defences be created which will limit the effects of the attack. 
The Activist Debate 
When attempting to comprehend the driving forces behind the hacker, it is 
important to look beyond our own media imposed images. In his research 
into hacker culture, Taylor (1999) identifies six main driving forces that 
motivate hackers (addiction, curiosity, boredom, power, peer recognition 
and opposition); within the section on peer recognition, Taylor includes 
politically motivated actions. The book is an excellent starting point for 
those wishing to understand the hacker; however, it is important to 
recognise that it is based upon research carried out prior to the growth of 
online activism. Today, any serious work on hackers should recognise the 
effects of a larger group of politically motivated online activists if it is to be 
considered to be complete. 
The actions of DoS attackers are, or are rapidly becoming, illegal. The 
question that therefore needs to be addressed is what it is that drives these 
people to carry out such actions. If they are merely criminals, then we need 
hardly proceed any further. The question is whether there can be any 
legitimacy in their actions. In order to explore this further, we must take a 
closer look at the motives underpinning online activists. This is not as 
simple as it may sound, since the current legal environment does not 
promote the development of an open dialogue between attacker and society. 
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A group of activists dedicated against the trend of clandestine action is the 
Electrohippie Collective. This group uses client-side DoS as a protest 
method and it does so in an open manner. They write:  
…we do not try to bury our identities from law enforcement authorities; any 
authority could, if it chose to, track us down in a few hours. However, because 
some of us work in the IT industry, we do not make our general membership 
known because this would endanger our livelihoods. (Electrohippies 2000).  
Furthermore, the group has taken pains to publish its views in a series of 
publications available online. 
In an attempt to create a dialogue on the subject of the use of DoS as a 
political activism tool, the Electrohippies have employed the sit-in as a 
metaphor and they term their attacks virtual sit-ins. Since they use the client-
side method they do not employ zombie machines, and without zombies 
their actions must be supported by those willing to carry them out. One of 
their claims of legitimacy is that they have the popular support of the 
protesters: “Our method has built within it the guarantee of democratic 
accountability. If people don’t vote with their modems (rather than voting 
with their feet) the action would be an abject failure.” (Electrohippies 2000). 
Since they are dependent upon popular support, in order to have any effect 
their actions must be deemed worthy of support by the protesting 
individuals. To obtain this support, the collective established four principles 
that govern any action they undertake. The principles are proportionality, 
speech deficits, openness and accountability. Proportionality refers to the 
insight that it is not acceptable to disrupt communications without 
justification; the attack itself must not be the focus. The tactic is a means 
and not an end: it brings publicity to an event that is the focus of the action. 
As an example, the Electrohippies (2000) cite their actions against the World 
Trade Organisation, which coincided with the offline protests in Seattle. The 
action can only be legitimate if a speech deficit exists, i.e. a lack of equality 
between the actors within the public discourse. The attack must therefore be 
used to draw attention to this inequality and is not in itself the intended 
goal. The principles of openness and accountability refer to the legitimacy of 
the attack, since without these it would be difficult to argue that the ultimate 
goal is an open discourse. 
The early attacks of the Electrohippies in February 2000 were aimed at 
protesting against the commercialisation of the Internet and therefore they 
protested the presence and influence of online actors involved in electronic 
commerce. The focus of this protest and the motivation and political 
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material presented online (Electrohippies 2000) caused another activist 
group to respond: 
This is the first and most egregious error that the Electrohippies make. It betrays 
their lack of understanding of hacker culture; it also creates a false bridge to their 
own anticorporate bias…It was irrelevant that the targeted sites were commercial 
and had e-commerce components. They could just have easily have been the 
Vatican, a Britney Spears fan site, or Aunt Beuears fan site, or Aunt Beulahs Jam 
page, that is, if those sites represented the same level of prestige and notoriety as 
the actual targets.  (Ruffin 2000). 
Ruffin is a spokesperson for the hacker group known as the Cult of the 
Dead Cow, which claims to be involved in online political activism and is 
therefore opposed to any frivolous use of the Internet as a tool of political 
protest if such use can have negative effects on other activists. They argue 
that using the Internet to protest electronic commerce actors is not a 
legitimate form of civil disobedience (Ruffin 2000) and they also posit that 
the functional equivalency approach to online/offline activities13 is not 
adequate.  
The Electrohippies further compound their misunderstanding of the 
Internet by assuming that the same rules hold in the digital realm as they do 
down on the street. They do not. Where a large physical mass is the 
currency of protest on the street, or at the ballot box, it is an irrelevancy on 
the Internet. (Ruffin 2000). 
The Cult of the Dead Cow are more focused upon technology than the 
importance of popular political participation and they state this clearly when 
they argue for the importance of technology over people in political online 
activism with the words “Programs make a difference, not people” (Ruffin 
2000). They address the problem of the democratic participation of the 
concerned minority (Singer 1973) by maintaining  
…if numbers lend legitimacy - as the Electrohippies propose - then the lone 
bomber who tried to assassinate Hitler in his bunker was wrong and the millions 
who supported the dictator were right. (Ruffin 2000).  
Ruffin (2000) further argues that since DoS attacks are a violation of 
people’s freedom of expression and assembly, “No rationale, even in the 
service of the highest ideals, makes them anything other than what they are 
– illegal, unethical, and uncivil” (Ruffin 2000). The Electrohippies are aware 
of the paradox of using DoS attacks for the purpose of promoting open and 
free speech since they are curtailing the speech of others, but they maintain 
                                                           
13 See Theoretical Focus page 38 et seq. 
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that their actions are justified if their principles are adhered to 
(Electrohippies 2000). In March 2003, virtual sit-ins organised by the 
Electrohippies against the war in Iraq managed to disrupt the Prime 
Minister’s website (www.number-10.gov.uk), causing it to be unavailable on 
several occasions. In response to criticism, they argued that their actions did 
not prevent any communications between the allies but were intended to 
show the use of official websites as a part of the propaganda directed at  
…seeking to sanitise their violation of International human rights law. Action by 
the Collective is therefore valid in order to highlight their violation of 
fundamental rights by a method that seeks to restrict their misuse of the right to 
freedom of expression under the UN Universal Declaration. (Electohippies 
2003). 
In terms of public education the group publishes its views on both their 
politics and their method of protest in a series of publications available 
freely online. This is an attempt to create a dialogue on the subject of the 
use of DoS as a political activism tool they have employed the sit-in as a 
metaphor and they term their attacks as virtual sit-ins.  “Our method has 
built within it the guarantee of democratic accountability. If people don't 
vote with their modems (rather than voting with their feet) the action would 
be an abject failure” (Electrohippies 2000).  
As we can see from the presentation above the Internet has become a de 
facto base for civil disobedience. While the actors themselves are attempting 
to come to terms with acceptable forms for the online disobedience none of 
the actors would deny that the Internet is an important tool for political 
protest. Offline political protest is a not uncontroversial method that has 
both supporters and critics. The same can be said of online political 
protests. The different groups are prone to argue methodologies and 
legitimate protest goals but these disagreements should in no way be 
understood to mean that the Internet is considered to be an unsuitable tool 
for online civil disobedience.   
Analysis: Structures 
It is important to observe that in the discourse on online activism today one 
of the terms being used with alarming regularity is cyberterrorism (Denning 
2000). When invoking the spectre of terrorism it is important to remember 
that today the relevance of the correct label in this case is far from academic. 
If the act of online political activism is seen to be disobedience the courts 
may show tolerance, if it is seen to be criminal the courts will punish it, but 
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if it is seen as terrorism then society will neither tolerate the actions nor 
forgive the proponents. 
From the point of view of the activists the main question is one of obtaining 
the correct degree of disobedience. However from the point of view of the 
regulatory structure the activists’ discussion is irrelevant since all the actions 
described above constitute illegal acts in most jurisdictions. The regulatory 
trend is moving towards an increased level of criminalisation of any 
activities similar to the ones described within this chapter.  
The three forms of online civil disobedience described in this chapter (email 
bombing, web page defacement and DoS) tend to fall into three different 
areas of criminal activities. While the exact mode and form of regulation 
differs between jurisdictions there are areas of wide consensus in the 
approach to the suppression of such acts in online environments.   
Email bombing is the most difficult act to regulate since the individual act 
of sending an email cannot be easily criminalised without encroaching on 
the legitimate use of email. If the attack originates from a single source the 
sending of massive amounts of email has yet to be criminalised in 
jurisdictions such as the UK, USA and Sweden. However this act is being 
redefined as DoS (more on this below). In a recent case in the UK where an 
individual bombarded an ex-employers email server causing it to crash 
explained, that since the email server was set up to receive email – sending 
email could not be a criminal offence. “In this case the individual emails 
caused to be sent each caused a modification which was in each case an 
‘authorised’ modification. Although they were sent in bulk resulting in the 
overwhelming of the server, the effect on the server is not a modification 
addressed by section 3 [of the CMA]”14. This case is under appeal. Similar 
approaches can be found in the USA and in Sweden. While this is not a 
criminal act the injured party may still sue for damages under all three legal 
systems.  
The activity becomes even more complex if the emails do not originate 
from the same sender. This is a traditional modus operandi of Amnesty 
whose letter writing campaigns consist of asking people to copy and send 
physical letters to government officials in countries who are failing to 
respect human rights (Power 2002). This method has been modernised and 
activists can now even send emails. While this will not fall afoul of 
                                                           
14 District Judge Kenneth Grant sitting in the Wimbledon Youth Court on 2 November 
2005. 
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Computer Misuse legislation recent legislation is being implemented to 
prevent SPAM which in addition to preventing SPAM also provides the 
means for the criminalisation of this activity. This use of email has however 
recently been made illegal within the European Union through the Directive 
(2002/58/EC) on privacy and electronic communications which has been 
implemented in the United Kingdom through The Privacy and Electronic 
Communications (EC Directive) Regulations. This regulation criminalises “the 
transmission of unsolicited communications by means of electronic mail to 
individual subscribers…a person shall neither transmit, nor instigate the 
transmission of, unsolicited communications for the purposes of direct 
marketing by means of electronic mail…” (Article 22).  
Due to the wording of this regulation it is interesting to ascertain whether a 
political protest message can fall under the definition of “communication 
for the purposes of direct marketing”. The legal definition of direct 
marketing in the United Kingdom can be found in the Information 
Commissioners (2003) Guidance to the Privacy and Electronic 
Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003 - Part 1: Marketing by 
Electronic Means which begins by stating that the Data Protection Act (DPA) 
defines direct marketing as “the communication (by whatever means) of any 
advertising or marketing material which is directed to particular individuals.” 
The Guidance explains that the term direct marketing covers  
…a wide range of activities which will apply not just to the offer for sale of 
goods or services, but also to the promotion of an organisation’s aims and ideals.  
This would include a charity or a political party making an appeal for funds or 
support and, for example, an organisation whose campaign is designed to 
encourage individuals to write to their MP [Member of Parliament] on a 
particular matter or to attend a public meeting or rally. (p 3). 
This definition therefore covers any use by an organisation wishing to 
market either there ideas or any direct actions which they are planning to 
undertake to any individuals who have not, in advance, accepted that they 
are prepared to receive email from the organisation. 
The legal position on web page defacement is the most clear since the 
defacement entails both entering into the server without permission and 
then changing the information stored therein. This is easily prohibited by 
the traditional offline laws of trespass and criminal damage. However there 
is a move to ‘upgrade’ the action of web page defacement from criminal 
trespass and compare it to an act of terrorism. Political activists who use this 
tactic want to equate defacement with traditional protest comparable to 
hanging a protest sign on a building owned by a corporation against whom 
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the protest is aimed. These are tactics very familiar in the offline world. 
However since the online world contains no street corners or public spaces 
such analogies become difficult to make. Despite this the move to apply 
stricter sanctions to this online behaviour has awoken concern among civil 
liberties groups. An example of this can be seen in the letter addressed to 
Governor Pataki sent by the two civil liberties groups: Center for 
Democracy and Technology and the Electronic Freedom Frontier (CDT & 
EFF 2003). In the letter protesting a bill passed through the New York 
Senate they write:  
This bill is not effective cyberterrorism legislation. It does not distinguish 
between those engaging in petty crimes, and those whose aims are to seriously 
damage a computer network in order to cause physical harm to civilians, severe 
economic hardship, or the crippling of critical infrastructures. CDT and EFF 
believe that these complex issues deserve careful review and public hearings 
before legislation is enacted. We encourage the State of New York to combat 
cyberterrorism, but not to brand as “terrorists” those who commit minor illegal 
acts in cyberspace, just as those who commit civil disobedience offline are not 
punished as terrorists. 
With legislation such as the Cybercrime convention (see more below) states 
are encouraged to view traditionally nuisance actions (trespass and 
defacement) as being comparable to serious criminal acts such as terrorism.   
The legal position on Denial of Service is reasonably straightforward. The 
United Kingdom Computer Misuse Act (CMA) 1990 provides no remedy 
against DoS attacks. It creates three offences: unauthorised access to 
computer material, unauthorised modification of such material, and 
unauthorised access with intent to commit or facilitate commission of 
further offences. This means that the CMA can only be applied in server-
side DoS attacks since these attacks require the use of zombies. The UK 
realised that legislation in this area needed to take technological 
developments into account, and in May 2002 an amendment to the CMA 
was introduced to the House of Lords, which inter alia dealt with DoS 
attacks. It defined what DoS is, and the terms under which a DoS action is a 
criminal offence. The amendment also included changes to ensure that a 
person could be prosecuted for a DoS attack where proof of the action was 
available within the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom. However, the Bill 
was never passed. Legislation which can be used against DoS attacks 
includes the Terrorism Act 2000, which defines terrorism in this context as 
the use or threat of action which is designed to seriously interfere with or 
seriously disrupt an electronic system for the purpose of advancing a 
political, religious or ideological cause. 
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Internet-based crime led to calls for harmonisation of the substantive and 
procedural security laws of EU Member States, and for the UK to ratify the 
European Cybercrime Convention and the European Commission’s 
proposal for a Council Framework Decision on attacks against information 
systems.15 Article 4 of this Decision deals directly with the criminalisation of 
DoS attacks.  
These developments have had the effect of criminalising DoS attacks. 
Additionally, the Convention on Cybercrime reinforces the legal position 
that these acts are criminal offences or should be criminalised, leaving little 
room for interpretation of DoS as a tool of protest. In the case of DoS 
attacks, actions which hinder the functioning of a computer system by 
suppressing computer data are criminsalised by Article 5 of the Convention. 
Despite the increase in legislation in this area, several issues of legal 
interpretation remain unresolved (Kerr 2003) and this creates an 
unsatisfactory position vis-à-vis the predictability of the law. 
In a recent decision16  (May 22, 2006) the First Penal Senate of the Higher 
Regional Court of Frankfurt has overruled a decision of the first-instance 
court of Frankfurt in favour of a group of online civil disobedients. Two 
groups, “Libertad” and “Kein Mensch ist illegal” (No one is illegal), carried 
out an online denial of service demonstration in June 2001. The motive for 
the demonstration was to protest Lufthansa’s participation in deportation of 
immigrants. The court found that the demonstration was not a show of 
force but was intended to influence public opinion. This interpretation had 
the effect of freeing the participants from charges of coercion.  
While this Lufthansa-decision can be interpreted as an important change in 
regulatory direction but it remains much too early to draw such conclusions. 
Discussion 
There is a prima facie moral duty of the individual to follow the law. For 
most, this duty to obey the law is based upon the belief that without this 
obedience either the state would be unable to function or without total 
                                                           
15 COM (2002) 173 final. Adopted in April 2002, it provides a general framework to 
approximate and increase judicial and police co-operation in relation to attacks against 
information systems. Member States had until 31 December 2003 to implement the 
proposed framework. 
16 1 Ss 319/05. 
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obedience some would gain unfair advantages however this position is not 
unchallenged (Raz 1999).  
It is interesting to note that the four criteria of civil disobedience discussed 
above have been developed in a pre-Internet environment and the question 
is whether they can be applied to disobedience in an online environment. If 
the criteria can be transferred into a digital environment then there is no 
reason why the use of digital technology as a form of protest should not be 
viewed as being functionally equivalent to other means of protest and be 
respected as such. If the four criteria do no transfer into the digital 
environment the question then becomes whether the online actions can be 
seen as legitimate forms of civil disobedience and therefore the theoretical 
basis of civil disobedience should be adjusted to fit the reality of the day. 
Alternatively the acts are merely illegal and have no moral justification as 
forms of protest.  
Probably the easiest criterion to fulfil is the question of legality. The actions 
mentioned in this chapter are illegal, or rapidly being criminalised in most 
jurisdictions. The act of criminalisation is taking place both in national 
legislation such as the CMA of the United Kingdom or the American 
PATRIOT Act and in regional developments such as EU directives and the 
Convention on Cybercrime.17 This move towards criminalisation has not 
only involved the loss of civil liberties in general but also brings with it an 
additional threat. This threat is the comparison of cyber crimes with 
terrorism which create a more serious environment for the perpetrator of 
such acts (Klang 2004a, Manion & Goodrum 1999). Civil disobedience will 
always remain an illegal act since, in part, making it legal would remove the 
concept of disobedience but it is important to consider the way in which the 
regulator views such acts. By attempting to classify acts which do little 
damage as terrorist acts not only limits the ability of groups to actively voice 
alternative opinions within the participatory democracy but also belittles real 
acts of terrorism and their victims.  
Online disobedience gives rise to many questions in relation to the term 
civil. Even if we accept that the actions are carried out to create publicity 
and to educate the general public it is interesting to note that online civil 
disobedience has been carried out in two untraditional circumstances. Firstly 
the attacks need not be directed only at state actors but even larger 
multinational corporations have been effected by disobedience. Secondly 
                                                           
17 The Lufthansa-decision mentioned earlier may be a break in this trend but it remains 
too early to draw any such conclusions from this single case.  
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the disobedience is not only limited to citizens within the state they are 
protesting. These circumstances have the effect that the actions fall outside 
the broader definition of civil disobedience put forward by Bedau (1970).  
Taken together online disobedience offers the disobedient party the ability 
to carry out activities which hamper the lawful activities of a private actor in 
another country. This raises questions of legitimacy since the attacked party 
may be following the law and morality of the culture were business is carried 
out. Additionally those carrying out the disobedience are not personally 
effected by the action of the attacked party and therefore must rely on a 
secondary right. They are acting in the name of the injustice carried out 
against others. At first glance this may weaken the legitimacy of the 
disobedience.  
The main complaint concerning violence in relation to online civil 
disobedience activities is in relation to the limitation of user’s enjoyment of 
their property. In situations where webpage defacement, DoS attacks, mail 
bombing or unsolicited mail are used as tactics of civil disobedience they 
tend to impair the users (or the websites customers) legitimate use of 
property. Personal violence or physical harm can be caused if, for example, 
a user is dependent upon a website for information however, to this 
author’s knowledge; no such cases have been reported. Damage to property 
in during these attacks is not necessary and even in the case of DoS attacks 
the web pages or services have been disrupted only for brief periods.   
If we are to see justification as containing an acceptance of punishment (but 
not necessarily a masochistic search for one) and the active presentation of 
ones ideas, subjecting oneself to the evaluation of society, we can then 
evaluate these criteria by an example. The electrohippie collective use client-
side DoS as a protest method and also maintains an open dialogue “…we 
do not try bury our identities from law enforcement authorities any 
authority could, if it chose to, track us down in a few hours. However, 
because some of us work in the IT industry, we do not make our general 
membership known because this would endanger our livelihoods” 
(Electrohippies 2000). They do not hide themselves or their actions but at 
the same time they do not advertise their identities. While the Rawlsian 
approach to disobedience may disapprove of their method, Singer (1973) 
seems to sympathise. 
Discourse Control 
In the press conference presenting the Commission’s proposal for a 
Framework Decision on attacks against information systems, the 
DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGY 
 84
Commissioners created clear links between DoS and terrorism (Klang 
2004a). Since September 11, 2001, as we have seen, discourse on the 
response to terrorism has become increasingly harsh. This has led to greater 
calls for the criminalisation of DoS attacks with little attention being paid to 
their role as a method of peaceful democratic protest. It is often pointed out 
that freedom of expression is the foundation upon which any democracy 
stands, since without the ability to freely spread and collect ideas there 
cannot be a functioning democracy. Naturally, even this right must be 
balanced so as not to seriously hamper the rights of others.  
In the physical world we tolerate (to a varying degree) our lives being 
occasionally disrupted. Environmentalists hang banners across privately 
owned buildings, animal rights protesters may hamper our ability to enter 
fast food restaurants; anti-war demonstrators may hinder our ability to travel 
through city centres as we normally do. At times this toleration depends 
upon the fact that actions offline are conducted in the public sphere or on 
common ground as opposed to private property.  
Our daily lives are also hampered by jubilant rugby supporters cheering the 
homecoming team, crowds viewing royal pageants, or roadblocks and 
diversions set up to protect visiting politicians. Around the world on New 
Year’s Eve there is mass disobedience in the streets as the New Year is 
ushered in. These events are tolerated by society since they are deemed 
important to society. Most protesters believe in the importance of their 
actions. To the rest of society, these actions are mere annoyances. Despite 
this, such annoyances are important since they are the voice of dissent, and 
it is only through the growth of dissent into mainstream thought that 
societal development can take place.  
Therefore the actions of protesters in city centres are tolerated or endured 
even by those who do not share their cause. We have come to understand 
the street or public space as the venue of manifesting public dissent. The 
problem with the Internet is that there is no such space. Everything done 
online is dependent upon privately owned equipment. The lack of public 
space is a serious weakness in developing both online rights and a genuine 
public sphere for online environments. Through the lack of public online 
spheres the Internet is seriously hampered as a place of political discourse. 
Despite the fact that we today feel that the causes people such as King and 
Gandhi fought for were just and their methodology is seen as being worthy 
of our admiration, this does not mean that civil disobedience is 
commonplace and acceptable in society. The goals and methods of civil 
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disobedients in the past are always easier to accept than the goals of those 
protesting against the status quo today. 
On the surface it would seem that society cannot create a right of civil 
disobedience since there can be no permission to disobey. Those who fear 
civil disobedience see a state of anarchy where individuals disobey rules on a 
whim. Fear of this anarchy maintains the status quo: a belief in the ideals of 
civil disobedience, a respect in the past practitioners, but no desire to create 
a toleration of disobedience. 
A common position adopted by those who oppose disobedience is that civil 
disobedience has no place in a democratic society. This argument is based 
upon the belief that democracy is the ultimate form of self-rule, which 
allows the greatest amount of input from the individual on the rule of law 
(Harrison 1995). Therefore, disobedience against the system is not the 
answer since the system itself is meant to be self-correcting and inequalities 
can be changed from within. It is important to make the distinction that 
while the state may be democratic, it does not necessarily follow that all 
practices therein are just. To be able to redress an injustice within this 
system, those who are affected by it must appeal for change. This appeal is 
the process of bringing the injustice under the gaze of those who have the 
ability to create change. Singer has defined the process of disobedience as 
one method for a minority to appeal to the majority to reconsider an 
injustice (Singer 1993). The need for disobedience in such an appeal is 
necessary when the democratic process itself prolongs the injustice. 
Disobedience is therefore not intolerance towards the system but the view 
that allowing the democratic process to run its course perpetuates the 
injustice.  
The fear is that the legitimate actions of people like King will be copied by 
the less scrupulous. While King ensured the justification of his actions by 
using four stages (Determining whether injustices exist, negotiation, self-
purification, and direct action) and also insisting upon non-violence from 
his supporters, it is often assumed that copycats will be less thorough. This 
increase in lawlessness due to the acceptance of disobedience has, however, 
been disputed (Dworkin 1978). 
There is another problem: if we are to objectively accept that disobedience 
is justified for a certain group, then how may disobedience be limited for 
others? This type of argument is often referred to as the slippery slope 
(Volokh 2003), the idea being that we cannot allow any disobedience since 
the moment we accept any form of disobedience we will rapidly slide to the 
bottom of the slope and be required to accept all disobedience. Using the 
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slippery slope to create a feeling of insecurity is not an acceptable solution. 
Such arguments have been used and abused over a long period of time 
(Volokh 2003); their complexity may create a desire to simplify. Let us not 
deny justice for the sake of simple arguments. 
If the protest, even the DoS, is an appeal from a minority group to the 
majority to reconsider, to pay attention to what is occurring within a certain 
situation, then it fulfils a worthwhile purpose. If the effects of DoS attacks 
are ephemeral, the purpose also justifies the cost. Therefore, the creation of 
legislation with the intent of criminalising protest under the guise of 
terrorism is to minimise the openness we presently enjoy in society. 
In his thesis on political terrorism, Bauhn (1989) notes that defining 
terrorism often hinges on the innocence of the victim. While he disagrees 
that the act should be defined by the victim’s innocence, he sympathises 
with previous authors’ attempts to define the actions of the politically 
motivated terrorist. His own definition is founded upon an understanding of 
the difficulties of definition. He defines the terrorist as the perpetrator of 
terror, and “political terroristic acts are violent, intimidatory and…have 
political purpose.”  
While in the main the negative connotation remains, the general concept of 
terrorism has been under development, particularly so since 2001. The 
political discourse on terrorism has shifted the focus from the methodology 
of violent action to the descriptive term for those who would oppose the 
established order. The main change is that whilst in the past a violent 
political group was not necessarily terrorist, today a terrorist group does not 
necessarily have to have committed an act of violence. 
The liberation of the terms terrorist and terrorism from the actual act of 
terror has allowed for a more flexible use of the label. Those who fight 
against terrorism are justified since terrorism is something reprehensible. 
This legitimacy is important since the violence perpetrated by the counter-
terrorist can at times be greater than the violence carried out by the terrorist 
(Gearty 2003). Gearty (2003, p 377) talks of “the deliberate or reckless 
killing of civilians, or the doing of extensive damage to their property, with 
the intention of thereby communicating a political message of some sort to 
a third party, usually but not necessarily a government.”  
While the removal or reduction of the need for violent activity from the 
definition of terrorist has made it easier for the counter-terrorist to 
legitimise violence in the name of combating terrorism, it has also allowed 
for the creation of a more confusing concept of cyberterrorism, which is 
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defined by Denning (2000) as the convergence of terrorism and cyberspace. 
Since the attacks are online, Denning’s terrorist has to be redefined as one 
who attacks or threatens to attack information; she also adds the 
requirement that the attack should “result in violence against persons or 
property, or at least cause enough harm to generate fear”. This final part is 
worrying, since the attack need not cause devastation for the label of 
cyberterrorism to apply; it is enough if the attack generates fear. The 
qualification of fear has not been a necessity when defining or discussing 
offline terrorism. Whether the government or populace is afraid has little 
bearing upon the justification in applying the term terrorism to a political 
action. This addition of fear may be due to the fact that there have been few 
cyberterrorism attacks of any dignity, if indeed there have been any at all 
(Vegh 2002). Despite the publicity and discussions of the vulnerability of 
the information society, the cyberterrorist remains a ghost in the machine 
rather than a serious threat. 
Conclusion  
The politically motivated online disobedient is actively partaking in a 
political discourse, the goal of which is to create a more equitable society. 
The disobedient is exercising fundamental rights of participation in a 
participatory democracy. Traditionally such rights are not limited without 
serious cause. The present trend is the use of hierarchical (Murray & Scott 
2001) regulation to criminalises DoS attacks and more in the name of 
terrorism are much too far reaching and seriously hamper the enjoyment of 
individuals’ civil rights. The blanket limitation of civil rights within a society 
should only be tolerated if the limitation also has the effect of removing a 
serious threat to the society that faces those limitations. The threat of 
cyberterrorism has been greatly overstated and is founded upon a lack of 
understanding of the technology, or even technophobia. If the threat comes 
not from terrorists but rather from criminal use of the DoS technique, then 
the legislation goes too far in its attempts to create order. 
The criteria of disobedience and justification are easily met in online 
environments and do not conflict with traditional theory. The issue of non-
violence is a bit more complex in the sense that the non-violence can be 
interpreted as zero violence, however this is a flawed interpretation as zero-
violence is an unobtainable goal. In the physical world we tolerate (to a 
varying degree) our lives being occasionally disrupted.  
The main issue is one of the moral right (or obligation) to react within a 
globalised civil society. Within traditional theory the protester would ideally 
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be reacting to either to a moral wrong or withdrawing support for a 
government carrying out morally wrongful acts. This limitation should not, 
however, prevent the actions of those who protest in the name of others. 
The a-national nature of information technology has the effect that it can be 
used to conduct global protests to aid those who are unable to create a 
moral majority within their own nation state.  
As this chapter has shown, the online political discourse is being threatened 
and is facing serious discrimination. Activities that would be tolerated or 
endured offline are being persecuted online. The present day attempt to 
create harsher penalties for nuisance offences is a serious threat to the 
development and use of the Internet for online participatory democracy. 
The rush towards criminalisation should be tempered with a toleration of 
political discourse and if the regulator wishing to promote online democracy 
then discrimination of online participation through the overregulation must 
be avoided.  
 89 
5 
Communication 
Genuine poetry can communicate before it is understood. 
T.S. Eliot 
Introduction 
A basic necessity of participatory democracy is the ability to communicate 
freely (Petäjä 2006, Schauer 1982). This is a relatively uncontroversial 
statement until this communication is put into practice. Attempts to 
communicate unpopular information or to communicate information in 
unappreciated manners are often prevented. Therefore the need to protect 
communication within a participatory democracy stems from the need to 
protect the forms of communication that are disliked. Communication, 
which everyone agrees with requires no special protection. Due in a large 
part to the simplified media discourse (Kling et al 2005) the concept of virus 
is almost universally vilified. Regulatory structures in most areas affect a 
unified approach towards viruses and prohibit their creation and 
dissemination. While it may seem easy to regulate the virus, the definition of 
a virus is not easy to achieve without including non-harmful or beneficial 
virus-like code. This causes several non-harmful virus-like applications of 
software to fall under this regulation. The reliance on the simplified view of 
viruses creates a hindrance for certain forms of communication thus 
creating a democratic deficit. The role of freedom of expression is vital 
within a participatory democracy. 
The motivation for the work carried out in this chapter is the discussion, or 
lack of discussion, which preceded and followed the Cybercrime 
Convention. There were concerns raised by different actors concerning the 
implications of the Convention to civil liberties and participatory democracy 
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however these discussions remain relatively anonymous and seldom reach 
the main political agenda. Therefore the interaction between the regulatory 
structures, represented both by national legislation and the convention and 
groups of actors attempting to negotiate and discuss the effects of structural 
regulation became highly interesting for the theme of this work.  
As this chapter will show, the virus is an excellent example of a disruptive 
technology. The computer virus is many things. It is a piece of software, a 
technical artefact, a socially defined and constructed phenomenon (Berger & 
Luckman 1967), and finally it is also a metaphor (Lakoff  & Johnsson 1980). 
The computer virus has become a part of our vocabulary and carries with it 
certain connotations. The development and dissemination of computer 
viruses has brought with it social changes in language, behaviour and 
culture. This specific technology has spawned an industry working to 
prevent its effects.  
There may be those who claim that writing in defence of viruses has no 
place in democracy. In 2003 the Department of Computer Science at the 
University of Calgary offered, as a part of a set of courses on Computer 
Security, a course on computer viruses and malicious software (malware). 
The decision to offer such a course met with protests from computer 
security industry (Bontchev 2003). The arguments against the course reflect 
the prevalent attitude in the computer security industry that there can be no 
such thing as a good virus. The position taken by the computer security 
industry is understandable and natural from their point of view. There is 
however a need to problematise this position. The goal of this chapter is to 
question the negative attitude towards viruses. The reason for this is that it 
is this attitude that informs the structural regulation of this technology. 
Therefore to problematise the virus is to develop a deeper understanding of 
our regulatory structures. 
To better understand the role of both the regulatory structures and the 
actors a specific area needed to be studied. The work in this chapter focuses 
upon the regulation of computer viruses. The harmonising effect of the 
Convention ensures that nation states cannot take an individual perspective 
on the computer virus and its regulation. Therefore it is of particular 
importance to be able to define and delineate the computer virus to ensure 
regulatory coherence and rigour. The purpose of this chapter is to explore the 
regulation of online communication by exploring the attempts by the regulator to come to 
terms with the computer virus.  
Within this chapter the structure is therefore represented by the regulatory 
acts undertaken by a state or a supra-national organisation. The actions of 
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the actors will be represented by actions those parties which the regulation 
effects directly or indirectly purposely or inadvertently. The role of the virus 
in the democratic debate will also be briefly addressed below. At this point it 
is important to point out that if the goal is to promote a pluralistic 
participatory democracy, then regulation should be curbing the negative 
effects of certain things without preventing, or only minimally effecting, 
legitimate uses, which cause no harm.  
Theory  
Traditional arguments on freedom of communication are either found in the 
areas of freedom of the press, freedom of speech or freedom of expression. 
These three areas reflect the technical developments within the 
communications field (de Sola Pool 1984).  Prior to the development of 
voice carrying mass mediums freedom of the press was the focus, prior to 
the development of vision carrying mass mediums freedom of speech was 
deemed sufficient. With the development of television the concept freedom 
of expression comes into focus (de Sola Pool 1984). Today with the width 
of communications technologies available the freedom of communication is 
in focus. Despite the large amount that has been written about freedom of 
expression the main arguments tend to fall into three groups for the 
purpose of free expression: truth, democracy and self-fulfilment (Petäjä 
2006, Schauer 1982). The truth argument is represented by Mill (1980 
[1859]) who argued that the purpose of free expression was to discover the 
truth and to this end he presented four arguments against the limitation of 
the right to freedom of expression. Stated briefly they are:  
First, if any opinion is compelled to silence, that opinion may, for aught we can 
certainly know, be true. To deny this is to assume our own infallibility. 
Secondly, though the silenced opinion be an error, it may, and very commonly 
does, contain a portion of truth; and since the general or prevailing opinion on 
any object is rarely or never the whole truth, it is only by the collision of adverse 
opinions that the remainder of the truth has any chance of being supplied. 
Thirdly, even if the received opinion be not only true, but the whole truth; unless 
it is suffered to be, and actually is, vigorously and earnestly contested, it will, by 
most of those who receive it, be held in the manner of a prejudice, with little 
comprehension or feeling of its rational grounds. And not only this, but, fourthly, 
the meaning of the doctrine itself will be in danger of being lost, or enfeebled, 
and deprived of its vital effect on the character and conduct: the dogma 
becoming a mere formal profession, inefficacious for good, but cumbering the 
ground, and preventing the growth of any real and heartfelt conviction, from 
reason or personal experience. (pp 115-116). 
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Therefore the arguments from truth presuppose that if freedom of 
expression is allowed and unregulated the truth will emerge from these 
discussions and errors will be corrected. Naturally this approach takes for 
granted that the truth will always be positive for a society.  
The democratic argument has its roots in the writings of Spinoza, Hume 
and Kant but its most eloquent modern presentation can be found in the 
work of Alexander Meiklejohn (Schauer 1982). It is based upon primary 
acceptance of democratic principles as the correct mode of state governance 
and includes an autonomous decision maker (Schauer 1982). The 
democratic approach believes freedom of expression to be a necessary 
component in any society that presupposes the population at large is 
sovereign. In these societies freedom of expression fulfils two necessary 
requirements: (i) providing the sovereign electorate with the information it 
needs to exercise its sovereign power, and (ii) making government officials 
and public servants accountable to the population at large (Schauer 1982). 
The democratic approach tends to be biased towards politically oriented 
expression. Communication between the electorate and officials is 
understood to be more valuable than other non-political expression.  
The self-fulfilment argument for free expression focuses on the role of free 
expression in the individuals right to self-development (Schauer 1982). Since 
free expression is a necessary part of the individual’s self-fulfilment any 
limitation to free expression is a hindrance to this fulfilment.  This argument 
is often refered to as the Millian principle since it takes its starting point 
from Mill’s arguments but does not have the same focus on the truth. 
Whether the truth emerges or not, expression is an important element of 
self-fulfilment and therefore should not be limited. An exponent of this 
view, Scanlon (1977), presents the harms that cannot be used to justify legal 
limitations on acts of expression. These are (i) harms to certain individuals 
that consist in their coming to have false beliefs as a result of those acts of 
expression. (ii) Harmful consequences of acts performed as a result of those 
acts of expression, where the connection between the acts of expression and 
the subsequent harmful acts consists merely in the fact that the act of 
expression led the agents to believe (or increased their tendency to believe) 
these acts to be worth performing. Scanlon (1977) accepts limitations on 
expression where such expression causes: direct physical injury or damage, 
produces harmful or unpleasant states of mind, causes others to form an 
adverse opinion, or defamation, or interference with right to fair trial, causes 
panic or constitutes a conspiracy to commit a crime. Despite this list of 
exceptions to the rule the argument for freedom of expression as self-
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fulfilment is strong since it takes its default value that freedom of expression 
is the norm and deviations from this norm must be well motivated.  
The Computer Virus   
While the first use of the term virus to refer to unwanted computer code 
appeared in the 1970s and the first better definition in the early 1980s the 
term computer virus continues to be inexact. While the term does have a 
certain amount of precision in the computer science field this precision is 
based upon a loose consensus as opposed to exact definition. For the 
computer scientist this loose consensus is satisfactory but for the law the 
lack of definition is a major problem in the creation of fair and balanced 
legislation.  
The first problem occurs with the actual term, virus. It was chosen to 
represent three characteristics: first the fact that the code self-replicates, 
second that it is unwanted and third that it is ominous. This is fine for most 
cases but not all programs that are seen under the law as viruses self-
replicate.18 The attempts to define the term have not been all too successful. 
The first formal attempts were made in Fred Cohen’s (1994) doctoral 
dissertation and included types of computer code with the ability to self-
replicate. This definition will therefore include many non-harmful or even 
useful or beneficial programs.  
The term has also captured the interest of the media. The media have used 
the term carelessly and wrongly in defining almost any occurrence of 
computer software failure or the loss of data due to anything from carelessly 
written program code to user error. The virus is an excellent example of the 
medias use of popular suspicion towards unknown technology to create a 
shallow media discourse (Kling et al 2005). A simplified portrayal of viruses 
often repeated in the media is one of ‘malicious’ software. This description 
is hardly useful since code is inanimate and therefore without emotions, 
whether malicious or beneficial. If malicious was to be understood to refer 
to the potential damage then weapons of warfare should also include the 
prefix malicious.  
The problem faced by the law is to be able to define which behaviour it 
wants to criminalize and to do so without preventing rightful or legitimate 
behaviour. To be able to do this the definition the law chooses to use must 
take into consideration alternative factors such as the occurrence of benign 
                                                           
18 Worms and sometimes even Trojans and Logic bombs are seen as viruses under the 
law. 
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viruses, the need for virus research, the role of the recipient of a virus and 
the role of social engineering etc.  
Using the metaphor virus to describe malicious computer code (malware) is 
not a well-chosen one. Based on the Latin word for poison and equated in 
everyday speech with something that should be avoided the legislator often 
forgets that the virus in itself is not necessarily bad. Before continuing a 
working definition of the computer virus must be given. While definitions 
have been debated and argued upon a working definition for the purpose of 
this chapter is necessary. I will use the definition quoted by Brontchev 
(1996) “We define a computer ‘virus’ as a self-reproducing program that can 
‘infect’ other programs by modifying them or their environment such that a 
call to an ‘infected’ programs implies a call to a possibly evolved, and in 
most cases, functionally similar copy of the ‘virus’.” 
Phenomena which are often confused with the virus are Worms or Trojans. 
While these are not viruses they tend to be referred to as viruses by the 
media or the uninformed. This causes additional complexity when 
discussing the legal status of computer viruses. The worm is a program that 
can run independently and travel through networks from one computer to 
another. The worm is also capable of having different segments of itself on 
different machines acting in harmony with each other. Worms traditionally 
do not alter other computer programs but they can be used to carry other 
viruses that have the ability to affect other programs. The fact that the 
worm replicates have led many to class them as viruses since they fall 
naturally into Cohen’s formal virus definition. This chapter will include 
worms in the definition of viruses even though they are technically not 
viruses. This is necessary since the legislation is often enacted without any 
particular concern for the correct terminology. 
One must remember that even those who are staunchly against viruses agree 
that viruses can cause greater or lesser harm. Theoretically viruses can be 
described as being destructive or benign. If benign they cause no damage, 
some may not be noticed by the user at all or they may, for example, display 
a message on the screen or play a sound. If the virus is destructive they are 
able to cause serious damage to the computer system anything from taking 
disk or memory space, occupying the central processing unit and 
introducing the risk of incompatibilities and conflicts. 
What is Infected? 
There are two ways of defining the history and evolution of computer 
viruses, first by looking at the technical development of the virus and 
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second by taking a strictly chronological view of viruses. Since this chapter 
is concerned with the regulation of the computer virus the presentation here 
will be based upon the technical development of the computer virus, 
explaining briefly what each stage of development entails and when suitable 
presenting historical data. The presentation here is a simplification. Many 
viruses are hybrid of several stages of virus evolution. The purpose of this 
section is to give the reader a general understanding of what the computer 
virus is and what it can do.  
In keeping with the metaphor of malicious software as virus, the virus can 
be seen as having a life cycle of stages in which it progresses. The dormant 
phase is when the virus is idle awaiting activation by a specific event such as 
a date or the presence of a program or file. The propagation stage is when 
the virus replicates itself and makes an identical copy of itself into other 
programs or onto system areas on the disk. Each copy is able to propagate 
and therefore recreate itself. The next stage is known as the triggering stage, 
this is when the virus is activated and this moves it to the execution stage 
where the actual event occurs. This could be anything from the destruction 
of data to a more benign act such as a message on the screen. Viruses can 
even have no effect, or no visible effect, at all.  
Viruses may also be defined via this last execution stage. From the execution 
stage viruses can be inserted into four different categories: the file infectors, 
system or boot infector, multi-partite infector and the macro infector. The 
file infectors most commonly attaches itself to program files but are 
generally able to infect any file containing executable code (for example 
script or configuration files) the virus is activated once the file is executed. 
System or boot-record infectors do not necessarily infect a file but tend to 
target the portion of the hard drive used for system processes, including the 
boot-record (the section responsible for booting the operating system). On 
diskettes the viruses can attach themselves to the Master Boot Record and 
replicate themselves onto any media in which the disk is inserted. Multi-
partite viruses infect boot records as well as files. This hybrid virus therefore 
manages to create more damage than either of the two mentioned above. It 
is also therefore more contagious than the previously mentioned viruses. 
The Macro viruses infect macro-enabled documents. When such a 
document is opened, the document executes its macro commands 
automatically. Sometimes the virus is such that the execution does not occur 
unless triggered by the user. 
Another commonly used method in virus description and definition is by 
observing the historical evolution of the virus. This is not the historical 
DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGY 
 96
evolution of a single virus but rather the development of virus code. The 
evolution of viruses has been sub-divided into five different eras, known as 
generations. These generations do not necessarily represent a historical 
overview since first generation viruses are still being created today. The 
generations represent the development of virus creation techniques. Often 
the later generations include the techniques from the earlier generations.  
The first generation are sometimes known as simple viruses were not 
especially impressive. There main ability, sometimes only ability was their 
ability, to propagate. While the effects could be serious, such as the case of 
boot sector viruses which would cause a long chain of linked sectors. In 
program infecting viruses the viruses tended to keep re-infecting the 
infected program. The viruses do nothing to disguise or hide their presence. 
This open re-infection increases the size of the infected programs, which 
facilitates detection by either noting an increase in size or the repletion of a 
section of code.  
The second-generation viruses where able to remedy the flaw in early virus 
manufacture, this was done by making the virus aware of itself. Since the 
first generations continuous growth facilitated detection and therefore 
destruction the second generation would only infect previously uninfected 
files. This is usually done by the virus creating a special signature during the 
first infection. The virus then searches any file for the signature prior to 
propagation. If the signature is present propagation does not take place. 
The third-generation of viruses is sometime known as the stealth virus. They 
are called stealth since they differ from earlier stages of virus evolution by 
the ability to disguise themselves. Scanning the secondary storage and 
searching for a pattern of data unique to each virus could discover earlier 
generations of viruses. Virus writers counteracted this by employing stealth 
techniques. These viruses subvert selected system service call interrupts 
when they are active. For example attempts to perform scans where 
intercepted by the virus and the scan returned the incorrect answer that the 
disks were uninfected.  
The armoured viruses heralded the fourth generation of viruses. This strain 
was designed to evade the anti-virus software by confusing it. Methods, 
which were used, could be the adding of unnecessary code to make 
detection, identification and destruction more difficult. Some fourth 
generation viruses used the concept of attack being a form of defence and 
have the ability to disable the anti-virus software.  
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The latest generation of viruses, the fifth, encrypted or polymorphic viruses 
are again attempting to disguise their existence by mutating. The virus 
infects the target, not with an identical copy of itself but with a mutation. 
The mutation takes the form of a modified or encrypted version of itself. 
The virus is able to modify the code sequences it uses to infect the target or 
encrypting the infecting virus with random encryption keys. This shape 
shifting makes the virus difficult to detect by simple byte matching and 
identification therefore requires the employment of more sophisticated 
algorithms which must be able to decrypt the virus to detect the presence of 
the infector.   
Analysis: Actors 
The original Latin word virus meant poison, our culture has learnt that a 
virus is something to be avoided, and catching a virus is not something to be 
envied. The whole subject matter is connected to negative connotations. In 
the digital world the word has had the same negative connotations and this 
has led to the almost unanimous idea in society, which is reflected in 
legislation, that the virus is bad and therefore the virus must be eradicated. 
Anyone intentionally creating a virus must be a bad person and therefore 
deserves to be punished.  
Bontchev (1996) argues that viruses are bad even if they may have 
potentially “good” or beneficial uses. He begins by stating that technology is 
in itself a neutral and is therefore neither good nor bad it is only the use of 
technology that can be deemed as bad. However he concludes that viruses 
on the whole negative and therefore, according to Bontechev (1996) all 
viruses are bad. From this he arrives at the conclusion that the eventual 
beneficial uses of viruses cannot outweigh their negative effects. Cohen 
(1994) has also argued that there could, in theory, be “good” and beneficial 
viruses. This position is not without its opponents, Kelman (1997) argues 
that virus writing is evil and cannot be justified under any circumstances.  
The position of this chapter is not to argue the absolute good or evil of 
viruses, virus writers or virus spreaders. It is not the role of the regulator to 
define what evil is; definitions of evil should be left to theologians, or maybe 
philosophers. The position of this chapter is to discuss the importance of 
recognising the alternative uses of viruses (if any) and to discuss their 
importance. If there may be important social roles for viruses to play then 
their outright vilification or criminalisation is not a step forward and this is 
something that any legislation and court must address. This chapter will 
present five non-harmful and possibly beneficial uses of virus-like software. 
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The purpose of this list is not to be exhaustive but rather to exemplify 
possible beneficial uses from different realms. The point being that if there 
are beneficial uses for this technology then the regulatory approaches of 
general prohibition is an incorrect one.    
Virus as Art 
Art can be understood as the implementation of skill and imagination in the 
production or creation of aesthetic artefacts, environments or experiences 
that can be communicated to others. Within the concept of art there are 
several modes or methods of expression, some of which are generally 
recognized while others are seen as more extreme. The movements from 
the accepted to the extreme are not fixed in time nor can they be seen as a 
linear development (Ross 1984).  
Any definition of art will either be too limiting or too vague to be useful. 
Art almost defies any real definition. As such it was inevitable that the 
computer software would eventually appraised as an art form in its own 
right. As Bond (2005) writes: “A programming language is a language after 
all, albeit a highly constrained one. As such, it is a perfect medium for the 
poet comfortable with other highly constrained poetic forms like the sonnet 
or haiku.”  
The next stage, to create an aesthetic software virus was therefore an 
inevitable one. Conceived and compiled for the invitation to the 49th 
Venice Biennale (2001), one of the more important European art events, a 
European Net Art Collective presented a computer infected with the virus 
“biennale.py”. The virus was developed by the collective 
0100101110101101.ORG in collaboration with another group known as 
epidemiC. The virus is written in the programming language Python.  
The collective hoped that the main spread of the virus would be limited to 
the source code printed on t-shirts and cd roms. They group has also 
contacted the main anti-virus companies with their virus (Reena 2001) in an 
attempt to minimize any ill effects of the virus. They describe their work as: 
…Biennale.py is both a computer virus and a work of art. The virus is made 
public and spread from the Slovenian Pavilion on the opening day of the 
exhibition, June the 6th 2001. Biennale.py becomes headline-hitting news, 
suddenly turning into an unprecedented performance, a controversial work of art 
revealing how media hysteria can be theoretically provoked and raised. Following 
the spreading of the virus, Symantec Corporation, world leader in Internet 
security technology, detects Biennale.py and starts the hunt. Eva, 
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0100101110101101.ORG's spokeswoman, says: «As part of an organization that 
produces art, my only responsibility is to be irresponsible».19 
The subject of computer code art has also been discussed for a few decades 
(Bond 2005) which is unsurprising considering the brief amount of time 
software has been available compared to other more traditional art forms. 
The aesthetics of software were addressed by Donald Knuth on his 1972 
ACM Turing Award lecture entitled “Software as Art” (Bond 2005).  
Lucidity is often pursued as an aesthetic goal unto itself and, when it is achieved, 
it can impart the most powerful of all reactions. In this respect, a lucid program 
exhibits a beauty analogous to the beauty exhibited by a profound mathematical 
theorem, or theory of physics. Typically, it is the mathematically oriented 
computer scientists who produce the great works in this genre. (Bond 2005, p 
121). 
Therefore the question is not whether a software virus can be an aesthetic 
representation but rather whether there is room for these forms of 
representations within the IT-based participatory democracy. 
Virus as Advertising 
Advertising is all about transferring information about products, services, 
opinions, or causes to public notice for the purpose of persuading the public 
to respond in a certain way toward what is advertised. There is little dispute 
about the power of advertising to inform and influence the intended 
audience, nor is their much dispute of the importance of advertising to the 
advertiser. The ability to market the message and inform the public is often 
a matter of survival for the advertiser. There are important issues 
concerning the ability of small organisation to reach a wider audience. 
Established marketing techniques are often too costly and beyond the reach 
of smaller organisations. 
The use of information technology has been suggested as a method for less 
wealthy groups to be able to reach a wider audience. Human rights 
organisations have seen an upswing due in part to their ability to find new 
members via information technology (Castells 1997, Hick & Teplitsky 2000, 
Meikle 2002, Pickerill 2003, Walch 1999). The question then is what part of 
the information technology can be used as a part of advertising.  
One such example is the Prolin worm. The W32.Prolin.Worm uses 
Microsoft Outlook to email a copy of itself to everyone in the Outlook 
address book. The worm moves all .mp3, .jpg, and .zip files to the root 
                                                           
19 http://0100101110101101.org/home/biennale_py/index.html 
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folder. It renames each of these files and appends the following text to the 
extension of each file: “change atleast now to LINUX”. 
The W32.Prolin.Worm uses Microsoft Outlook to email a copy of itself to 
everyone in the Outlook address book. It sends an email with the subject 
message “A great Shockwave flash movie” and contains the message 
“Check out this new flash movie that I downloaded just now ... It's Great 
Bye” in the body. The attachment is named Creative.exe. The worm creates 
a copy of itself with the name Creative.exe in the C:\Windows\Start 
Menu\Programs\Startup folder. The worm will run each time Windows is 
started. Finally the worm leaves this text message in the root folder:  
“Hi, guess you have got the message. I have kept a list of files that I have 
infected under this. If you are smart enough just reverse back the process. i could 
have done far better damage, i could have even completely wiped your harddisk. 
Remember this is a warning & get it sound and clear... - The Penguin” (Klang 
2004a, 2005a). 
Another example is the MacMag Peace virus. The MacMag virus printed 
this message on the screen of Apple computer users: “Richard Brandlow, 
the publisher of MacMag, and his entire staff would like this opportunity to 
convey their universal message of peace to all MacIntosh users around the 
world.” (Branscombe 1995, p 92) After displaying the message, the virus 
deletes itself. Although MacMag is not designed to be malicious, infected 
systems can display a variety of problems (Klang 2004a, 2005a) 
These two examples show how viruses may be used to transmit messages to 
a wider audience. While the recipient may not be pleased to receive this 
message or she may even be annoyed to receive it the question is whether 
this is enough of a reason to prohibit such communication. While the Prolin 
example caused minor damage in terms of annoyance the level of damage 
caused by the MacMag example must be seen as being exceedingly low. It is 
a relatively easy task to find people who are disturbed by more traditional 
advertising such as billboards and neon signs but this alone is not enough to 
stop this form of provocative communication.  
Virus as Free Expression 
Freedom of expression is a fundamental human right described in the first 
session in 1946 by the United Nations General Assembly as the touchstone 
of all the freedoms to which the United Nations is consecrated 
(A/RES/59(1): Para.1). Freedom of expression is often described as the 
precondition of individual self-expression, self-fulfilment and true 
democracy. The right of expression is, to paraphrase Orwell, the right to tell 
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people what they do not want to hear. It is just this value of telling society 
what it does not accept to be true or given where free expression plays its 
most important role. To express an opinion shared by everyone is not 
something that requires legal protection. To express that which is 
uncomfortable does.     
Despite its importance it is not an absolute. The freedom of expression can 
easily come into conflict with other rights enjoyed by society and this 
balance of rights must be carefully weighed and balanced in an open society. 
First, can a virus writer or distributor be exercising the right of free 
expression and if so should this right be curtailed? Suffice to say that 
whether we choose to look at philosophy from Mill to Habermas, 
international or regional conventions or national law in most cases the 
writing and distribution of programming code, benign or malicious must be 
viewed as a communicative act of expression.  
There is, however, no doubt that this expression may be curtailed. The 
classical example that no man may cry “fire” in a crowded theatre is an 
excellent analogy. The freedom exercised must not cause harm. This then is 
the necessary balance that must be achieved if the legislator is to attain the 
goal of both freedom of expression in the case of computer viruses while 
maintaining a secure environment and protecting property. 
The Helpful Virus 
There have previously been theories proposed as to what a beneficial virus 
could be. Researchers such as Cohen (1994) and Bontchev (1996) have 
proposed both beneficial uses for viruses and rules for which these may be 
used. Examples put forward to exemplify the concept of the helpful virus 
are viruses used in research and development. The creation and study of 
viruses under controlled conditions is an often-cited need for the 
advancement of anti-virus research. There have also been experiments, 
mainly within closed networks, to use viruses and worms to help users with 
updates, bug-fixes and general security issues.  
Virus as Artificial Life 
I think computer viruses should count as life. Maybe it says something about 
human nature, that the only form of life we have created so far is purely 
destructive. Talk about creating life in our own image. (Hawking 1994, p 1). 
In 1997 the Tierra project announced that they had successfully conducted 
and experiment with the evolution of artificial life. The research was based 
upon computer programs that were capable of Darwinist evolution. The 
study was to increase the further knowledge on evolution and the biologist 
DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGY 
 102 
Thomas Ray used computer programs similar to viruses to be able to 
understand how the evolutionary process works. The goal of the project was 
to show that the organisms could survive under conditions of free evolution 
and secondly, to develop a digital model of the Cambrian explosion of life 
which took place on Earth about 530 million years ago when the first 
multicellular creatures with hard parts suddenly evolved. 
The question as to whether computer viruses also may be seen as artificial 
life has been discussed by Spafford (1994) in this article he discusses ten 
criteria for the definition of life and compares them to the behaviour of 
computer viruses. He concludes that the computer virus is something akin 
to artificial life but cannot be refined to develop into an artificial life form. 
Despite the fact that Spafford (1994) does not believe that the virus may be 
refined into an artificial life form he concedes that the study of viruses is an 
important one. 
Analysis: Structures 
The legislative approaches to computer viruses tend to follow the general 
arguments found in the relatively uninformed media debates (Kling et al 
2005). Those who would speak in favour of computer viruses are 
considered to be naïve or misguided since they do not comprehend the 
damage malicious viruses cause and since malicious viruses cause damage to 
property they are inherently bad and must be prohibited. Those who argue 
against the computer virus are often seen as being either anti-virus 
corporations attempting to create scares or law enforcement officials who 
have no appreciation of either the rights and necessities involved in the use 
of computer viruses.   
Another issue is the fact that the term “virus” is often inadequately defined 
in legal texts. This lack of adequate definition leads to the problem that 
many benign, healthy and helpful programs fall under the definition of 
computer virus. This does not necessarily mean that the creators and 
distributors of these programs will be prosecuted but what it does mean is 
that there is an uncertainty in the law. The need for predictability and 
certainty is not satisfied when the law states not what a virus is but allows 
the virus to be either the fact that unwanted damage occurred or the fact 
that the regulator disapproved of the program. 
Spanning the possible width of legislative approaches is the liberal laissez 
faire combined with the free expression arguments to the restrictive 
approach of full criminalisation. The free expressionists tend to attempt to 
argue that the law should not limit their expression via viruses. The laissez 
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fair approach seems often to be seen as a lack of action or it can take the 
position of “wait and see”.  
The arguments, for full criminalisation, are based upon the concept of the 
virus as an indisputable evil and as such have no place in society. Kelman 
(1997) equates virus writers to murders and terrorists. 
As a staunch defender of Free Speech and the rights of young people to 
experiment with their lives in recent months I have had to face up to some 
unpalatable facts - virus writing is evil and cannot be justified in any 
circumstances. It follows that prosecution of virus writers is something which 
should be universally accepted as appropriate action. Virus writing needs to be 
recognized as a criminal act by international conventions and virus writers should 
always be subject to extradition.  Just like murderers and terrorists, virus writers 
should find no escape across national boundaries. And the investigation of 
computer viruses needs to be a regulated activity with failure to apply for 
regulation being a criminal offence.  
Kelman (1997) therefore advocates the addition of the computer virus 
writer to the list of criminals that, under international law, are to be seen as 
terrorists or war criminals. They are to be offered no harbour or defence for 
their actions. This approach is frightening since it is all to simple to point to 
other actions or uses of technology that have caused more pain, suffering or 
human and property damage without achieving any of the status argued for 
here.  
While both these extremes are positions, which should be avoided the latter 
position is more worrying since it does not attempt to define what it is that 
actually makes a virus writer a terrorist. Without an adequate definition 
anyone who writes or modifies computer code can fall into this category 
irrespective of any criminal intent.  
What is the Crime? 
One question in looking at what should be protected and what should be 
criminalised in connection to computer viruses is the question of which 
effects the virus has. There are seven different basic criminal acts, which 
could be of special interest in connection to viruses. The first is the actual 
writing of the code, which could be seen as a preparation to commit a 
crime, second is unauthorized access, which occurs when the virus enters 
into a new computer without the authority of the legitimate user. Third is 
the question of unauthorized modification, which could be the infection of 
a file, boot sector, or partition sector. Fourth, is loss of data, the effects of 
the virus may be that the data is no longer accessible by the legitimate user. 
Fifth may be the endangerment of public safety due to the failure or 
DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGY 
 104 
reduction of efficiency of the computers. Sixth, the making virus code 
available to others may be seen as incitement. This includes making available 
viruses, virus code, information on virus creation, and virus engines. 
Seventh is denial of service, which may be the effects of the virus. The 
second issue, which must be addressed, is how to deal with the actions of 
preparation to commit and attempt to commit. Also the legislation should 
take into consideration mitigating circumstances, minor offences and the 
actions of the recipient.20 
The issue is not one of regulation or not. There is obviously a need for anti-
virus legislation. But not in the sense of virus legislation as it is today. There 
is a need for the legislation of malicious software no matter the form. There 
is also a necessity of clarifying the responsibility of legitimate software that 
causes harm or property damage However this case study will limit itself 
specifically to the role of viruses and not to this latter larger issue of 
clarifying the responsibility of legitimate software which causes harm or 
property damage. The following three sections will present virus regulation 
within three different jurisdictions. 
The United Kingdom Approach 
Prior to legislating against computer viruses, tort law and the Criminal 
Damage Act where used. In the case of Cox v Riley21 charges were brought 
under the Criminal Damage Act 1971 which states: 
A person who without lawful excuse destroys or damages any property belonging 
to another intending to destroy or damage any such property…shall be guilty of 
an offence. 
Cox was employed to work a computerised saw. The equipment in question 
consisted of a powered saw whose operations could be controlled by means 
of the insertion of a printed circuit card containing a number of computer 
programs. The equipment contained a program cancellation facility. This 
was used by Cox, deliberately and without due cause, so that the programs 
were erased and the saw rendered useless until it was reprogrammed. The 
Divisional Court held that the critical factor was that as a result of Cox’s 
conduct, the saw’s owner was required to expend time and money in 
restoring the saw itself to its original condition. 
                                                           
20 Little or no room has been given to this issue in this work. The role of the recipient is 
crucial in the limitation or damage. 
21 (1986) 83 Cr App R 54. 
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The need to improve legislation to also include computer equipment into 
the Criminal Damage Act was clear. The Law Commission expressed the 
view that difficulties had been encountered in the bringing of prosecutions 
under this Act. Acting on its recommendations, the Computer Misuse Act 
was enacted which provides in section 3 that an offence will be committed 
by a person who causes a modification to the contents of a computer 
system with the intention of impairing its operation. The Act also modifies 
the Criminal Damage Act to make it clear that for the purposes of the 
Criminal Damage Act 1971 a modification of computer software shall not 
be regarded as damage unless the effects impair the physical condition. 
Section 3 of the Computer Misuse Act 1990 refers to the unauthorised 
modification of computer material. This section must be read in conjunction 
with section 17, which is concerned with the interpretation of the Act. From 
section 17 we can surmise that section 3 covers a wide range of different 
activities. It covers all form of intentional alteration and erasure of programs 
and data (Computer Misuse Act 1990 (s.17(1)(a))) where the intention is to 
impair the operation of the computer or hinder the use for the legitimate 
user. It is important to note that recklessness is not sufficient mens rea for 
this offence (Wasik 2000). 
Soon after the enactment, the Court of Appeal delivered its judgment in the 
last computer related case brought under the 1971 Act. In R v Whitely, the 
intentional alteration of information contained on a computer disk caused 
significant impairment to a range of computer systems including some used 
in connection with medical research. He was convicted of offences under 
the Criminal Damage Act. The Court of Appeal sustained the convictions 
holding that damage to the contents of computer systems constituted 
criminal damage in the same manner as damage done to tangible property 
under the same Act despite the fact that changes in the magnetic particles 
on the disk could not easily be viewed (R v Whitely [1993] FSR 168 (CA)). 
A more recent case was that of “the Black Baron” - Christopher Pile 
released a toolkit, named SMEG, which could randomise the code of 
existing viruses and therefore making them more difficult to detect, he also 
released two SMEG viruses called Pathogen and Queeg. These viruses 
where both polymorphic and encrypted, they displayed messages such as 
this one for the Pathogen virus: 
Your hard-disk is being corrupted, courtesy of PATHOGEN! 
Programmed in the U.K. (Yes, NOT Bulgaria!) 
[C] The Black Baron 1993-4. 
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Featuring SMEG v0.1: Simulated Metamorphic Encryption Generator! 
‘Smoke me a kipper, I`ll be back for breakfast.....’ 
Unfortunately some of your data won't!!!!! 22 
Pile was charged under the Computer Misuse Act and in 1995 he was 
sentenced to 18 months in prison (R v Pile (1995) unreported). 
A noteworthy aspect to consider in the move towards criminalisation is that 
even if the act becomes criminalised the damages caused are not 
automatically resolved. The person or organisation must still apply for 
damages despite any criminal court proceedings prosecuted by the state.  
The United States Approach 
Before legislation in the eighties the American courts used common law 
principles to prosecute computer crime. Most often, drawing analogies 
between ordinary crimes and the new situations created by the new 
technology. It became a difficult task to attempt to analogise virus 
distribution to traditional common law transgression such as trespass. The 
increase in technology use led to further cases and the widespread realisation 
that legislation was required to improve the situation. 
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 replaced the first piece of 
legislation (The Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act of 1984) this was a marked improvement in clarity and usability. This 
new Act specified that “unauthorized access to a government computer” 
was a felony, and “trespass into a federal government computer” was a 
misdemeanour. The difficulties with this act became clear in its usage. It 
soon became clear that the Act prescribed a too narrow standard of 
culpability (Colombell 2002). The Act required that the virus writer or 
distributor must “knowingly” or “intentionally” cause the damage. This 
becomes difficult to prove due to the fact that once the virus is released it is 
almost impossible to know how and where it will strike and therefore also 
which damages it may cause.  
More recently there have been amendments to the legislation concerning 
virus regulation in the form of the 2001 PATRIOT Act (Field Guidance 
2001). In Section 1030(c), the PATRIOT Act amends the penalties for 
hackers that damage computers and also it eliminates mandatory minimum 
sentences. Prior to the amendment offenders violating section 1030(a)(5) 
could receive no more than five years imprisonment while repeat offenders 
                                                           
22 http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/smeg.pathogen.html 
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received up to a maximum of ten years. It was felt that these sentences 
where inadequate to deal with such offenders, such as the creator of viruses, 
like the Melissa virus, which caused huge damage (Klang 2004a, 2005a). 
Previous law also included mandatory sentencing guidelines with a 
minimum of six months imprisonment for any violation of section 
1030(a)(5), as well as for violations of section 1030(a)(4) (accessing a 
protected computer with the intent to defraud). The amendment (Section 
814 of the Act) raises the maximum penalty for violations for damaging a 
protected computer to ten years for first offenders, and twenty years for 
repeat offenders (18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(4)). At the same time the amendment 
removes the mandatory minimum guidelines sentencing for section 1030 
violations. 
The Swedish Approach 
As early as 1992 the Datastraffrättsutredning (1992) suggested that a new type 
of (allmänfarlig) crime should be created in Swedish law. The crime was to 
prevent the manufacture and spread of computer virus. The wording of the 
legislation was to prevent the manufacture of program code that was created 
with the intent to alter data without the consent of the data owner. It was 
also to prevent the spreading of code that had the ability to cause a danger 
of data loss. Despite the interest in this proposed legislation no measures 
have been taken by the government in the creation of any such legislation. 
There is no specific prohibition on the manufacture of viruses or malicious 
software under Swedish law. However, the manufacture and spreading of 
malicious code (computer virus) can fall into several criminal categories such 
as illegal computer entry (dataintrång), criminal damage (skadegörelse), and 
sabotage (sabotage).  
Illegal computer entry, according to the Swedish Criminal Code 
(Brottsbalken) Chapter 4 Article 9(c) states that anyone who without 
authorisation gains access to data or without authorisation makes changes or 
erases data will be sentenced to illegal computer entry to fines or 
imprisonment for up to two years. The legislation on criminal damage (Ibid 
Chapter 12) is both simple and clear. Destruction of, or damage to, 
property, which affects another’s rights to said property would be sentenced 
to fines or imprisonment for a maximum of six months. Sabotage (Ibid 
Chapter 13 art. 4) is more concerned with the damage or destruction of 
property which is of vital importance to the defence of the realm, public 
maintenance, the process of justice or administration or the maintenance of 
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public order and public safety shall be sentenced to imprisonment for the 
crime of sabotage for a period of a maximum of four years. 
The ability to prosecute the perpetrator involves a problem of a legal-
technical nature. This is due to the fact that for responsibility for these 
actions to be sentenced, the attack must be directed towards a certain target, 
for example a certain data. The prosecutor must also be able to show that 
the perpetrator had intent to cause the damage to the target. This is often 
very difficult to prove since the virus manufacturers or distributors are 
usually unaware of the full extent of the damage their virus may cause. If 
data, which is damaged by a virus, can be seen as damage to property 
(sakskada) then this can lead to a claim of damages even in a non-criminal 
use of viruses. A condition for a successful claim for damages is that they 
have been caused by criminal negligence.  
Since July 1, 2001 the law has been amended to also criminalize the 
manufacture of viruses. The purpose of the change was also to clarify that 
not only physical, but also “immaterial” objects can be seen as such criminal 
aides that are included in the crime of “preparation to commit a crime” 
(Ibid Chapter 23). The preparatory works specifically mention computer 
viruses, computer programs exclusively manufactured to gain illegal entry or 
other types of crimes such as forgery (Proposition 2000). 
In the crime of “preparation to commit” the law does not require that the 
manufacturer of a virus has had the intent to commit a specific attack but 
rather that there is an intent to commit a certain crime, sooner or later. 
Convention on Cybercrime 
The Convention on Cybercrime includes provisions dealing with illegal 
access and interception of computerized information of any kind, including 
data and system interference. Some provisions contained in the draft treaty 
limit the production, distribution, and possession of the software used by 
hackers to exploit computer vulnerabilities. 
The most important regulatory tool at present is the Cybercrime 
Convention (2001) since it has recently been adopted and is in the process 
of being ratified in several countries. It is both an instrument of 
harmonisation and a harsh instrument which will become the de facto 
standard of regulation for many of the activities described in this thesis. This 
convention has been heavily criticized for many things, amongst others, the 
way in which it was developed, its lack of concern for privacy and human 
rights and its tendency to grant sweeping powers to police and investigatory 
agencies (Akdeniz 2005). Amongst the many acts, which the draft 
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convention attempts to regulate, is the creation and distribution of the 
computer virus.  
Article 4 – Data interference 
1. Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary 
to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed 
intentionally, the damaging, deletion, deterioration, alteration or suppression of 
computer data without right. 
2. A Party may reserve the right to require that the conduct described in 
paragraph 1 result in serious harm. 
The aim of Article 4 is to provide computer data and computer programs 
with protection similar to that enjoyed by corporeal objects against 
intentional infliction of damage. The protected legal interest here is the 
integrity and the proper functioning or use of stored computer data or 
computer programs.  
In paragraph 1, ‘damaging’ and ‘deteriorating’ refer to the alteration of 
computer programs or data. Deletion is equated with the destruction of a 
corporeal thing since deletion makes data useless or unrecognisable. The 
concept of suppressing data is the making of data unavailable to the 
legitimate user. Alteration refers to the modification of existing data and 
would include the addition of viruses, Trojan horses and logic bombs etc. 
The actions in Article 4 are only punishable if they are committed without 
authorisation and the offender must have acted with intent.  
The second paragraph allows for legislation to include the proviso that 
criminalisation must require serious harm. The concept of serious harm is 
left up to each legislating state to decide but each state is under obligation to 
notify the Secretary General of the Council of Europe of their interpretation 
if use is made of this reservation possibility. 
Article 5 – System interference 
Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to 
establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed 
intentionally, the serious hindering without right of the functioning of a 
computer system by inputting, transmitting, damaging, deleting, deteriorating, 
altering or suppressing computer data. 
The purpose of this provision is to criminalise the intentional sabotage 
which prevent the lawful use of computer systems, here computer systems 
also include telecommunications facilities, by using or influencing computer 
data.  
The attempt is to create a level of protection for the legitimate interests of 
the users of computer or telecommunications equipment. The term  
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“hindering” refers to any and all actions that interfere with the proper 
functioning of the system. This could be anything from inputting, 
transmitting, damaging, deleting, altering or suppressing computer data.  
To create criminal sanctions it is not enough that hindering has taken place 
it is also necessary for the hindrance to be of a serious nature. Each state 
shall be able to define for itself what the level of seriousness may be. The 
drafters of the convention, however, consider serious  
…the sending of data to a particular system in such a form, size or frequency that 
it has a significant detrimental effect on the ability of the owner or operator to 
use the system, or to communicate with other systems (e.g., by means of 
programs that generate “denial of service” attacks, malicious codes such as 
viruses that prevent or substantially slow the operation of the system, or 
programs that send huge quantities of electronic mail to a recipient in order to 
block the communications functions of the system). (Cybercrime Explanatory 
Report 2001). 
Misuse of Devices (Article 6) 
With paragraph 1(a)1 the idea was to criminalise the production, sale, 
procurement for use, import, distribution or otherwise making available of a 
device, including a computer programme, designed or adapted primarily for 
the purpose of committing any of the offences established in Articles 2-5 of 
the present Convention. In this section ‘distribution’ refers to the active act 
of forwarding data to others, while ‘making available’ refers to the act of 
making available by the placing of said devices online for others to 
download and use. This also includes the disputable act of linking to a 
computer virus.  
The Convention goes quite far in its criminalisation of the computer virus. 
The creation of a virus will become, under this convention, a criminal 
offence, the same with the distribution of any virus programs. The 
interesting issue is that even a hyperlink to a virus will entail prosecution for 
distribution. One cannot help but wonder how far the crime of linking to 
material can be interpreted as being a criminal act. 
Discussion 
It is necessary to be clear upon one point: The spreading of software, which 
causes damage to others property, is not what this chapter seeks to defend. 
The purpose of this chapter is to question which issues present and future 
regulation must take into consideration when dealing with computer viruses. 
One point that becomes quickly clear is the fact that the term virus is not 
one which can, or should, be used by regulators since the term does not 
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clarify the problem. When it is defined it is badly defined at best and 
without definition the term serves no useful purpose except to create a 
spectre which to persecute. Besides the point that the term virus is 
exceedingly inaccurate this chapter attempts to show that the term virus can, 
and does, include several uses that may not be such as to warrant 
criminalisation.  
If we are able to create a virus as an art form, that must necessarily include 
the proviso that it does not damage other people’s property or harm their 
persons, the suppression of a creative form of expression is to be equated 
with censorship. Censorship is not only an abusive practice it is also today 
frowned upon in open societies. The practice of censorship has long been 
used to suppress that which does not please the mainstream of society (for 
more on this topic see Chapter 9). The question, which must be posed, is 
whether a virus can be spread without damaging other people’s property, 
this question is often answered in the negative. The reason for this negative 
response is the fact that viruses take up space on other people’s computers 
that therefore prevents them from using their property to the full extent. 
There are three interesting points that can be raised against this. The first is 
the question of whether today computer storage memory can still be seen as 
the limited resource it once was. Secondly there is the question of whether 
the argument of disk space can be used against many badly designed 
programs which tend to use more than their needed space on the disk and 
finally, can this be a valid argument if the program code destroys itself and 
leaves no lasting damage. Any legislation, which states that viruses are 
forbidden, will go beyond that which is necessary and border upon 
censorship.  
If there can be such a thing as an advertising virus which fulfils the same 
requirements as the artistic (self destructing and non-damaging) the question 
again can be posed – should the regulator go so far as to outlaw the virus. 
The marketing virus should be dealt with under marketing law in much the 
same way as spam or the irritating pop-up windows.  
The question of viruses being used either to market human rights groups is 
no different from the marketing argument above. But one of the least 
discussed issues is whether a damaging virus can be used for good. As 
earlier mentioned Bontchev (1996) reminds us that viruses are only 
technology and as such neutral, this means that it is only in the actual use 
that we can define if the virus is good or evil (Kallinikos 2005).  
In the legal debate we often see actions not only from their effects but also 
we attempt to value the actions based upon the intentions of the 
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perpetrator. In certain cases we allow harmful acts if they are done to 
prevent a greater evil. One such example is the permissibility of the use of 
force in self-defence or in the protection of property. On the web there is a 
growing practice of hacktivism (Klang 2004a, 2005a) (for more on this topic 
see Chapter 4). This is the use of hacker techniques to either change the 
message on others web pages or to use multiple browsers to access a site 
thus preventing (in theory) legitimate use of the site. These denial-of-service 
attacks can be seen as being a form of picketing or demonstration, but they 
can also be seen as being a form of trespass (Klang 2004a, 2005a). What 
would be the role of a virus used for these purposes and how should the law 
deal with the desire of the populous to protest and the rights of corporate 
individuals.  
There is also the issue of useful software containing much of the same 
characteristics as the computer virus. Both naturally helpful programs which 
help the user carry out tasks such as copying files, updating systems and 
more and the more specific programs created for either virus research or 
research into such areas as the Cambrian explosion mentioned above. The 
limitation of the use of any programs that would fall under a definition of 
virus would in this case be more of a hindrance than a help to the legitimate 
user or society at large. 
The question therefore remains whether legislation has gone too far? And 
what should the alternative approach be. One interesting methodological 
approach is the use of functional equivalency23. The main concept is 
transferable to virus legislation. Instead of creating new and nationally 
diverse legislation the idea is to allow the courts a greater amount of 
independence when deciding upon cases involving new technology. This 
approach is most closely seen in the type of legislation adopted by Sweden 
in its attempts to come to terms with viruses. 
No matter which legislative approach is chosen the problem is here to stay. 
Not only have we only seen the beginning of the problem with the insertion 
of more technology and more computer code into everything from mobile 
telephones, cars, fridges and any hand-held device, the computer virus as a 
menace and as a fact will become a common event. The interconnectedness 
(Kallinikos 2005) of devices will additionally lead to the problem of not 
being able to limit the spread to certain types of devices. Therefore the 
                                                           
23 See Theoretical Focus page 38 et seq. 
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traditional defence of isolation will not work to protect our devices from 
each others viruses.   
The width of choices for different countries in legislating viruses will make 
for interesting cases where countries such as the United States penalising 
virus writers with jail terms running into decades while other countries may 
be choosing to fine its viruses writers. The cybercrime treaty is one way to 
go but as we have seen with other such ideas the application of 
multinational treaties are difficult to ensure.  
Today, and for a long time into the future it is still up to the legitimate user 
to take precautionary measures to ensure the integrity of their systems. The 
question is when will the law begin to demand a reasonable standard of care 
from the legitimate users. Is it fair to cry foul when a virus infects a system 
and damages data if it was triggered by an employee wishing to read an 
anonymous love letter or see nude pictures of tennis stars (Klang 2003a). 
The effects of the social engineering of the virus must eventually be taken 
into account if virus legislation is to become well balanced. By now anyone 
who opens unknown attachments should know (or should be informed) 
that they are playing with fire. 
The legislation of viruses is a serious affair. The concept itself is shrouded in 
mystery and fear. This is not a good basis for a balanced and fair debate but 
tends to be the basis of a witch-hunt. The creation of destructive software 
must obviously be dealt with swiftly and efficiently by the law in the same 
manner as any other form of criminal damage. At the same time the new 
legislation must not be used to give sweeping powers to the courts to 
remove anything that does not conform to the mainstream of computer 
usage. 
Conclusion 
From the three national approaches to the regulation of the disruptive 
technology of viruses we can deduce two basic approaches to regulating the 
phenomenon, these are hierarchical and design-based regulation (Murray & 
Scott 2001). The design-based control is seen through the use of anti-virus 
software – this has not been the focus of this chapter.  
The focus of this chapter has been on the two opposing methods of 
hierarchical regulation. The more common approach is the general 
prohibition of the creation and dissemination of viruses. This approach 
negatively affects any virus-like software that may be harmless or even 
beneficial. The case study has presented examples of virus software that can 
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be classified as being beneficial (in the case of research and development) or 
harmless (in the case of advertising). In these cases a general prohibition 
limits the manner in which certain individuals can communicate their ideas 
to others.  
The less common approach of hierarchical regulation is represented in this 
work by the Swedish position on viruses is not to criminalise the software. 
The latter position has the advantage of not having to attribute character 
traits to inanimate objects – as is the case with the concept of malicious 
code. This approach is interested only in demanding that individuals act 
responsibly and are liable for any damages they may cause. Such an 
approach is common in many other social regulations, for example in the 
case of car insurance. The technology is not prohibited but damages caused 
by the reckless driver must be carried by the driver or his insurance 
company.  
However, as this case study has also shown, this third approach is not going 
to be able to remain in place much longer. Due to the moral panics 
(Thompson 1998) and the shallow media discourse (Kling et al 2005) the 
topic of viruses has become a high level concern. In response to this the 
Convention on Cybercrime has been developed and is now in the process of 
implementation in large parts of the world. This convention reflects and 
reinforces the repressive views of the regulation shown here. The effect of 
this is that the regulatory position in relation to viruses will be 
criminalisation of the creation and dissemination. This entails a limitation of 
one of the core values in a democratic society while few believe that harmful 
viruses can be eradicated by prohibitive legislation the effect is one of 
ensuring that non-harmful virus-like software cannot be used as a form of 
communication.  
Therefore, as this case study has shown, the disruptive technology in the 
form of the virus has created a drive towards regulation. In the desire to 
regulate, the regulator chooses a method, which creates a blanket 
prohibition against the disruptive technology notwithstanding, that the 
technology itself contains legitimate uses within a participatory democracy. 
The net effect of these regulatory actions is the loss of democratic 
interaction in the virtual environment and the discrimination of the online 
environment in favour of the more conservative communication of the 
offline world. 
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6 
Integrity 
Forty years it had taken him to learn what kind of smile was hidden beneath the dark 
moustache...But it was all right, everything was all right, the struggle was finished. He 
had won the victory over himself. He loved Big Brother. 
George Orwell 
Introduction 
This case involves the examination of the role of integrity in a participatory 
democracy. The importance of the connection between integrity and 
democracy should not be understated. Integrity is, as Sundström (2001) 
writes, a prerequisite for democracy. In this study we can see the effect of 
when users experience a lack of integrity through spyware. The perceived 
lack of integrity causes concern among users. This concern was however 
met with a regulatory inertia since the apparent legal position of the 
software in question could be disputed. This lack of concern for the users 
opinions vis-à-vis integrity resulted in the creation of a market based 
regulatory solutions. These solutions came in the form of integrity 
protecting, spyware removal software.  
The earliest uses of the term Spyware to denote a particular form of 
software that gathers, without the users knowledge, information about the 
user and transmits it back manufacturer appeared around 2000 (Zone Alarm 
2000). However awareness of the concept grew slowly. The empirical work 
that provides the foundations of this chapter was carried out during the 
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period of 2002-2003. This was a period during which the discussion of 
spyware was growing in importance among privacy24 advocates.  
This chapter discusses an unusual type of surveillance software, which may 
be installed in many computers. The strange aspect of this software is that it 
has often been downloaded and installed by the user, but without her 
knowledge. The software is mainly designed to collect information about 
the user of the computer and relay this information back to the software 
manufacturer. The download, installation, data collection and data transfer 
all take place within the users own computer but very seldom with the users 
knowledge (Freeman & Urbaczewski 2005, Zhang 2005). It is the intention 
of this chapter to describe the technology involved and thereafter discuss 
how this new technology is affecting the online privacy debate. The chapter 
continues to discuss the basis for legitimacy of technology and also the 
current level of technological deterrents available. The chapter concludes 
with a comparison of two approaches at resolving the current problem, via 
legislation or the market approach.  
The importance of the discussion of spyware lies in the discussion of 
control of user data and user control over the personal computer. Despite 
being installed via deceit (Klang 2004b) those discussing the effects of 
spyware on user integrity and privacy issues were aware of the fact that 
causing spyware to be installed was not an illegal act. Therefore the 
discussion becomes a practical definition and implementation of the 
concept of online privacy. Groups of actors perceived spyware to be a 
threat to individual privacy despite the uncertain legal position gives spyware 
manufacturers an upper hand.  
The failing ability of regulatory structures to provide protection against the 
perceived threat of spyware create the rise of a market based solution where 
software manufacturers created anti-spyware software to provide users the 
wherewithal to prevent spyware from operating within their computers. The 
example of spyware provides an excellent case of the failure of structural 
regulation, the rise of a perceived threat among actors and the development 
of a market-based solution to the perceived threat. By studying this example 
we may find a method where the slowness of structural regulation to react 
to a perceived user threat provides both an economic opportunity for actors 
and provides an example of how online problems can be resolved without 
the intervention of regulatory structures.  
                                                           
24 For the purpose of this work the terms privacy and integrity are viewed as synonyms 
and used interchangeably.  
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The purpose of this chapter is to illuminate an example where regulatory structures fail to 
act in an adequate manner and the solution to the problem is enacted by the socio-technical 
means in the sense that the solution lies in a combination of technological, organisational 
and social solutions.  
Theory 
The discussion of privacy as a philosophical, social and legal value has been 
lively ever since the publication in 1890 of the influential paper, The Right to 
Privacy (Warren & Brandeis 1890). Arguably the clearest conclusion from 
this long debate is that the interpretation of privacy is context dependent.  
However despite the width of the arguments most can be categorised either 
as belonging to the reductionist approach or by viewing privacy a necessary 
individual right (Thompson 1975). The reductionist approach understands 
privacy as being described by its component parts while ignoring the 
relationships between them. This is the view that privacy is not unique and 
can be reduced to other interests. The second approach to privacy is to see 
it as a fundamental human need or right and therefore it needs not be 
derived from other rights. Thompson (1975) argues that privacy is not an 
individual right but can be motivated and defended by using other rights, 
which makes the right to privacy per se unnecessary.  
For if I am right, the right to privacy is ‘derivative’ in this sense: it is possible to 
explain in the case of each right in the cluster how come we have it without even 
once mentioning the right to privacy. Indeed, the wrongness of every violation of 
the right to privacy can be explained without even once mentioning it. 
(Thompson, p. 313).  
Posner (1984) argues for the reductionist approach by using an economic 
analysis of privacy. He argues that “personal privacy seems to be valued 
more highly than organizational privacy, a reverse ordering would be more 
consistent with the economics of the problem.” The reductionist arguments 
have often been attacked by scholars (Rachaels 1975), who claim that the 
distinctive right to privacy is both desirable and important when attempting 
to support and protect this interest.  
The debate on integrity has developed over time (Wong 2005) and has 
always stood in relation to the level of technology of the day. The seminal 
Warren and Brandeis (1890) article on privacy was very much a result of the 
technology of the time. They recognized the developments of technology 
and feared, amongst other things, the continued development of the small 
portable camera that could be handled by the amateur (Kern 1983). 
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The idea behind the Warren and Brandeis (1890) article was to explore 
whether existing US law afforded a principle of privacy protection. Their 
conclusions have been actively discussed since then. The reason for this 
discussion is that privacy is an ambiguous term definitions have ranged 
between the right to be let alone, (Warren & Brandeis 1890), the 
development of personality (Strömholm 1967) to the right to control 
information about oneself (Fried 1970). This privacy includes other notions 
such as individual dignity and integrity, personal uniqueness and personal 
autonomy. 
Westin (1967, p 25) examines privacy from the starting point that “…the 
constant search in democracies must be for the proper boundary line in 
each specific situation and for an over-all equilibrium that serves to 
strengthen democratic institution and processes.” The search for an 
adequate understanding of privacy is further complicated by different 
methods implemented in attempting definitions. Therefore some writers 
have described the condition of privacy, characterising its features but not 
offering a definition (Parker 1974) while others have attempted definitions.  
Westin (1967) conducted anthropological studies of privacy and through 
these he offers a control-based definition of privacy claiming that it is the:  
…claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, 
how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to others. 
Viewed in terms of the relation of the individual to social participation, privacy is 
the voluntary and temporary withdrawal means, either in a state of solitude or 
small-group intimacy, or, when among larger groups, in a condition of anonymity 
or reserve. (p 7). 
While control-based definitions have their advantages and are attractive to 
the individual or group invoking privacy rights they have been criticised for 
their focus upon individual autonomy since this focus becomes a weakness 
when attempting to formulate privacy protection policies (Regan 1995). In 
rejecting the control-based approach as being inefficient for policy 
formulation Regan (1995) argues that greater recognition should be given to 
the “broader social importance of privacy”. The reasons for this are 
threefold, firstly privacy should be understood as a common value in which 
all individuals value some degree of privacy, secondly privacy is as a public 
value, which is not merely of value to the democratic political system and 
thirdly privacy can be understood as a “collective value” in light of 
technological developments and market forces, requiring minimum levels of 
privacy protection.  
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A flaw contained within the control-based definition is that it is inadequate 
when considering instances where personal information is obtained without 
the individuals knowledge and therefore without informed consent. This is 
common through methods such as data mining techniques and online 
profiling (Bygrave 2002). Such methods cannot provide methods for the 
subject to control information and therefore the remaining alternative is 
regulation of minimum standards of data protection (Bygrave 2002).  
Foucault & the Panopticon 
In an attempt to reform the prison system of his time Bentham (1995 
[1787]) developed an architectural plan for an ideal prison called the 
Panopticon. His ideal prison design was a ring shaped prison with a 
watchtower in the centre of the ring. The ring contained the cells were each 
prisoner would sit in individual cells. Each cell would have a window on the 
outer wall to allow light into the cell and a large opening, opposite the 
window and facing the watchtower. The walls of the cell were extended to 
prevent the prisoners from communicating with, or even seeing, each other. 
From the watchtower the guard could see everything in each cell while the 
use of lighting and blinds prevented the prisoners from seeing the guards 
and therefore they could never know if they were watched at any time. The 
prisoners could only act on the assumption that they could be watched at 
any time.  
The Panopticon design is control by architecture. With a minimum of 
manpower and direct intervention the prisoners are immersed in total 
visibility and the inmates reaction must be one of self-control (Foucault 
1980). The gaze of the guards is through this architecture internalised by the 
prisoner making the prisoner become her own guard. Through this self-
policing surveillance the effects are constant and pervasive even when no 
actual surveillance is being carried out. As Foucault (1980) notes the 
Panopticon is an architectural device made into regulation. 
There is no need for arms, physical violence, material constraints. Just a gaze. An 
inspecting gaze, a gaze which each individual under its weight will end up by 
interiorising to the point that he is his own overseer, each individual thus 
exercising this surveillance over, and against himself. A superb formula: power 
exercised continuously and for what turns out to be a minimal cost. (Foucault 
1980, p 155). 
 Since his presentation of the metaphor of the architectural device 
Foucault’s interpretation of the Panopticon has been widely used in 
discussions on privacy and surveillance. The basic premise is that the 
awareness of potential surveillance effects the way in which the subject 
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under potential surveillance behaves. The Bentham/Foucault Panopticon 
metaphor has increased in popularity with the increased use of surveillance 
technology both online and offline. This metaphor is however not 
applicable in the situation of privacy since, as explained below, the user 
under surveillance is unaware of the surveillance. Therefore the actor 
continues to behave in an open manner. The difference therefore is that the 
actor has no choice in the matter. The use of covert surveillance regularly 
considered to be a more serious interference with the individual’s integrity 
and usually allowed only in more extreme situations (Etzioni 1999, Norris & 
Armstrong 1999).   
Spying Technology 
Spyware can be defined as surveillance technology or software, which is 
bundled into another piece of software and enters the ‘infected’ computer, 
and use the ‘infected’ computer in an unauthorised manner. Blanke (2006) 
writes about spyware,  
Basically, they are computer programs that are installed (or install themselves) on 
computers and perform activities that range from the innocuous to the criminal, 
but almost always negatively affect the basic use and enjoyment of the machine. 
(pp 1-2). 
Spyware is most commonly bundled together with freeware which the user 
downloads and installs (Klang 2003b, 2004b). The main purpose of the 
spyware is to collect information, and send it to the information gatherer. 
Spyware, once installed on the computer, can take a wide range of activities 
such as: (i) Transmit information about the computer user to a third party, 
(ii) Lower the security by subjecting it to allowing an attacker to remotely 
control the infected computer, (iii) Record keystrokes to reveal passwords 
and other sensitive information, (iv) Enable the computer to be hijacked 
and used in a denial-of-service attack, and (v) Search for vulnerabilities 
which may be exploited by hackers (Thompson 2005). 
This chapter takes a more limited view of spyware, focusing on the types of 
spyware that most users find objectionable. The reason for this is that most 
users would prefer, had they known what was happening, not to have 
spyware on their computers. This becomes an interesting ethical discussion 
since the spyware manufacturers tend to claim that the users have agreed to 
the spyware installed in their computers. Since there is a difference of 
opinion as to whether or not the spyware has been installed with or without 
the users consent the actual installation becomes a critical issue. What is 
interesting to note is the fact that spyware can be included with the users 
consent but without her knowledge. This is done by including spyware 
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clauses in the end user licence agreement (EULA) which is displayed when 
the user begins installing the software and requires the user to agree to the 
terms before the software can be installed and used. The importance of 
contract law and the EULA will be discussed further below. The discussion 
on spyware is made more complex due to the lack of an agreed upon 
definition; this flaw seems to stem from a lack of adequate consensus with 
which to reach a definition. The name alone is not universal, spyware is 
sometime known as scumware, parasite-ware, stealware or theftware and 
occasionally mixed up with computer trojans, viruses and worms. This 
chapter uses the name spyware since it is the name, which is rapidly 
becoming the most accepted when describing the phenomenon.  
An important additional aspect of spyware is the difficulty connected with 
its removal. Spyware rarely appears in the computers uninstall list and even 
if it can be located removal of parts of the software can sometimes affect 
the more traditional workings of the computer. Other complaints connected 
with the removal of spyware have been the issue that if not totally removed 
the spyware has an ability to re-install itself. 
To create a better understanding of what spyware may be, five examples of 
spyware (Klang 2004b) will be presented in this section. The purpose of 
these examples is not to provide an exhaustive list, nor is it to point a finger 
at manufacturers or software as being extreme in any way. These examples 
were chosen since they are reasonably well documented and therefore serve 
to give the reader an example of what the software and their manufacturers 
are attempting to do. 
The first example is Comet Systems Inc., the maker of Comet Cursor. The 
software allows the user to change the colour and shape of the computer 
cursor. The shape can change into alternative shapes such as company logos 
when the user visits websites connected with the service. However the 
software also installs a GUID (global unique identifier) and is able to follow 
the users online browsing habits (Klang 2004b). The effect of installing a 
GUID is that a computer can be identified by this number and this is the 
first stage in building a database of the computer users habits since the user 
is no longer anonymous. 
The second example is Sharman Networks, the creators of Kazaa Media 
Desktop bundled in software that connected the users to a secondary 
private network called Altnet which was operated by an affiliated company 
called Brilliant Digital (Klang 2004b). This system works in the same way as 
a distributed computing project and takes advantage of the unused 
processing power in computers where it has been downloaded. According 
DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGY 
 122 
to the company the processing power is used to process the data gathered 
by the advertisers and to render video and 3-D animated advertisements. 
However, the network, using the software of unsuspecting Kazaa Media 
Desktop users without their knowledge could also be used to process large 
amounts of user profiles. A network such as this steals resources, and 
abuses the property of the unsuspecting. It also raises security concerns 
since it allows additional access to the user’s computer. 
The third example is the Napster like software called Audio Galaxy also 
included the spyware program from a company called VX26. The software 
recorded the user’s movements and sent the data back to the database which 
was used for advertising purposes. The interesting issue about the Audio 
Galaxy case is that it also illustrates the temporary relationships and shifting 
loyalties of the different companies involved. These temporary relationships 
can be seen by the fact that Audio Galaxy bundled the VX2 software for a 
period of 34 days but no longer does so (Klang 2004b). These types of 
relationships will be discussed further below. 
The fourth example is the Gator Corporation, which is, according to their 
own website, a leader in online behavioural marketing. They create, maintain 
and distribute software called ‘‘Gator’’ which acts as a digital wallet. Gator 
also offers users the ability to store personal data and other information 
which is used to fill in online forms. The advantage to the user is that they 
no longer need to retype all the information when presented with an online 
form. This software is bundled with another, called ‘‘OfferCompanion’’. 
OfferCompanion has also been bundled with peer-to-peer software such as 
Kazaa. The spyware, OfferCompanion, launches automatically when the 
user launches the browser program and when the user visits certain web 
sites the Gator Corporation transmit advertising pop-ups which appear on 
the screen in front of the desired page. The pop-ups prevent the legitimate 
page from being viewed in a manner which it was intended since the page is 
marred by advertising messages. 
The fifth example concerns the interesting case of the so-called self-
installing toolbar, this can be seen as a variation on the Comet Cursor. The 
Xupiter is an Internet Explorer toolbar program registered to a Hungarian 
company called Tempo Internet but has been traced to two Internet 
businessmen in California (Klang 2004b). Some users have even claimed 
that it installs itself onto the computer after only visiting certain websites. 
The software changes the user’s startup page to xupiter.com and redirects 
searches on Internet search engines to xupiter.com and changes security 
settings. This is important since changing security setting allows more 
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information to be gathered about the computer user. The program attempts 
to download updates and in certain cases downloads and launches other 
programs such as gambling games and causes pop-up advertising windows 
(Klang 2004b). Since many users are unaware that spyware has been 
installed onto their computers they are not aware that they should uninstall 
the software. However, if the user is aware that software she installed 
included spyware it is seldom straightforward removing the spyware. Even if 
the software, which carried the spyware onto the computer, is removed it 
does not follow that the spyware is removed. 
Spyware Business Model 
It is important for software manufacturers to spread their software and also 
to obtain financing for their work. There is a culture of not paying for goods 
and services online. Many, if not most, users have come to expect and 
demand that information, software and services are available at no cost. The 
traditions of no cost software have been compared with tribal gift 
economies (Barbook 1998) since there is a tendency to help, share and 
barter with property in these cultures. 
The tradition of no cost software and information has developed into the 
copyright conflicts taking place today. Entertainment files are being 
transferred over peer-to-peer networks despite the fact that they are 
copyrighted. The entertainment industry is attempting to regain control over 
their traditional marketplaces by persecuting those who aid copyright 
infringement via technical means (Bowrey 2005). This situation has led 
many users to attempt to legitimise their infringing actions and call for the 
demise or radical change of copyright legislation. In discussing the 
legitimacy of infringing software copyright Nissenbaum (1995) argues both 
with consequential and deontological arguments that there are some specific 
cases where infringement is morally permissible. However, whether or not 
the action of copyright infringement can be justified or not the situation is 
such that many do not feel that they are doing anything wrong in violating 
another’s copyright or at least they are not deterred by any such emotion. 
This desire for free software has led to a loss of revenue and a need for 
software manufacturers to find alternative incomes. Enter the parasite 
economy (Cave 2001). To obtain income for their products, popular 
software can act as a host for other software, carrying it into the computers 
of users. Popular free software can create channels of revenue by offering 
themselves as carriers of bundled software. The spyware (or indeed any 
other software) which travels with the free software pays a minimal fee per 
download for the service. The total cost paid therefore depends upon the 
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popularity of the downloaded software. The creators of the downloaded 
software claim that their actions are both legal and driven from economic 
necessity. Users demand free software, software manufacturers need 
funding to create more competitive software and marketers need to reach 
potential customers. Since the users obtain free software, software houses 
obtain a new source of income and the marketers increase their reach, then 
one might argue that there should not be any discussion on the evils of 
spyware. This is, however, an oversimplified interpretation of the situation. 
Integrity 
Those who are discontented with the position of spyware often evoke the 
arguments of the privacy and integrity debate. Lacking the international 
consensus of contract law these users have to argue from a rights based 
position which is a weaker position since they first have to prove the 
existence of their position and then argue that theirs is the position more 
worthy of concern. Online privacy has been discussed for a long time and in 
many different ways. The most common legal discussion tends to be 
whether or not there is, or there should be, a right to privacy. If this can be 
answered in the affirmative the question then becomes one of degree i.e., 
where do the limits of privacy stand? 
In Europe this question has received considerable help in recent years due 
to the growth of the European Union, which requires the incorporation of 
the European human rights convention (Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms – Rome 1950). Prior to the 
incorporation of the convention into the national legislation of the member 
states the discussion centred on the creation of a right as opposed to a 
discussion of positive law. After the incorporation the main thrust of the 
legal discussion became a positivistic discussion on what should be included 
in a right to privacy. 
The concept of privacy can only be placed in relation to the ability of that 
privacy to be invaded. Unfortunately the discussions have for a long time 
focused on either the voluntary submission of data or the use of cookies. 
Software such as spyware has not been discussed and its appearance and 
proliferation requires urgent action on the part of the users, software 
manufacturers and regulators. In the modern privacy debate an influential 
work is Foucault’s (1979) interpretation of the Panopticon. This 
internalisation of supervision arises from the awareness of constant 
supervision, or even the threat of constant supervision, and causes the 
subject to behave differently. The subject must behave in a manner 
consistent to the fact that she may be observed at any time. This knowledge 
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has the effect of changing the behaviour of the subject in a manner that is 
incompatible with the concept of human freedom. 
Technological advances have brought about the change in the concept of 
privacy and many would claim that the new technology represents a 
Panopticon of sorts. While there may be certain elements of truth in this 
type of discussion this is not the case with spyware. This is due to the fact 
that the user is unaware that she may be watched and this causes her to 
behave in a natural and uninhibited manner. This means that tools of 
supervision installed in the computer through bundled software are more 
serious than the Panopticon metaphor. In the Panopticon the user is aware 
that she is being watched and has the choice to behave accordingly but this 
crucial difference is, in the case of spyware, that the user has no knowledge 
that her actions may be observed. 
Leaving the Panopticon metaphor leaves us more able to understand the 
need for an increased discussion in the privacy debate. This new technology 
represents a new challenge to the level of privacy we can expect. The 
amount of privacy we can reasonably expect is “…a function of the 
practices and laws of our society and underlying normative principles” 
(McArthur 2001, p 127). Unfortunately the open public debate on the 
integrity depriving aspects of spyware has not yet developed enough which 
has the effect of depriving the law from a worthy basis of discussion and 
not developing the underlying principles to be able to meet this new 
challenge. In the face of this vacuum courts may be tempted to fall back 
upon a familiar pattern of discussion centred on contract law and this leaves 
the user in a weaker position. 
Analysis: Actors 
Despite the fundaments of contract law and despite the legality of the 
business models there appears a level of discontent among those afflicted by 
the technology. These users are not pacified by the legality of the scheme. 
They do not agree with the implementation of technology in this clandestine 
manner for the purposes of invasion of their experienced integrity. In this 
we can see a connection to the arguments of Habermas (1989) on the 
relationship between technology and power. This relationship exists in a 
state of constant evolution and the important issue to be discussed is one of 
legitimacy. The problem of legitimacy arises when the technology is driven 
forward in such a way as to exclude a number of users from the socio-legal 
discourse. Since it can be claimed that it is one of the many roles of law to 
legitimise actions and create a level of understanding between the citizens 
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and those in power it is important that those who are affected by the 
technology, and the infrastructure it creates, have the opportunity to partake 
in an open discussion. When the law is used in such a manner as to silence 
debate by legitimising actions, which are unwelcome to the users, then one 
can claim that the law has been used as a pacifier and alienated the users 
from partaking in the debate. 
While attempting to remove the nefarious software may be a complex affair 
there are software programs which may be useful. Software such as Ad-
aware created by Lavasoft and Spybot created by PepiMK Software both 
can be downloaded free and be used to find and remove the unwanted 
software. These programs have however given rise to an interesting 
dilemma. They are not all too open about their methods in defining what 
spyware is and as such have a large amount of political power in their ability 
to blacklist programs. Comet Systems Inc claim that they have been unfairly 
targeted by Lavasoft and their business has suffered because of it (Miles 
2002).  
The potential of anti-spyware companies to damage the legitimate business 
interests is a serious threat. Marketing companies claim that they have a 
right to market their products, software companies need revenues from 
marketers to be able to provide free software. The whole process is 
legitimised by contract law. The question therefore may be to what extent 
the anti-spyware companies are, or should be, liable for their activities. 
It is therefore important for the creators of anti-spyware programs to be 
open about their methodology and their choice of programs that their 
software removes. The most popular anti-spyware program is reputedly 
overly covert and silent about their business practice that makes any 
discussion on openness difficult. For those who are technically adept the 
whole problem of spyware is an issue of lesser importance but the majority 
of technology users are happily unaware of how their technology works or 
how to correct it if it fails to work. This is the group that needs anti-spyware 
software. This group is usually unaware of the choices made by the 
programmers of which software to define as spyware and which not to 
include in this category. 
Anti-spyware software, once established, creates for itself the role of 
gatekeeper since it has the ability to choose which software is to remain on 
the users computers and which is not. For software developers therefore, 
the anti-spyware software becomes another barrier that must be respected. 
Some software developers have attempted to open discussions on the 
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powerful position attained by anti-spyware companies in relation to deciding 
which advertising is allowed and which is not (Klang 2003b).  
Another interesting reaction can be seen in the attempts of the software 
companies to fight back against the anti-spyware programs. The Radlight17 
video playing software, once installed, attempted to remove or disable the 
Lavasofts Ad-aware program. This action was legitimised in the EULA 
…You are not allowed to use any third party program (e.g. Ad-aware) to uninstall 
application bundled with RadLight. Such programs will be removed. If you want 
to uninstall them, you may do so via Add/Remove in Windows’ Control Panel. 
The EULA text has since been amended with a text describing which types 
of third party software is bundled into the program and also the fact that it 
will create a GUID for the computer. It no longer claims the right to 
remove software installed in the computer. It does however openly explain 
that the software will be used for marketing purposes. In a text few of their 
customers will ever read.  
Analysis: Structures 
As shown in the examples in Chapter 625 these types of software are capable 
of sophisticated surveillance and they have not been introduced into the 
computer in an open manner. An important issue to discuss therefore is 
what position software such as this has in the legal system. There are valid 
claims being made that this is all legal and above board. Those making the 
claims can be found in both camps of the pro and contra spyware battle. 
Therefore this section will take its starting point in the examination of this 
claim since an accurate understanding of the legal position is beneficial to 
the total discussion of the software and its effects. 
The right to privacy is a fundamental right protected both in international 
conventions26, European Union directive27 and national legislation. Despite 
these structures intended to provide regulation aimed at protecting privacy 
                                                           
25 See Theory in Integrity chapter, page 117 et seq. 
26 See for example Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Adopted 
and proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 1948, or 
Article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms. 
27 Most importantly Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of 
personal data and on the free movement of such data. Also, Directive 2002/58/EC on 
Privacy and Electronic Communications (DPEC). 
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these types of software present a threat to computer user integrity. In 
addition to this the software user has seldom had the opportunity to provide 
informed consent to the software since it has not been introduced into the 
computer in an open manner. The computer user is often unaware of the 
surveillance and therefore continues to behave in an open uninhibited 
manner. Despite legal measures, the legal position of spyware is not clear 
and there are legal grounds for claiming that the software is legal.  
Spyware: Legal Position 
The current EU Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications 
2002/58/EC does not define what spyware is or even the scope of spyware. 
While there may be advantages to such an approach the result is a degree of 
uncertainty about what types of programs constitutes spyware.  The only 
guide the Directive on Privacy offers is recital 24 which provides that: 
…so-called spyware, web bugs, hidden identifiers and other similar devices can 
enter the user’s terminal without their knowledge in order to gain access to 
information, to store hidden information or to trace the activities of the user and 
may seriously intrude upon the privacy of these users. (p 9). 
This lack of definition causes the users and the regulatory structures to rely 
heavily upon fundamental regulatory principles. Once such principle is that 
of contract law, implemented in the case by the end user license agreement 
(EULA). In contrast certain jurisdictions have defined spyware, one such 
example is the State of Utah, and have received criticism for its definition as 
being over-inclusive, in other words including harmless or beneficial 
software within the scope of the spyware definition.  
Since those who claim that the software is legal all tend to focus upon the 
EULA as a ‘‘silver bullet’’ in resolving the conflict then it is in the re-
examination of contracts which we must base this first stage of the 
discussion. Therefore this section must briefly explore the regulatory 
structure of the EULA.  
Contract theory (Furmston 1996) is taught to most law students in the form 
of a simplified mythical situation where two people meet. In the meeting, A 
makes B an offer. In our scenario A offers B the latest widget in technology 
for the price of 10$. B, after careful thought, agrees to the offer and the 
contract is formed. Formation means that legally enforceable obligations 
have been created. The point of formation is usually symbolically celebrated 
by some ceremony of, e.g., handshakes, nods or applying names on paper. 
This ceremonial aspect is an important issue in producing evidence that a 
contract actually has been formed but binding obligations can be formed 
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without the ceremonial aspect. The whole basis of liberal contract theory is 
the meeting and agreement of the wills of competent individuals.  
If B wishes to buy some software from her local computer store the 
contract is completed when she hands over her money and receives the box, 
containing the disk, containing the software. However, an interesting thing 
occurs when B gets home and tears open the shrinkwrap, opens the box and 
begins to install the software. Out of the box spills lots of documents 
written in unfriendly complex language. These amendments and additions to 
the contract are known as shrinkwrap contracts (Rowland & McDonald 
2000). B does not need these to install the software so she proceeds to enter 
the disk into her computer. On the screen she receives many options all of 
which she must decide whether or not to agree to. One such text, which 
usually appears in the beginning of the installation, demands that she agree 
to a larger text to be able to continue. This is known as a clickwrap (Arne & 
Bosse 2003) and is an evolution of the shrinkwrap and has the power to 
regulate the contract that B has already entered into. Usually the clickwrap is 
seen to be more binding than the shrinkwrap since it requires positive 
actions from the user.  
The situation is the same if B had chosen to download free software from 
the Internet. Supposing B had downloaded the software Kazaa to be able to 
share music files with all her friends. The text that precedes the installation 
of the program is binding. The fact that she does not read it, or if she does 
read it but cannot understand it does not alter the fact that it is binding. So 
if Kazaa has written that they intend to collect data and send it to the 
company for marketing purposes B cannot do anything about that – except 
not install the program.  
Naturally the theory of contracts is a simplification used in education to 
teach students about the basics of law. It is not intended to be the solution 
or total description of reality. Nor are the challenges created by technology 
the only situations where flaws in the simplified model of contract theory 
become more evident. In any large business process there may always be 
difficulties in discerning when a contract was entered into and what the 
content of the contract was. To solve this dilemma the myth has been 
amended with the theories of the shrinkwrap and clickwrap licences as 
described briefly above. The courts have understood the necessity of these 
licenses and have reinforced their legality and power over the users.  
At first glance the courts acceptance of these licences may seem unduly 
harsh. The writer of the contract is at an advantage since they have the time 
to create a contract which best suits their needs. Additionally the advantage 
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is enhanced by the situation that most consumers are not legally trained and, 
should they read the contract, may not see the disadvantages the contract 
places them in. However, this situation is true of many contractual 
situations. Few of us bother to read the contractual terms when renting a 
video film or a car. There is a great deal of trust placed in the fairness of the 
overall system (Klang 2001), additionally we see many other people renting 
cars and video films without problem and therefore we assume the same 
will be true for us. The courts acceptance of the standard licence is based 
upon the needs of commerce; the courts acceptance of the 
shrinkwrap/clickwrap contract is based upon the knowledge that most 
consumers are not going to read the contractual terms that underpin every 
train or airplane ticket. In most cases the contracts are not unduly harsh 
since they have developed over time to suit the contractual situation and the 
courts acceptance of them is based upon commercial necessity.  
It is however, important to note that this is not the same as saying that the 
shrink/clickwrap licence is enforceable in all situations. There are contract 
situations were the contracts are not enforced by the courts. In Scandinavian 
contract law the courts have the power to amend contracts that are unduly 
harsh on one of the contracting parties. This situation typically occurs when 
the drafter of the contract has used techniques, such as language and layout, 
to obfuscate the terms of the contract. Under common law the question 
may be one of misrepresentation since the spyware is most commonly 
bundled into another software product and it is not the intention of the user 
to download the spyware. Under U.K. law, in the case of Spurling v 
Bradshaw28, Lord Denning stated that in the use of sweeping exclusion 
clauses it was necessary to draw the contracting parties’ attention to such 
cases it required something startling. Denning suggested printing in red ink 
with a red hand pointing to it or something similarly striking which could 
not be missed. Arguments, such as these, show that the existence of 
contract is not enough to legitimize any and all content. The red hand 
argument can be extended for use against the bundling of spyware, 
especially since the spyware interferes with the peaceful enjoyment of the 
users’ property vis-à-vis the browser and the personal computer. Today we 
tend to follow what is often referred to as the liberal contract theory and see 
contract law as an instrument for enforcing promises (Gordley 1991). This 
view is tempered with the fact that the contract is seen as an agreement 
                                                           
28 Spurling (J) Ltd v Bradshaw (1956), CA. Also in Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking [1971] 2 QB 
163. 
INTEGRITY 
 
131 
where the wills of the contracting parties are in accord. If we are to view 
contract law as an enforcement mechanism then the law tends to be 
weighted in favour of the EULA since this is, at first glance, the contract. 
However, it is important to remember that the contract should represent an 
agreement and as such the question of what the parties knew they were 
agreeing to is vital to the actions of the courts in attempting to decide upon 
these issues. 
Spyware in Court 
The courts have already been made aware of spyware, however the issues 
that have been raised have not be concerned with the privacy aspects of the 
software and are therefore not helpful to understanding where the legal 
reasoning should be developing within this field. However, it is interesting 
to note that the development of spyware related case law is moving ahead in 
relation to trademark and copyright infringement. While this is helpful for 
companies hoping to maintain control over their online assets the 
connection of spyware to trademark and copyright tends to relegate the 
importance of privacy concerns to a lesser place. 
The software of the Gator Corporation29 caused pop-up advertising to 
appear on the screen in front of the desired page. These prevented the 
legitimate page from being viewed in a manner in which it was intended 
since the page is marred by advertising messages. This prompted 16 online 
news-publishing organizations to file a lawsuit30 against Gator claiming 
trademark and copyright infringement, and unfair enrichment by freeloading 
on the reputation of the established sites. The court granted a preliminary 
injunction in July 2002 preventing Gator from causing pop-up advertising 
on the Plaintiffs websites. In February 2003 the case was settled out of court 
but unfortunately for the development of jurisprudence in this area the 
settlement is covered by confidentiality. 
The US courts have, however, not been consistent. In June 2003 the court 
(Tedeschi 2003) granted WhenU’s motion to dismiss charges of trademark 
infringement, unfair competition and copyright infringement. With this the 
company U-Haul could not prevent WhenU.com from delivering 
competitors’ ads to visitors to U-Haul’s site. 
                                                           
29 Described above in Spying Technology page 120 et seq. 
30 Washington Post, Newsweek Interactive Co., LLC., et al. v The Gator Corporation, 
Civil Action 02–909-A, U.S. District Court (EDVa). 
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The Regulatory Approach  
The American legal reaction to the problem of Spyware has been to develop 
the “Spyware Control and Privacy Protection Act of 2001” (hereafter The 
Spyware Act) intends to control spyware. The Spyware Act requires that 
manufacturers notify consumers when a product includes this capability, 
what types of information could be collected, and how to disable it. More 
importantly The Spyware Act makes it illegal for the programs to transmit 
user information back to the manufacturers unless the user enables this 
function and the user has given the collector access to the information. 
There are exceptions for validating authorized software users, providing 
technical support, or legal monitoring of computer activity by employers. 
However, The Spyware Act has been attacked for not being consumer 
friendly since despite its good intentions it does not go far enough in 
controlling the actions of the spyware producers. The Spyware Act follows 
the ideas set out in the European Data Protection Directive (DPD) in that it 
divides personal data into two categories: sensitive and non-sensitive. 
Sensitive data concerns personal data surrounding the data subject’s 
finances, medical history, sexual orientation, lifestyle, political affiliation and 
race. 
This data cannot be collected or used without the data subjects consent. The 
non-sensitive data, however, is everything else and all information which can 
be inferred from that information. This includes any and all actions which 
the software can record from the web and the conclusions which can be 
drawn from this data. This non-sensitive data can be collected, processed 
and sold without the data subjects consent. While at first glance this seems 
to be a reasonable starting point, there is one major drawback. By collecting 
or recording much, or all, of the information a user obtains via the Internet 
several inferences can be made about the users, which pertain to their 
sensitive data, and therefore the division of sensitive and non-sensitive 
division is no longer useful.  
The European legal reaction has been to develop the DPD, which has been 
enacted in all member states and can be used to criminalise the actions of 
spyware since the DPD requires that the consent of the user be obtained 
prior to collection of personal data. While these legislative tools are effective 
they have been unable to deal with the Internet-based privacy invasions due 
in part to the fact that the techniques required to monitor and enforce are 
beyond the power of single, or groups, of states. The member states of the 
European Union have a strong level of privacy legislation that enables a 
level of control of the companies dealing with personal data in their 
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businesses. Unfortunately those dealing in personal data collection through 
spyware are notoriously difficult to locate and tend to shy away from 
establishing themselves in states where there is a strong privacy enhancing 
legislation. 
In addition to this the Directive 2002/58/EC on Privacy and Electronic 
Communications (DPEC), lacks a clear definition of spyware. In addition to 
which, the users right to be informed in accordance with the DPD has been 
watered down in relation to online information about the purposes of 
cookies or similar devices: 
Member States shall prohibit the use of electronic communications networks to 
store information or to gain access to information stored in the terminal 
equipment of a subscriber or user without the prior, explicit consent of the 
subscriber or user concerned. This shall not prevent any technical storage or 
access for the sole purpose of carrying out or facilitating the transmission of a 
communication over an electronic communications network. (EU Official 
Journal 13 June 2002, C. 140E/121). 
The weakness of the legislative approach is that it must struggle to obtain a 
balance of the needs and wants of the different groups in society. After this 
balanced approach there is the difficulty of enforcing legislation that is 
limited to nation states in an environment that no longer considers these 
boundaries to be relevant. It is not that the courts do not have the 
competence or jurisdiction to rule in a case but rather the question as to 
whom is behind the software and which corporate entities or private citizens 
are to be considered to be responsible for the software. 
Discussion 
The ethical viewpoint of the spyware maker can be summarised by the 
Friedman’s (1993) controversial view of the sole duty of the corporation to 
maximise profits and benefit the shareholder. This deontological approach 
however is opposed by the other rule based imperative not to spy upon or 
cause harm to others. The question of how to resolve this conflict of ethical 
rules by applying the Kantian humanity principle of not treating people as a 
means to an end but rather as ends in themselves. If we were to apply this 
final Kantian principle we can arrive at the conclusion that spyware 
constitutes a breach of ethical conduct. However if we were to attempt to 
apply a utilitarian analysis of the situation the ethics of the actors becomes 
less clear. The inclusion of spyware in free software could be viewed as a 
necessary evil and the creation and supply of free software creates more 
happiness or utility than the evil generated. This argument is effectively 
reinforced by the fact that there is software which can be used to protect the 
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individual from the harms of software. For this argument to be effective the 
person downloading spyware must be aware both of the consequences of 
her actions and the availability of counter-measures. 
Since it is difficult to clearly state that spyware is inherently immoral, the 
position of other actors who provide the infrastructure with which the 
software is spread (for example those who bundle spyware with other 
software) is even more difficult to ascertain. Despite the difficulties it is 
possible to state that spyware is often an unwelcome addition to the 
computer and from the growing popularity anti-spyware software it is 
possible to surmise that many computer users believe spyware to be wrong. 
One interesting question, which the spyware problem opens up, is the 
question of which is the best method for combating these types of issues. 
The problem of spyware is relatively new and relatively unknown outside 
technical forums or privacy forums. While many of these forums may agree 
that the problem is growing, it remains difficult to see which solutions 
should be applied to the problem. The use of anti-spyware software is at 
best a market solution that requires from the users knowledge of the 
problem and, at least, a working knowledge of where to find the solutions 
and how to install and use them. The level of information required by the 
market is therefore reasonably high, especially considering the fact that most 
Internet users have never even heard of spyware and, even if they had, may 
not appreciate the importance of defending their privacy. If the users are 
aware of the problem, and want to resolve it, a new question arises and this 
is one of understanding which software is the best for their problems. This 
stage is crucial since the users can download inadequate anti-spyware 
software or, in the worst case scenario, even more spyware.  
Attempting a regulatory approach takes time and a great deal of concerted 
effort. Habermas argues (1989) that societies are the base for a multitude of 
pluralistic opinions but only a few ever come to the forefront of the public 
debate. In ensuring that the debate is maintained in an open environment 
and that the rules are created in a transparent method it is important that the 
basis for rules are discussed by those who are effected by them. It is also 
important however to note in this context that all rules should be held under 
constant debate (McCormick 1997). Rules should not exist in a closed space 
but must exist in the open under public scrutiny to avoid the creation of a 
representative elite whose interpretations of societies needs, or an illusion of 
public good, control what is developed as a social balance. The user is left 
therefore with problems on all sides and must therefore attempt a pragmatic 
approach to the problem. Not using information technology is not a viable 
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option but what is important is that an effort is made by the users to keep 
up to date with the state of privacy, both technical and legislative. The user 
must be prepared to use both technical means to protect her own data while 
participating in a public discourse on the importance of better data 
legislation. 
As has already been shown the nation state is not capable of meeting all the 
ills on the Internet and protecting its citizens from them but it is important 
that the nation state creates an environment where the individual has the 
ability to find information, make informed decisions concerning her privacy 
and, if so desired, implement technical countermeasures to protect the level 
of privacy required. 
The case of spyware shows that users are concerned with their online 
privacy and expect a certain level of anonymity in their online 
communications. Sundström (2001) has also pointed to the importance of 
integrity and privacy in relation to ICT in the democratic process. This case 
also shows the way in which users behave when a core value upon which 
they rely is threatened and the regulatory structures fail to react in an 
adequate manner to protect them. In this case we see how a niche is created 
in the market for software manufacturers willing and able to provide 
software that will resolve or alleviate the problems experienced by the 
actors. The market-based solution represents the privatisation of regulation 
in that the regulation is implemented by the user groups through their 
choice to implement such software.  
Conclusion 
Spyware is yet another example of how privacy has become the price that 
computer users pay for their use of the information technology 
infrastructure. This time the threat comes from software bundled into free 
software, the problem is that the price the user pays is not one that is 
discussed or declared openly. The user is therefore not able to enter into an 
agreement on equal grounds or attempt to negotiate to achieve a better 
bargain. Contract law is in this scenario pushed to the limits and used as a 
legitimising factor for unethical business practices. 
The form of regulation seen in this chapter is a blend of the design-based and 
competition-based (Murray & Scott 2001) forms of regulation. As this case 
study has shown, the lack of hierarchical regulation leads to an opening for 
competition-based regulation to fill this gap. In this specific case the form 
which competition-based regulation has taken is one that uses design-based 
regulation in the form of anti-spyware software.  
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There are alternatives for the user. She can naturally choose not to use free 
software but this choice requires knowledge of the integrity threatening 
software within the free software. Also the choice not to use free software 
has economic effects and may create barriers to active participation in the 
information technology infrastructure. There are also possibilities for the 
user to attempt to eradicate the unwanted software installed into the 
computer. These types of solutions require an awareness of the problem and 
a certain level of knowledge on how to find, download, install and run the 
necessary software. An important issue with these market-based solutions is 
that their fairness and objectivity have been marred by accusations of 
injustice and unfair treatment. On the legislative side we, once again, see an 
example of legislation struggling to enforce local ideas under fire from a 
global (or a-national) infrastructure. This is becoming a familiar pattern 
when the national or regional legislation attempts to deal with Internet-
based technology. There is no solution to this aspect of the problem other 
than international legal consensus which is very hard to achieve, implement 
and enforce. The disruptive effects of technology upon a social balance 
created over time can have the subtle effect of changing that balance which 
was created at a prior technological balance. Technological advance 
demands a renewed discussion on its effects upon the users in society and 
on the gradual effects of technology on society. This is especially true since 
a market approach to resolving the issue requires that more information is 
made available to those who are effected by the problem. Without this 
information they will be unable to take a stand on whether they desire to 
protect themselves, and if so, in which manner. 
An additional reason for the need for more public debate amongst those 
concerned is that they are themselves responsible for achieving a re-
balancing of the socio-technical regulation. Without information and debate 
the process of establishing a balance between the effects of technology and 
the needs of society will cease to be forceful and any meaningful effects 
such a debate can create will be lost. The focus of regulation should be to 
maintain the core democratic value of integrity. Within the participatory 
democracy the need for integrity protection is important to ensure 
individual participation within the democracy. Without such assurances a 
supervising gaze is developed, and such a gaze becomes a mechanism of 
control internalised in the behaviour of the individual preventing her from 
participating openly and freely in the democratic process. Therefore it is 
important to ensure that the disruptive effects of technology in relation to 
integrity do not negate the positive potential of participation through 
technology. 
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The process of participating in a democracy requires privacy. The simplest 
example of the importance of privacy is the secrecy of the ballot box. The 
voting system is created in such a manner as to insure that even those 
closest to each other cannot be certain of how the others vote. This integrity 
is there to ensure democracy. While many could argue that they would not 
change the way they vote even if they had to do so in public the importance 
of integrity in democracy is, through this example, easily grasped. Therefore 
it is strange that when threats to online integrity appear they are not treated 
with equal importance. The need for integrity is fundamental for the 
participatory democracy to function even in the online domain and 
therefore the regulator should be more concerned with protecting this core 
democratic value than conservatively overprotecting the sanctity of contract.  
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Property 
Property is intended to serve life, and no matter how much we surround it with rights and 
respect, it has no personal being. It is part of the earth man walks on. It is not man. 
Martin Luther King 
Introduction 
A large part of our online interaction takes place within specialised virtual 
environments. One such environment carries the unwieldy acronym, the 
massively multiplayer online role-playing game (MMORPG) (Kelly 2004), 
which can be defined as any online role-playing game where a hundred or 
more players can play simultaneously in the same environment. MMORPG 
have quickly become a huge success. The games, such as Ultima Online, 
Asheron’s Call and Everquest have evolved from single player games and 
text-based multi-user domains (MUD), and they have been created as a way 
of combining the playing advantages of single player games, strategy games 
and synchronous social interaction. 
To play the game, the player buys the program and installs it on a computer 
with an Internet connection. Once the installation is complete, the player 
then logs on to the server and creates an account. Financing the game is 
done in two stages: first there is the initial fee to buy the software, and then 
there is a monthly cost to access the game environment. These games 
cannot be played without access to the game environment. Once the 
account has been set up, the player then creates a character from a list of 
choices. These choices can include certain fixed attributes, which the 
character will then have during the rest of the game – such as hair colour 
and occupation – and they also have a certain number of features that will 
change during the game – for example, the character’s strength, agility and 
PROPERTY 
 
139 
other vital statistics. From this point on the player enters the online 
environment and can perform tasks within this world. The limits of the 
actions of the character are limited or decided by the configurations of the 
program. 
One peculiarity of the MMORPG is the level of interaction that is possible 
between the players via their online personas. The players often form teams 
or guilds in which they can help each other with the more difficult tasks 
inside the game. The guild not only provides help and tips for new players 
but also a sense of security, since the self-regulatory guild system ensures 
that the players within the same guild will not cheat each other while trading 
or cheat within the game to the detriment of fellow guild members. In 
certain games, the guild is almost a necessity for those who wish to play the 
game and be unhampered by other players who have managed to 
manipulate the program and grant their characters powers unintended by 
the game programmers, such as the power to destroy or kill the characters 
of other players. 
MMORPG’s are an established form of social interaction; the phenomenon 
has created an increased academic interest in online game studies and 
created several new business models for the companies that create, 
distribute and maintain the games. The roots of the games can be seen in 
the interactive worlds of MUDs (Pargman 2000) and chats (Sveningson 
2001) where the creation of an online persona becomes strongly connected 
to the personas reputation.  
The goal of this chapter is to study the assets that are created in the 
MMORPG with special focus on the avatar itself. The reason for this study 
is that there is a discrepancy between the regulatory structure, which in this 
case is the MMORPG controller, and the actor, which in this chapter is 
represented by the player. The fundamental difference of opinion between 
these two groups concerns the property rights in that which is created 
online in these virtual environments. The structural regulation formed by 
contract favours the regulatory structure, many actors disapprove of this 
balance, and argue that the value created in MMORPG belongs to the actor 
who actively works to create added value. This chapter therefore will look at the 
way in which new environments, such as MMORPGs, challenge existing established 
principles in property and attempt to re-interpret them to better suit their new 
environment.  
This case deals with the core democratic value of property (Harris 1996). 
This case examines the frontiers of intellectual property in that it looks at 
the conflict that appears in the creation of intellectual property in online 
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environments. The basic disagreement surrounds the ownership of artefacts 
within massively multiplayer online role playing games (MMORPG). From 
the traditional point of view these environments are created and controlled 
by private organisations and the users are regulated by contractual 
agreement with the private organisation. Among the users there has been a 
growing belief in that they own their online characters and any artefacts they 
find within the world. This opinion is widespread among the players but is 
contrary to the contract. This case shows that there is a growing re-appraisal 
or negotiation on the way in which intellectual property originating in online 
environments should be understood. This entails a re-evaluation of the role 
and concept of property being driven by the users of MMORPG. This is 
tantamount to a grassroots revolution to see a user-driven re-appraisal of 
one of the core values in democracy being negotiated in this manner.  
Theory 
The concept of property is neither static nor easy to define. On one level 
there is the simple concept of mine that every child develops and 
understands (and every parent attempts to temper with the concept of 
sharing) on the other hand property is all about exclusive access and not 
having to share. In addition to this there are discrepancies between what we 
consider to be ours and what the law protects. Many of our ideas of what 
can become, and what is, property are founded in the technological 
standards of the age. Once it becomes technologically viable to do 
something the law is required to take it into consideration and attempt to 
incorporate the technologically possible into the property regime.  
The development of digital technologies has led to the transfer of much of 
our creative material from traditional into digital storage formats. This 
format offers substantial economic and logistical advantages however it also 
creates an ease in which the products can be duplicated and transferred 
without permission. These new advantages are testing the boundaries of 
property regulation. Bringing into question previously resolved social 
agreements on the limits of property ownership in cultural material and 
demanding of the legislator a re-appraisal of the values that need to be 
protected.  
Marx (1978 [1844], p 26) defined property, as “…the right of man to 
property is the right to enjoy his possessions and dispose of the same 
arbitrarily without regard for other men, independently, from society, the 
right of selfishness.” Whether or not we agree with this property theory is 
deceptively easy. Property today implies exclusive privilege of the thing in 
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question. Despite the difficulties in attributing property rights to intangible 
objects, the legal institutions of copyright and patents have been created to 
create exclusive property–like relationships and grant property rights on 
certain symbols, images, and intangible matter. This has led to the expansion 
of property to encompass a larger sphere. That which is owned is no longer 
simply the item itself but the privileges which it provides to the owner 
(Harris 1996). One of the most heated areas of conflict within this 
discussion is the conflict between private property and public domain or the 
commons (Ostrom 1999). These concepts will be discussed in the next 
section before we apply them to the digital domain.  
The concept of property often is related to the legal relationships between 
persons in relation to things. These things may be tangible such as real 
estate or pencils or they may be intangible such as stocks, patents, or 
software. As in many other areas, the protection offered by the law, and the 
way in which it is offered varies greatly. The law in relation to property 
exists in every legal system but the scope and manner in which protection is 
created and enforced depends very much on the culture, both where and 
when, in which the legal system was created and developed (Harris 1996). 
Common amongst the concept of property law is that it deals with the 
accumulation, protection, use, and limitation of wealth and therefore has 
serious repercussions on many other aspects of society. A characteristic of 
the core European legal systems is the predominance of private ownership. 
Western legal systems regard individual ownership as the norm, derogations 
from which must be explained. The legal concept of property in the West is 
characterized by a tendency to agglomerate in a single legal person, 
preferably the one who is currently in possession of the thing in question, 
the exclusive right to possess, privilege to use, and power to convey the 
thing.  
Property is not often seen as a static condition but rather is viewed as a 
relationship between a person (or persons) who owns, the things that are 
owned, and actions affected by ownership. The word ownership is not 
especially clear since it seems to denote a single relationship to that which is 
owned. In reality ownership is a collection, or bundle, of rights that 
complement each other and grant to the owner the authority to legitimately 
enforce conditions. Stated more simply, ownership allows the owner to 
enjoy, that which is owned and prevent others from similarly enjoying that 
which is owned. 
In addition to this, the owner may grant others the right to enjoy, that which 
is owned. This permission may be connected to conditions and fees. Under 
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the law today most tangible things may be owned, but there are exceptions 
(for example hazardous goods, narcotics, wild animals, important 
waterways) which limit full property rights through specific rules. 
Intangibles are more complicated under the law. This is not due to any lack 
of historical or traditional intangible ownership (Sherman & Bently 1999) 
but is due to the focus on the concept of possession. 
Scarcity, Distribution & Justification 
The exclusivity of property is one of its salient factors and the interaction 
between private property and the commons has become one of the more 
discussed questions within technology law of our day (Boyle 2003) For most 
people the commons is very strongly connected with the idea of tragedy. 
Even without ever having read Hardin’s (1968) article the idea that 
commons are a wasteful form of property is something we almost intuitively 
believe to be true. Hardin’s view was that when property was in the hands 
of a collective group, each individual would act in a manner to maximise her 
own utility. The result of this, in Hardin’s metaphor, was that the pasture 
owned by all would eventually become over-grazed. The commons could 
only lead to ruin of the property, or as Hardin puts it:  
Ruin is the destination towards which all men rush, each pursuing his own best 
interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. 
Hardin’s position is not without historical predecessors. This line of thought 
contends that the externality costs are not considered when individuals 
strive to maximise their own utility. Since theoretically all actors will strive to 
maximise the optimal short-term strategy is to strive to maximise and 
therefore the pasture will be lost. Hardin’s critics maintain that his theory is 
flawed since the context within which the commons is located is not 
considered (Ostrom 1999, Shiva 2002). The high level of social cohesion 
and trust among the actors ensure that the see beyond the long-term goals. 
The concept that each actor has only the maximisation of personal utility in 
mind is also a point that is seen as being a simplistic view of humankind.  
The disappearance of the European commons has been called the process 
of inclosure or enclosure and took place mainly between the 15th and 19th 
centuries (Gonner 1912). The enclosure movements were partly legitimised 
by philosophers such as Locke, who believed that idle nature was wasteful 
and that property could be created by adding labour to wasteland. Property 
occurred since “...every man has a Property in his own Person. This no 
Body has any Right to but himself. The Labour of his Body, and the Work 
of his Hands, we may say, are properly his” (Locke 1960 [1690], p 287-288). 
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With this the stage was set for the commoditisation of nature. “Whatsoever 
then he removes out of the State of Nature hath provided, and left it in, he 
has mixed his Labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and 
thereby makes it his Property” (Locke 1960 [1690], p 288). This latter 
accommodating view on property creation has been used to legitimise the 
creation of new property rights in both tangibles and intangibles (Hughes 
1988). 
Recently there has been an awakening of interest in the commons among 
lawyers working in technology related law. The most active proponent of 
the concept, Lawrence Lessig, equates the commons with access to 
infrastructures  
Central park…an extraordinary resource of peacefulness in the center of a city 
that is anything but; an escape, and refuge, that anyone can take (take, or use) 
without the permission of anyone else. The public streets…on no one’s schedule 
but your own, you can enter the public streets, and go in any direction you wish. 
(Lessig 1999a, p 2). 
The public domain, according to Lessig, must not only be protected but it 
must also be created. It is created when people share what they own.  
…we are not interested only in talking about a public domain or in getting 
legislators to help build a public domain. Our aim is to build a movement of 
consumers and producers of content…who help build the public domain and, by 
their work, demonstrate the importance of the public domain to other creativity. 
(Lessig 2004, pp 283-284). 
While the commons may be a notoriously vague term (Boyle 2003) 
consisting of ideas such as property owned by a group, common access to 
another’s property and un-owned property (wasteland). The term is 
positively crystal clear in relation to the concept of the public domain. In 
frustration at not being able to define it clearly the public domain is often 
referred to as that which is not protected by intellectual property. In other 
words the term lacks an adequate definition but is often defined by what 
intellectual property is not. The public domain is our collective culture. It is 
what makes us who we are and it is the font from which most creative work 
is collected. The definition of the public domain as that which is not 
property diminishes its fundamental importance and maintains the myth, or 
“charming notion” (Litman 1990), that intellectual property is created 
without context. When the creator removes something from the public 
domain and presents it as her own the claim is based upon the idea that that 
which has been created is an original work. It is important that we do not 
forget that the actual legal interpretation of the criteria of originality is that it 
is not plagiarism (Litman 1990). While the courts need a baseline from 
DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGY 
 144 
which to award property it is difficult to understand why everything short of 
verbatim copying can be seen as property.  
Social institutions cannot be accepted as they are but always require 
justification, in the institution of property this is even more acute since the 
results of the implementation of property may at times be morally 
objectionable (Waldron 1999). In part justification can be the most efficient 
management of limited resources as seen above in the tragedy of commons 
(Hardin 1968). Beyond the criticism presented earlier against Hardin it is 
important to recognise that the utilitarian argument for property does not 
address what will be done with those who are not benefiting from the 
property and indeed how should conflicting needs be addressed Hardin 
(1986) exemplified with the use of grazing but what of the needs for other 
groups what would happen if a motorway needed to be built on the grazing 
land? The utilitarian arguments of Hardin therefore do not always address 
the needs of all groups.  
An issue, which needs to be discussed and regularly reappraised, is the 
question of the distribution of property since this has a deep impact upon 
the individuals ability to participate within a social context and a democracy 
(Harris 1996, Rawls 1999, Waldron 1999). For example political 
developments may cause a need for reappraisal as seen in the large-scale 
land redistribution conducted in Mexico and New Zealand (Waldron 1999). 
Among the innovative modern theories of redistribution we find the Coase 
(1960) theorem that, ignoring the primary justifications of initial 
distribution, attempts to settle an efficient distribution of property based 
upon an economic foundation of utility.  Whilst the Coase theorem is 
innovative the main arguments for property distribution can still be divided 
into three approaches: The Humean, the Rousseauian and the Lockean 
(Waldron 1999) these will be briefly reviewed here.  
The Humean approach takes its starting point from the premise that people 
will fight over resources and the distribution of property at any time will 
“…be arbitrary, driven by force, cunning and luck” (Waldron 1999, p 17). 
This arbitrary distribution of property based upon power may, at times, 
become stable and conflict can then subside, to the benefit of society:  
I observe, that it will be for my interest to leave another in the possession of his 
goods, provided he will act in the same manner in regard to me. He is sensible of 
a like interest in the regulation of his conduct. When this common sense of 
interest is mutually express’d, and is known to both, it produces a suitable 
resolution and behaviour. (Hume 1978 [1739], p 490). 
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Therefore property distribution becomes legitimised by the mutual 
recognition of each other’s interests in their own property. The point Hume 
is making is that there is no real advantage to be made in disputing 
inequalities in property distribution. The real advantages will be made when 
everyone can rely on the status quo and not have to actively defend their 
property.  For Hume the basic need for justification is not justice but to 
provide a stable foundation upon which society can build (Waldron 1999).  
The Rousseauian differs from the Humean in that where Hume means that 
society benefits from the legitimisation of status quo Rousseau (1997 [1762]) 
places the will of the people and the social contract first. Therefore through 
the social contract the state becomes the expression of the will of the people 
and therefore if necessary the state has the power to redistribute property if 
this benefits the people. This redistribution has been criticised for being 
arbitrary and against freedom (Nozick 1974), however Rawls (1999) is more 
positive and argues that property distribution cannot be valued in isolation 
from the context where it is situated and therefore it would not produce the 
arbitrary results Nozick fears.  
Finally we have the Lockean approach to property distribution. Locke (1960 
[1690]) disagreed of state regulation on the grounds that the individual was 
the best judge of what she needed and to Locke there was nothing wrong 
with the individual using initiative to take what was necessary. Locke 
espouses occupancy theory (Waldon 1999) in that the legitimisation of 
ownership comes from the individual who has worked for the property.   
…every man has a Property in his own Person. This no Body has any Right to 
but himself. The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we may say, 
are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the State of Nature hath 
provided, and left it in, he has mixed his Labour with, and joined to it something 
that is his own, and thereby makes it his Property. (Locke 1960 [1690], pp 287-
288). 
This theory is controversial but has its supporters and has been accepted in 
particular in relation to intellectual property (Nozick 1974). Therefore once 
the principal theories and causes of property justification and distribution 
have been briefly viewed we can proceed to the implementation of this case.   
Analysis: Actors 
The online character is often seen as a reflection of the offline self and is in 
literature referred to as the avatar since it is a manifestation of the self in this 
online world. Avatar is a Sanskrit word that refers to the incarnation of 
God, but is more commonly used to mean a manifestation of the self. While 
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the initial creation of an avatar is merely a list of choices, which then 
generates a character by use of sophisticated algorithms, many players tend 
to develop deeper relationships to the avatars they use. The MMORPG not 
only involves playing in an online environment but there is also a strong 
aspect of online cooperation and communication. This cooperation and 
communication can even be seen as a crucial aspect of the online game, 
since the successful completion of many situations in which the player will 
find herself are not possible to complete with only one player. The game 
also requires that the avatar collects a steady stream of artefacts, which are 
more and more powerful; without these more powerful artefacts the player 
will have a difficult time proceeding in the game. The online collaboration 
also makes the MMORPG a more socially oriented game than any of the 
computer game predecessors. The online environments are created as 
complete worlds with their own topologies and cosmologies, which are 
often reasonably coherent within the confines of the game. For a discussion 
on the importance, growth and future of MMORPGs, see, for example, 
Keighley (2002), Kosak (2002) and Krantz (2002). 
The development of an avatar from an unskilled, low-level character to a 
level of skill and strength within the virtual environment requires, above all, 
a great deal of time and commitment from the player. The more one plays 
the greater the skill of the avatar. With the improvement of skills comes the 
greater accumulation of wealth (either in currency or in goods), and with all 
this follows an improved social standing both within the game and also 
within any guild the player belongs to or even in any external offline 
gathering where two or more players meet. 
The avatar is therefore not only the physical representation of self within the 
online environment but also a social being within its own social circle and a 
corresponding position that follows this social position. Finally, the avatar is 
an investment. The time spent creating a powerful avatar can be seen as an 
investment within a social group, but it can also be seen as an investment in 
monetary terms as well. The fact that MMORPGs have internal economies 
has been mentioned briefly earlier. Everquest’s virtual world ‘Norrath’, if 
compared with offline economies, has a gross national product per capita of 
US$2,266, which makes it more economically sound than China 
(Castronova 2001). The currencies of online games have been (and some 
still are) more valuable than the currencies in offline environments. 
Outside the game the online currency traded in relation to offline currency, 
and the avatars themselves and the artefacts they possess can be seen as 
being economic assets. Trade in these assets has been carried out both 
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within and outside the virtual environment. Trading the in-game assets 
within the game has almost always taken the form of bartering since no 
offline money has changed hands. 
But this is not the only trade that has been taking place. Much of the trade 
has been carried out in other, non-gaming, virtual environments such as the 
online virtual marketplaces like eBay and Yahoo!. The practice of selling 
artefacts and avatars on online auctions has been seen as a natural part of 
the game for the players, even though those who buy powerful characters 
do lack a certain amount of social cachet and are often considered inferior 
players. This is much the same attitude that old money has towards the 
nouveau riche.  
In 2000, a wizard sold, by online auction, the “Cloak of Flames” he had 
managed to obtain after successfully vanquishing Lord Nagafen of Norrath. 
The cloak was sold on eBay for over US$1,000. Others have sold their 
avatars for prices reaching the thousand-dollar mark and above (Sandoval 
2000). It is interesting to note that the virtual world is not free from sexism; 
male avatars usually fetch higher prices than female avatars (Castronova 
2003). In 2001, this practice was stopped by the auction houses. Their 
rationale for stopping the auctions in virtual merchandise and avatars was 
their policy of cancelling auctions that may violate intellectual property 
rights (Sandoval 2001). This issue was quick to spark a debate about who 
owned the products of the game (Carter 2002, Taylor 2002b, Klang 2004c). 
Most players felt that they had acquired proprietary rights over their avatars. 
This right arises, according to the players, not from the actual payment of 
the software or the monthly subscription fee. The players feel that they have 
a right to their avatars and the merchandise they collect because of the time 
they invest in the game (Carter 2002). The legal questions that arise are 
natural. First, what is it that is being traded? And, second, if that which is 
being traded can be seen as being property, then to whom does it belong 
and, finally, which rights do they have over it? The dispute begins with the 
first question.  
Most players who want to trade their avatars claim that they are selling their 
time while the platform owners31 claim that they are selling the game 
manufacturers’ own intellectual property. When it comes to artefacts found 
or bartered within the virtual environment, the defences are the same but 
the arguments of the players tend to be much weaker. 
                                                           
31 This term is used to define the group in control of the virtual environment. 
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If we were only concerned with the law ‘as it is’, then legal philosophy 
would never evolve and the needs of the people would never be met. The 
validity and scope of the end user license agreement (EULA) might easily 
end this debate, bringing all other complaints to an end. But attempting to 
end a discussion by simply referring to the fact that the current solution is in 
line with the law is neither a fruitful nor an interesting discussion. Also, it 
must be remembered that the EULA can be interpreted by the courts and it 
is they who will fill it with meaning via their interpretation and 
understanding of what the EULA really is. Without an active discussion on 
the role of the EULA, the courts will not have much material with which to 
interpret the EULA. There is also a final question that must always be 
posed: What is it that regulation should be? And in this discussion the role 
of the users is crucial. This issue is too important to be answered less 
rigorously than it deserves with a condescending remark to read the end 
user licence agreement. 
While positive law (i.e. the written law and the decisions of the courts) is an 
important tool of the lawyer, it has often come into conflict with the moral 
rights and obligations of the citizens. In classical terms this is the conflict 
between positive and natural law. Both the age and the content can be 
illustrated in the Greek tragedy of Sophocles where Antigone disobeyed 
King Creon’s command and buried her dead brother. When Creon asks her 
if she broke the law she replies: 
Yes; for it was not Zeus that had published me that edict; not such are the laws 
set among men by the justice who dwells with the gods below; nor deemed I that 
thy decrees were of such force, that a mortal could override the unwritten and 
unfailing statutes of heaven. For their life is not of today or yesterday, but from 
all time, and no man knows when they were first put forth. (Sophocles 1912 [ca 
442 BCE]). 
The conflict in the tragedy is the fact that there are worldly laws and there 
are laws that must be followed since they have a greater standing and 
supersede the laws of men. Today it is not the laws of any god which one 
can use to argue a higher obligation and therefore a diminished need to 
follow positive law. But this does not mean that positive laws take 
precedence. Today we tend to discuss the rights of individuals as being 
important enough to stand above written laws enforced within the borders 
of a single state. 
The question is, therefore, can there be a right to ones own avatar? The 
initial response to a question such as this is that no such right exists; but this 
is a much too short-sighted answer since rights tend to evolve over time. 
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The fact that there is no such right now does not mean it cannot evolve. 
And also the fact that we claim something to be a right does not mean that 
it will be enforceable – for example, the American Declaration of 
Independence (1776) declared all men to be equal but did not prevent 
slavery. 
Avatar as Property 
What would be the basis of the right to ones own avatar? The first such 
basis must be found in the discussion of what an avatar is. If we return to 
the older understanding of the term, we find that in Hinduism it is the 
incarnation of a deity in a human or animal form. It commonly refers to the 
ten appearances of Vishnu, who appears to counteract some particular evil 
in the world. Or, as Lord Krishna tells Arjuna in the Bhagavadgita: 
Whenever there is a decline of righteousness and rise of unrighteousness then I 
send forth Myself. For the protection of the good, for the destruction of the 
wicked, and for the establishment of righteousness, I come into being from age 
to age. (Johnson 1994, Chapter 4).  
Within the game avatars are cyborgs, that is to say a combination of the 
actor and the machine represented in a virtual space (Balkin 2004). 
Lastowka and Hunter (2004) even consider the possibility that cyborgs have 
rights since they are representations of humans, with rights, acting in a social 
context. These contexts often develop community norms that regulate 
conduct within these contexts. The regulated norms are often controlled 
and regulated both by the other players, through their avatars, and the 
platform owners (Balkin 2004). 
The Reputation Aspect 
While this is an interesting background it may not be applicable here since 
we are not deities taking on human form – even though in certain role-
playing games some may argue against me. One thing that the avatar is, 
however, is the manifestation of my self in a virtual environment. My self is 
not only my appearance, even though this is not without weight, but my self 
is also the sum of my actions. This last point is usually summed up as 
reputation (Gambetta 1988, Luhmann 1988) and, indeed, the avatar is the 
focal point of my reputation within the virtual environment. 
As in the real world, my reputation is a valuable asset, which I use and abuse 
at my discretion, but it is not something I can fully control since it is the 
sum of other people’s opinions of me that make up my reputation 
(Gambetta 1988, Luhmann 1988). If the avatar is a part of my reputation, or 
if the avatar is the bearer of my reputation within a virtual world, then 
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should it not be protected in the same way as my offline reputation and be 
part of my assets to be dealt with as I see fit? Human reputation is protected 
to some extent in most, if not all, jurisdictions and is even protected in 
Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights32 and Article 10 of 
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms. The protection of reputation is therefore a human right, and, in 
much the same way as the government has an obligation to protect their 
citizens other rights, there is also an obligation to protect the reputation of 
its citizens. 
The problem is, of course, that the rise of the MMORPG and virtual 
environments in general has not received the amount of attention they 
deserve. There is a tendency to look upon these environments as being 
unimportant and mere playthings not requiring legal protection outside the 
scope of the protection of the intellectual property of the software 
manufacturer. Reputation is a key aspect of all virtual environments and will 
require a more serious legal protection than previously envisaged. 
The Speech Aspect 
Another important function fulfilled by the avatar is the mode in which one 
expresses oneself within this world. While there is a difference between 
expressing oneself and obtaining a right to protected freedom of expression 
(Schauer 1982), in these environments the full control of ones avatar is 
essential for the right to control ones speech. It is hardly necessary to point 
out the massive amount of work that has been done on the importance of 
free speech in an open society. Yet it is important to underscore the fact 
that most legislation for the protection of speech only protects the speaker 
from governmental involvement or persecution.33 
                                                           
32 Conventions are often used to create and defend human rights. E.g. Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, Adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 
217 A (III) of 10 December 1948. Article 12: No one shall be subjected…to attacks 
upon his honour and reputation.  
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as 
amended by Protocol No. 11, Rome, 4.XI.1950. Article 10 – Freedom of expression. (1) 
Everyone has the right to freedom of expression…The exercise of these freedoms…may 
be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by 
law and are necessary in a democratic society…for the protection of the reputation or 
rights of others. 
33 Ibid. 
PROPERTY 
 
151 
Considering the technological realities of the day and the rapid advances in 
technological development it is an open question as to whether the right to 
speech will be limited to protection from the involvement of governmental 
actions. But the question of human rights may one day create the right to 
ones avatar. But will these rights ‘to be left alone’ and to ‘free expression’ 
also entail a right to treat the avatar as personal property that may be traded? 
The right to ones own avatar should be an absolute right for a human 
person since any interference with the right will quickly limit the efficiency 
with which the avatar can be used in exercising these rights. Therefore, the 
rights should include a full right to dispose of ones avatar as one feels fit. 
The Property Aspect 
And, finally, we reach the aspect of property. This is where most arguments 
on the rights of avatars usually end up. In this case, I would like to take a 
slightly different approach. I would like to take the starting point of a non 
EULA-regulated environment. In other words, I would like to explore who 
owns the avatar if there is no EULA to weigh the arguments so heavily in 
the favour of the manufacturers. 
To be able to discuss this in more depth, we must return to the creation of 
the avatar. Since the avatar is created out of a, more or less, complex series 
of settings, the actual avatar cannot be seen as anything other than the 
output of an equation or programming function. However, the user then 
has the option of naming the avatar, and this act of providing the avatar 
with a unique name does entail a certain amount of separate intellectual 
investment in the avatar. 
In the same way as trademarks are protected, so can the avatar be protected. 
While the act of naming does entail a certain activity that could make the 
avatar less likely to be a result of the programming, it is still a weak link 
upon which to claim ownership. An interesting argument can, however, be 
found in the works of Locke (1960 [1690]) when he writes that the result of 
an individuals labour should belong to the individual.  
If we see the newly created avatar as coming from the state of nature, it is 
devoid of personality and does not noticeably differ from many other 
avatars (except in name). The player’s use of the avatar can be seen as 
enjoining the state of nature with ones own labour and, as such, the product 
of these actions, in this case a more powerful and socially adept avatar, 
should belong to the player since he is the one who has created it. 
The purpose of this section is to attempt to seek a rationale for the right to 
ones own avatar. The law of intellectual property has reached an interesting 
DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGY 
 152 
point today since in many situations there has been a reversal of position 
from its origins. Originally, only a limited number of things were protected 
and the use of most intellectual property was unregulated. Today we see that 
the situation is the opposite, since the default situation is that most usages 
of intellectual property are regulated and what is left is only a small area of 
rights (Lessig 1999). When it comes to the ownership of the avatar, the 
situation is clearly in the favour of the software manufacturers, but this 
should not prevent others from finding arguments with which to attempt to 
rebalance the scales. 
Analysis: Structures 
While many discussions on the issue of digital property tend to gravitate 
around the concept of intellectual property, there is a very important issue 
to be resolved before we can enter into that arena and this is the question of 
whether or not the property (intellectual or otherwise) belongs to those who 
wish to sell it. 
To be able to answer this, we must look at how the property came into the 
hands of those who wish to sell it. The first stage is actually a simple 
contract. And while there is still no actual international consensus on which 
requirements must be fulfilled for there to be a contract, most jurisdictions 
agree upon a simple formula when attempting to explain contract law. This 
is usually referred to as the offer-acceptance model. The idea is that the 
contract is a reflection of the will of the parties to be bound by contract. 
Formally, this occurs when one party makes an offer that the other accepts 
(Furmston 1996). 
Leaving aside the differences of opinion as to whether offers are binding 
(e.g. in Nordic law) or not, whether there needs to be consideration 
(common law) or not, (civil law) the simple model sketched above is the 
basis of contract law. In the case of the MMORPG buyer, the first stage of 
the contract is that he purchases the software and then installs it onto a 
computer. The buyer then logs onto the site and enters into an agreement to 
pay a fixed sum each month to access the online game. 
However, there is a small part that is usually ignored by the buyer in the 
rush to commence use of the new game. When the actual installation of the 
program begins it is usually interrupted by several questions, which the 
experienced computer user tends to agree to without a second glance. The 
questions involve technical settings such as where the program shall be 
located and whether a shortcut shall be placed on the desktop and so on.  
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Among these questions the EULA (for more on EULA see Chapter 7) 
makes its appearance. It is usually in the form of a box where the buyer 
must click on the ‘I Agree’ icon to be able to install the program onto the 
computer. The text box containing the licence agreement is not especially 
interesting and the text is rarely reader friendly. A friendly interpretation of 
the scenario is that the buyer and manufacturer are in general agreement of 
what can be done with the software, so the buyer tends to agree to the terms 
without much ado. In reality the terms are quite harsh. There is no option to 
negotiate on any of them. The situation is all or nothing. If the user does 
not wish to agree then the software cannot be installed and attempting to 
return an opened software CD to a vendor is a harrowing experience. 
So the position of the buyer is either to agree, or to lose the money already 
spent and to not be able to play the game that was bought. What is the 
position of these agreements in the law? Much has been written on this 
question (Furmston 1996, Gomulkiewicz & Williamson 1996). The question 
is usually dealt with theoretically and seen as: the actual terms that appear 
after the purchase of the CD should not be part of the contract and cannot 
be binding. This is usually because it is not seen as fair that one contracting 
part can put himself in a better position after the deal has been done. 
However, the fact is that the shrinkwrap licence and the clickwrap licence 
have become standard practice and have been regularly enforced in courts in 
several jurisdictions.  
Therefore this chapter could be at an end here. The EULA is seen as being 
binding by the courts and, therefore, the situation under the law is clear: if 
the EULA states that the avatars and artefacts within the MMORPG are the 
property of the software house and may not be sold, then this is binding to 
the user. If we were to remain here, the question would not be complex, and 
to many this is the complete answer of the discussion. This may be 
regrettable since the many players feel that the situation is not equitable, but 
it is legal. 
Therefore, the question should be posed: Is there a rationale for increasing 
the scope of protection for the players and should this mean that they have 
greater rights of which the law should take notice?  
The Limits of EULA 
Simply because EULAs have been enforced by the courts does not mean 
that legal systems are prepared to enforce all their terms in all situations. 
The EULA is an important document since it does more clearly state the 
obligation of the purchaser or user of the software. The courts apply these 
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licences since they generally reflect the trade practices that are currently in 
use today. But it is important to remember that these trade practices are not 
fixed in stone and also the courts still often have the power to interpret 
these practices in favour of the purchaser should a need to do so arise. 
The EULA does not live in a vacuum and comes from a context known to 
lawyers as adhesion contracts. These are contract terms that are part of the 
contract without being actually included in the contract text or that have not 
been discussed during the negotiation. These adhesion contracts are not 
unusual nor something to be feared (Gomulkiewicz & Williamson 1996). 
For example, airline tickets are bought without consulting the mass of rules 
that apply – in this case, the adhesion contract simplifies the negotiating 
process by standardizing the terms involved. 
It is important to remember however, that the adhesion contract does limit 
the scope of rights available to the parties and as such must be treated with 
some care. Software companies wishing to ensure that their EULA is 
applicable should ensure a certain amount of transparency and information 
in the process of presentation of the EULA. This entails such steps as: (i) 
making the EULA visible and enabling the user to study the terms in a 
reasonably easy manner; (ii) any limitation to the rights of the software user 
should be included as highlighted warnings; (iii) the language must be such 
as to be comprehendible to the average reader, meaning that a limited 
number of legalese and unclear terms should be used; (iv) it should be 
possible for the users to return to the EULA for future reference; (v) 
uncommon or onerous terms should be highlighted – inclusion of especially 
harsh terms should even require that the users acknowledge their awareness 
of the harsher terms (Brown 2002). 
As we can see, there is a common thread in all this and that is the act of 
creating clarity and agreement between the buyer and the seller. 
Unfortunately, the craft of drafting software contracts and the inclination of 
those who draft them has moved away from clarity. This has led to the 
increasing disparity between the contracting parties. The more this trend 
continues and the more the parties are mismatched in legal power the more 
likely it will be for the courts to find EULAs to be inequitable. 
Looking at EULAs today, we can see that many of the basic rules – which 
were created to ensure that adhesion contracts are not unduly onerous and 
surprising to one of the parties – are being ignored. Even a cursory survey 
among users will show that they do not read the contract terms. Those who 
read them find them confusing and, as the current situation with avatars 
shows, they are not in line with what the ordinary user feels to be correct.  
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The sections of the EULA that particularly limit the rights of the user are 
not more clearly displayed and as such it is possible for the parties to have 
an increasingly mismatched concept of their rights and obligations. All these 
factors create a new scenario where it may be that the courts will eventually 
limit the power of the EULA. This does not mean that the EULA will not 
be a very important document in guiding the rights and obligations of all 
involved, but the lack of transparency and clarity has led to an opening for 
the courts wishing to curtail the absolute freedoms created by EULAs. This 
situation becomes even more poignant when the parties involved are 
mismatched, such as a large software house and an individual consumer.  
While there are openings for these kinds of interpretations, the courts have 
not yet shown a willingness to move in this direction. The American 
legislators have, however, proven to be more forthright, and in the UCITA 
(Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act) they legitimized the 
shrinkwrap licence, creating an even stronger position for the EULA than it 
had already held (Crotty 2002). The position of the EULA is strong in law 
and it has yet to be challenged in the manner discussed within this chapter. 
Until serious challenges to the EULA occur, it will maintain its current 
strength and must be taken as a starting point in any legal analysis of virtual 
property. 
The whole issue of selling both artefacts and avatars recently came to a head 
when Blacksnow Interactive sued Mythic Entertainment for unfair business 
practices and interference with prospective business advantage. Mythic 
Entertainment is the computer game developer that developed and runs the 
MMORPG Dark Age of Camelot. Blacksnow Interactive specialized in 
“farming” the online game Dark Age of Camelot. Blacksnow’s business model 
consisted of employing low-wage Mexican workers to work three shifts per 
day in the MMORPG. The work consisted of collecting valuables within the 
game. The valuables were later sold in online auctions.   
In the beginning of 2002, Mythic terminated Blacksnows game accounts and 
contacted auction sites and requested that they stop dealing in copyrighted 
material – sites like eBay complied. Mythics actions led Blacksnow to file 
charges that Mythic was behaving in an anti-competitive manner and was 
attempting to “exert monopoly-like control over uncopyrightable material”. 
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On 10 May the same year, the District Court of California34 found that the 
end user licence agreement (EULA)35 was valid in this dispute and that, 
according to the terms of the licence; the dispute was to be settled by 
arbitration. Since arbitration is a private affair, the terms of the resolution of 
the conflict are not public knowledge and one can only point out the 
Blacksnow Interactive no longer trades in artefacts from any online games.  
The enforcement of the EULA has led to the demise in large-scale trade in 
avatars and artefacts. But the interesting issue with the EULA is how 
enforceable is it and how is it that it can control the activities of the user?  
Discussion 
Democracy and property theories stem from the 17th century works of 
philosophers such as Locke and Hume who both argued that the purpose of 
government was to protect life, liberty and property. The discussions on the 
distribution and justification of property have been active ever since. The 
basic premise being that if there were structures to protect property then 
productive labour would not be worthwhile since there is no way of 
knowing if someone would simply come and take your property away. 
Private property ensures that the individual can participate freely and with a 
degree of autonomy within the democracy. Therefore to ensure the survival 
of the community private property is necessary and there must be a reliable 
structure that protects it (Harrison 1995).  
The question, which arises within this case, is not whether property is, or is 
not, a vital component of a democracy but rather when property becomes 
the private property of an individual – which claim can one use to claim the 
exclusive right to something? Harris (1996) points to the core of the 
controversy surrounding property:  
Private property is controversial for the same reason that it is commonly prized. 
It emphasizes the individuality of the property-holder. A property institution at 
least confers some private domain over some scarce things, so that the 
separateness of persons is made evident in the face of collective decision-making. 
(p 165). 
Within the framework of this case the claims are based either upon the 
concept that labour grants property. This theory, based upon Lockean 
                                                           
34 Blacksnow Interactive, et al. v. Mythic Entertainment, Inc. (2002) SA CV 02-112 GLT (ANx), 
10 May. 
35 For more on the EULA see Spyware: Legal Position page 127 et seq. 
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thought, is appealing in that it confers a level of recognition onto the 
individual who worked for or made the property. As this chapter has shown 
the dispute revolves around the understanding of who developed the 
property and therefore who can call it theirs. The actors claim that the 
artefacts found within the virtual environment belong to them since they 
have struggled and worked hard to find them (Taylor 2002b, Klang 2004c) 
while the environment providers point both to the fact that the 
environment is the result of programming and entry into the environment is 
controlled by contract and therefore the can be no property within the 
environment which does not belong to them.  
Today, the computer software manufacturers have the power and the ability 
to close down the accounts of any users who are in violation of the EULA. 
This means that buying or selling an avatar could result in the termination of 
ones whole account. To many the termination of an account in a computer 
game does not seem like a harsh punishment. Some would even claim that 
the players should join the real world instead of spending their time online. 
This, however, is a very short sighted approach. We are presently drawing 
up the future of the legal status of avatars, and, at present, the status is that 
they are to an ever-greater extent falling under the ownership of the 
software manufacturers. If the situation were only relevant to online games, 
this would maybe be less important to the larger community; but this is not 
so. 
The growth of MMORPGs has shown that they are here to stay and that 
they will continue to grow. Another future trend is the development of 
mobile platforms that allow access to virtual environments. The future will 
bring a much easier access to virtual environments and maybe even the 
development of more avatars for more diverse roles. 
The more dependent we become on our avatars the more necessary it 
becomes that they are seen by the law as being an integral extension of the 
human body in the virtual environment, since they will be the way in which 
we express ourselves and the way in which others perceive us in the future. 
This is a development that we must begin to take seriously. Whether or not 
this requires the creation of a new right, as in the right to ones own avatar, 
remains to be seen. But what should be understood is that, even without the 
separate right, the avatar must start to be perceived as the extension of 
body. This extension of body and rights therein does not affect the software 
manufacturer. A question that is rarely raised is: For what purpose does the 
software manufacturer claim to need the rights of ownership in my avatar? 
Instead of the users needing to explain the rationale for what is an easily 
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understandable reaction, it would be interesting to hear the rationale from 
the software manufacturers. 
The Blacksnow incident has led many to believe that there is not much 
point in arguing any more. The courts have determined the fate of the 
avatars, and with legislation like UCITA the situation seems very bleak 
indeed. But the situation where a company for business purposes cultivated 
avatars for the express purpose of selling them should not be the reason 
why no rights can be given to the avatars of private individuals. 
Attempting to view the online activities in Humean, Roussean and Lockean 
terms can further our understanding of the distribution and justification of 
online property ownership. According to the Humean approach property 
was taken by whatever means necessary and the best one could hope for 
was a period of stability where society could develop an acceptance of the 
status quo in property ownership. This approach would legitimise the role 
of the platform controllers since they have the power to close of the 
individual’s access to the game. This approach does not disallow that 
individuals may continue in their attempts to sell online material. The 
actions of the legal system would not support them since the role of the 
structure is to maintain the status quo of power. Using Rousseau provides 
an interesting opening discussion for applying changes to the power 
relations involved in this discussion. Rousseau allowed for the possibility of 
property transfer if this was compatible with the will of the majority. This 
becomes problematic when attempting to define the majority. Is the 
majority the online game players, society at large, or the game owners? The 
Lockean approach has been put forward as a support for the position of the 
player. Here the user invests time and energy into creating something which 
then can be transferred. We can see clear comparisons to the concept of the 
fruits of one’s labour argument posited by Locke. Therefore both actors and 
structures can rely on traditional philosophical arguments to support their 
moral positions. Modern property theory, as exemplified by Coase (1960) 
would argue for the distribution of property which offers the most in terms 
of economic returns. In this scenario the most probable conclusion is in 
favour of the platform owners since allowing the individual to profit from 
the fruits of her online labour may have a long-term negative effect on the 
economy of the game as a whole (Castronova 2001).     
This conflict of interests concerns that which Balkin (2004) called the 
freedom to play and the freedom to design. However Balkin’s freedom to 
design entails a large degree of control rather than design. This control takes 
place to a large extent, as we have seen, through the EULA. However this 
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focus should not exclude the element of social creation and control which 
takes place among the actors within the virtual environments. The focus of 
this case has been on the commercialisation of items created or found 
within the environment and since much of this commercialisation takes 
place beyond the confines of the game internal community norms become a 
weak form of social control. However there are examples of this (Balkin 
2004). The actors’ ability to play and to claim property within the game is 
experienced by the actors as an important factor the ability of self-regulation 
and democratic participation among users. While the control exercised by 
the EULA is understood to be hierarchical and inaccessible from the users 
point-of-view. The freedom or influence that the actor retains is the ability 
to leave the community however this cannot be a democratically acceptable 
alternative.  
Conclusion 
The MMORPG and similar online environments are providing new places 
of social interaction and within these places we can see new discussions 
arising on social issues that have previously been settled. Therefore, in this 
way, the virtual environments are disruptive in that they demand that we re-
interpret established social institutions such as property. The forms of 
regulation most evident in this chapter are the design-based and the hierarchical 
forms of regulation (Murray & Scott 2001). The design-based regulation is 
seen in the way in which the software making up the MMORPG 
environment can be changed to suit the regulatory needs of the platform 
owners. This is used together with the application of the EULA as a form of 
hierarchical regulation, which is supported by the courts through the 
implementation of contract law.  
The controllers of these environments have traditionally held the high 
ground in particular since they have the overall control of the software 
created environment and are therefore able to implement changes in the 
software that regulate the behaviour of the actors. The actors, on the other 
hand, have begun to accept as a rule that the avatar and the artefacts within 
the game belong to them (Taylor 2002b, Klang 2004c). They have 
established a strong social practice within their online communities that is 
proving hard to regulate completely.  
The negotiation between the parties has inevitably led to conflicts and 
attempts to regulate and circumvent such regulation. While the controllers 
have been reasonably successful in regulating certain types of economic 
activity, in particular organised attempts to find and sell artefacts, they have 
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been unsuccessful in others (Castronova 2001). This lack of success can 
probably be seen as the result of the negotiation between the regulators and 
actors where the regulatory strategies (regulation through code, law, social 
practice etc) have been an overall failure. One example of the way in which 
the actors can be said to have managed to redefine the way in which 
property in this case is viewed is the recent opening of an official online 
auction site  for Everquest, organised and run by Sony. 
The rights of actors in virtual environments have to a large extent been 
explored in online gaming environments however these rules and regulatory 
procedures are equally applicable in the growing number of virtual 
environments where actors participate. These include, but are not limited to, 
online distance learning environments (Svensson 2002), local government 
(Ranerup 2000) and the corporate intranet (Stenmark 2002). The democratic 
implications of the regulation of property within these environments will 
continue to have far reaching implications on the way in which democratic 
participation is carried out and developed.  
With the increase of online interaction follows a heightened interest in the 
way in which the products of our time therein are shared. This is a relatively 
new form of social interaction with great potential however a great deal of 
this potential as a tool for interaction, collaboration and creation will not be 
able to be used unless there is an equitable method of sharing that which is 
created in online environments. The present day disruptive effects of 
interaction via virtual environments have begun to demonstrate the 
inadequacies in present day property regulation since it tends to discriminate 
against online participation. To be able to develop online participation to its 
capacity this must be satisfactorily remedied. 
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Access 
The value systems of those with access to power and of those far removed from such access 
cannot be the same. The viewpoint of the privileged is unlike that of the underprivileged. 
Aung San Suu Kyi 
Introduction 
Another core value in a democracy is the right of access to the social and 
democratic infrastructure (Åström 2004). The study in case five 
demonstrates the way in which this right can be problematised within the 
digital environment. The case concerns the present day distinction between 
the development rationales for software. The traditional form of software 
(erroneously referred to as proprietary software) production is based upon 
an economic rationale. In other words the motivation to make software is to 
make economic profit from the activity. The last 25 years have seen the 
growth of politically motivated software development. The latter is an 
attempt to build a digital infrastructure that grants the user a greater amount 
of freedom. Through policy documents and technological decisions there is 
a state bias towards the use of economically developed software. This bias 
discriminates against the ideologically motivated software developed in 
society and in certain cases this bias can result in state subvention of 
individual products, to the detriment of others.  
The previous chapter discussed the legal position of property created within 
online virtual environments. This chapter will study a related problem to 
software as property – the rights of users to access technological 
environments. The software contained in most computers can be defined as 
being proprietary. The term proprietary is misleading but the term has 
become established and therefore must be recognized. Proprietary refers to 
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the fact that the thing that is proprietary has an owner (a proprietor). 
Therefore proprietary software is software that belongs to someone. In the 
case of software property rights are established through copyright. The 
person or persons who create software have a copyright in their software 
and are therefore the owners. Even if they choose to give their property 
away at no cost they remain the copyright holders (in most cases). Therefore 
all software is, in reality, proprietary.  
The term proprietary does not really refer to software which someone has 
property rights in since almost all software would then be proprietary and 
the term would lack meaning. The term proprietary means such property 
where the owner intends to enforce such rights as are granted to him or her 
by copyright law. The term proprietary software only becomes relevant in 
relation to such property where the owner does not intend to enforce such 
property rights as are granted by copyright law.   
Free Software, as defined by the Free Software Foundation, is software that 
can be used, copied, studied, modified and redistributed almost without 
restriction. Freedom from such restrictions is central to the concept of 
“Free Software”, such that the opposite of Free Software is proprietary 
software, and not software that is sold for profit, such as commercial 
software. Free Software may sometimes be known as libre software, FLOSS, 
or incorrectly as open source software (more on this term later). 
To most outsiders the ethics of software is not something usually 
considered. To most proficient computer users with a passing interest in this 
question the ethics of software is recognized as one of the fundamental 
questions in the digital rights area. To most of the latter, terms such as Free 
Software, open source, and their derivatives (FLOSS, FOSS, Software 
Freedom) are interchangeable. Choosing one over the other is a matter of 
taste rather than politics. However, to most insiders the question is not one 
of taste. There is a fundamental difference between the two areas even if 
they share a similar root. Free Software is not the same as open source. The 
two groups differ in their fundamental philosophical approach to software 
and its importance to society as a whole. This chapter examines the two 
groups’ differing philosophies and explores how their actions have affected 
software development, access to fundamental software infrastructure and 
the development of the concept of freedom. 
This chapter studies the role of Free Software as a disruptive technology. 
The disruptive nature of Free Software lies not in its technological 
development or in the manner in which it is produced, even though the 
latter has received a great deal of attention (Ljungberg 2000, Williams 2002). 
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The disruptive nature of Free Software lies in the goal to create an 
information infrastructure which is freely available (i.e. at no cost) and 
which the users are free to use in the manner in which they themselves 
choose. This openly altruistic goal stands in contrast to the traditional 
incentives for software development.  
The disruptive force of this technology was not created by technological 
means but rather by the express goals of the project founders. These goals 
have been subsequently enacted in through legal means. In an attempt to 
free the dependence upon the regulatory structures created by proprietary 
software the creators of Free Software have taken it upon themselves to 
create their own software and effectively circumvent the need to be reliant 
upon proprietary software and its regulatory structures.  
This chapter therefore studies the creation of an information infrastructure with the 
express political goal of being freely available for everyone who wants it, to be used in any 
way the users desire.  
Theory 
The philosopher Habermas (1989) is often associated with the term public 
sphere, which he describes as the realm of conversation and discussion by 
private individuals on matters of public interest. These conversations and 
discussions range from the private personal conversations to the open 
dialogue in the public press. No matter if the topic is personal or public, 
appreciative or critical, Habermas’ posits that the key feature of the public 
sphere is universal access. This means that entry and exit to the arena of the 
public sphere should be without constraints and once within the public 
sphere the communication is free from constraints. Therefore the 
participants must be free to enter and to render independent judgments and 
criticisms in the manner that they choose (Habermas 1974).  
Habermas’ (1989) work on the public sphere is his thesis that under the 
post-feudal developments of capitalism and the liberal state, the public 
sphere became a critical in the interaction between society and the state. The 
fundamental aspect of Habermas’ public sphere was its separation from the 
power of the state and market forces (Habermas 1974). To function, this 
public sphere was to be freely accessible by all citizens and public debate 
was to be uncontrolled in both content and format. A well functioning 
public sphere is, to Habermas, essential to the function of democratic 
societies. To Habermas the role of the public sphere is primarily a form of 
public communication and he posits that this role has been under a 
prolonged decline. This is, to a large extent, due to the commercialisation 
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and privatisation of the public sphere to such an extent that it is unable to 
serve its function and through this there is a diminishing of democratic 
communication. Brill (1989) criticises this concept of the diminishing public 
domain. He argues that there cannot be a slow demise of public sphere 
communication, as envisaged by Habermas and others, since the public 
activism and pathos of the public sphere never existed. According to Brill 
this image of the public sphere is an over-romanticised view of its liveliness 
and profundity. Yet despite this criticism Brill (1989) acknowledges the 
importance of open access to the public sphere.  
The components of the access to public sphere include (i) physical access, 
(ii) social access, (iii) access to discussions, and (iv) access to information. 
(Carr et al 1992). These points may be summarised as the ability to 
participate within the discussion in any form, for the public sphere to be an 
effective and productive part of a participatory democracy there should be 
no limitations to access to it. Once the importance of universal access has 
been established the question of affordance (Norman 1990) must be 
approached. An affordance is a property of an object, or a feature of the 
immediate environment, that indicates how to interface with that object or 
feature. Latour (1992) offers an illustrative example when he discusses the 
open door and sees that it affords movement across the threshold (Latour 
1992). What is important to recognise is that the affordance is a design 
feature and therefore must be added or assisted. When discussing the 
physical public spaces in cities Gehl (1994) notes that a number of 
Scandinavian cities have, through design choices, actively created a public 
culture where little or none previously existed. The same applies to software. 
Affordance in software that ensure or support universal access must be 
designed and supported.  
Castells (1996) has posited an alternative approach to the tangible elements 
of the public sphere. He argues that the urban physical arena of the public 
sphere is on the verge of becoming an irrelevant. Despite its importance 
Castells (1996) argues in the past the information technology revolution is 
moving the public sphere from the physical places within the industrial cities 
and exchanging their importance with the information networks and 
network nodes. The elites within this new system will be those who control 
the networks rather than the physical spaces.  
Even in the network society access remains the democratic key. Castells 
(2001) argues that Internet access is the first step towards overcoming 
inequality and establishing democracy. This becomes even more apparent in 
societies where many important social and political activities are mediated by 
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ICT and the Internet. Castells (2001) realises the importance of equal access 
to technology as a first step to develop an inclusive society. He recognises 
that equal access alone will not provide automatic solutions. Equal access to 
the arena must include social access as well as access to discussions and 
information.  
Mode and Purpose of Production 
Classical economics recognises three factors of production: land or natural 
resources, labour and capital goods (or means of production). While this 
division remains a rough one, it is still used since no major theory has 
substantially altered the foundation assumptions of either Marxist or 
Neoclassical economic theories. Upon entering the post-fordist information 
age it became clear that communication is an element of production. This 
change occurs with the commodification of information and its 
metamorphoses into a necessary part of production. The recognition of this 
process is described by Williams (1980a): 
As a matter of general theory it is useful to recognize that means of 
communication are themselves means of production…themselves always socially 
produced and reproduced…they are not only forms but means of production, 
since communication and its material means are intrinsic to all distinctively 
human forms of labour and social organization, thus constituting indispensable 
elements of both the productive forces and of the social relations of production. 
(p 50). 
If this argument is carried to its conclusion in the context of this case study 
we can see that programming is the production of an artefact manifested in 
computer code. The production of this artefact through forms of 
intellectual labour should be seen as part of the development of both Base 
(economics) and Superstructure (ideology) (Williams 1980b). 
The lines between the factors of production have never been watertight and 
yet they have become particularly unclear when applied to the forces of 
production of software. The programmer is the natural resource, the 
labourer and the means of production. The product that is produced is, like 
all artefacts (Winner 1985) a product and a manifestation of ideology.  In 
addition to this the software is the base upon which we communicate within 
an Internet-based society it is the infrastructure of the advanced 
participatory democracy and as such it should be under constant 
surveillance to ensure its impartiality.  
In The Cathedral and The Bazaar (Raymond 1999) the author presents one of 
the most persistent metaphors software development. The Cathedral 
represents the commercial model for software development. It is a pregnant 
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imagery of hierarchy, high walls, high priests and secret rites which are all 
geared to the official release of the final product. Once the product is 
released it remains under the control of the Cathedral in the sense that only 
limited forms of use are permitted. Adaptation, exploration and 
dissemination are not permitted without authorisation.  
The Bazaar represents the opposite of this. In Raymond’s metaphor it is a 
flat structure were everyone seems to be in movement. The goal is to release 
the product early, release it often and allow the user to become part of the 
production process. To enable this the user is supplied with the tools and 
the permissions to adapt, explore and disseminate the software without 
needing additional permission.  
Whether a Cathedral ever is so rigid or a Bazaar is ever so free is not 
important. The important point is that Raymond (1999) is describing two 
opposing modes of production not fordism and post-fordism but the main 
difference in the goal of this production methodology is political. The 
commercial method of production, the Cathedral, is a process developed to 
manufacture software for profit. The main goal of the Cathedral is not to 
make software but to make a profit. The alternative model, the Bazaar, has a 
different goal. The goal is to develop political software. Political in the sense 
that the software being developed is freely available and it is unhampered by 
commercial goals. Naturally actors within the Bazaar frequently have 
commercial interests but the software being developed is left uncontrolled. 
The rationale for this is that the software is intended to constitute the 
infrastructural base in society and therefore the lead developers have taken 
the (political) decision to make the software free. 
The Freedom Debate 
The formalisation of FSF’s philosophy is most clearly stated in the GPL in 
which the preamble states: “The licenses for most software are designed to 
take away your freedom to share and change it. By contrast, the GNU 
General Public License is intended to guarantee your freedom to share and 
change Free Software — to make sure the software is free for all its users.” 
More specifically the freedom envisioned by FSF and formalized in the GPL 
concerns the so–called four freedoms, which are the freedom to: 
a) run the program, for any purpose (freedom 0). 
b) study how the program works, and adapt it to your needs (freedom 1). Access to the 
source code is a precondition for this. 
c) redistribute copies so you can help your neighbor (freedom 2). 
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d) improve the program, and release your improvements to the public, so that the 
whole community benefits (freedom 3). Access to the source code is a precondition 
for this. 
The Free Software Definition establishes criteria for a program to be 
considered “free”. There is an interesting clarification about the concept of 
freedom so that the reader will not be confused. Readers are asked to think 
of “free” in terms of free speech rather than “free beer”. Aside from being a 
rather unique metaphor in the debate on freedom, the free speech/free beer 
dichotomy adequately captures the conflicts involved in the term “free” in 
relation to computer software.  
The importance of freedom, its attainment and preservation, has been the 
topic of discussion in every society. However the definitions and contents of 
freedom vary over time and place. The Stoics’ discussions on freedom, for 
example, are very reminiscent of present day discussion on determinism and 
free will (Bobzien 2001). Today an accepted systemisation of freedom into 
negative and positive freedoms, with its roots in Kantian (2003 [1781]) 
thought, is a popular theoretical construct. The concepts of negative and 
positive freedom were developed by Berlin (2002 [1969]). Negative freedom 
is commonly seen as the absence of barriers or constraints that prevent 
actors from carrying out their wishes or desires. Positive freedom deals with 
the existence of enabling factors that create the ability for the actor to carry 
our desires. An alternative approach is to look at negative freedom as 
external forces on the actor while positive freedom concerns the internal 
forces affecting the actor. 
In terms of state actions the liberal view is one of negative freedom and 
minimal state interference while those who argue for positive freedom 
understand that the removal of barriers is not enough to create freedom. 
Active positive freedom in social terms can be seen when individual 
freedom is achieved by actively participating in the decision–making 
processes of society. In its best form, the rules of society are then a 
reflection of the general will, based upon self–determination. Members of 
such a society are free only to the extent that they participate in the creation 
of society (Gauthier 1986). 
Those who argue for positive freedom point to the fact that the removal of 
barriers is too simplistic to create freedom. For example anyone born in the 
United States can become president. Those who subscribe to negative 
freedom will point to the fact that there are few or no barriers, while those 
who argue for positive freedom would point out that despite this lack of 
barriers no president has been female, openly gay, or from a non-white 
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minority. In other words, the removal of formal barriers is a necessary pre-
condition but does not de facto create a larger freedom of action for the 
individual. 
Positive freedom, on the other hand, is criticised for its authoritarian 
tendencies since it requires the paternalism of other actors to provide for 
the encouragement of the concept of freedom in others. Additionally, 
positive freedom carries with it a paradox when dealing with an oppressed 
minority. No matter how much the minority participates in the decision–
making process it will remain oppressed and cannot be seen as free. 
An issue, which we have not yet dealt with here, is the role of the actor’s 
desire. In other words, is it the actor or the surroundings that decides 
whether the situation is free or unfree? Prison is the symbol of lack of 
freedom. Are perfectly content inmates unfree if all their desires can be 
fulfilled? The prisoners are, relatively speaking, content and therefore do not 
suffer from their lack of freedom. Those who espouse positive freedom 
would therefore conclude that these prisoners are free. Some argue that 
freedom cannot be limited to what one wants to do but must also include 
what one might want to do. 
In attempting to understand this form of free will, which includes what one 
might want to do in the future, it is important therefore to understand the 
actors’ motives. Christman (1991) uses the example of women raised in 
cultures where women are subservient to men. A woman’s desire to 
conform in such a society may be her own desire or it may be a role from 
which she cannot rebel. Positive freedom theorists would argue that the 
woman is unfree since her views were formed in an oppressive 
environment. Most theorists would consider that if the desire to conform is 
her own, then forcing an alternative view of freedom upon her would not 
increase her individual sense of freedom (Saul 2003). 
There is an alternative approach to this binary definition. We have noted the 
“freedom to” (positive) and “freedom from” (negative) approach to 
understanding notions of freedom. Another way of looking at freedom is 
the so–called triadic model (MacCullum 1967) which states “A (Agent) is (or 
is not) free from B (Obstacle) to achieve, be, or become C (Goal).” The 
triadic model was important in showing the error in attempting to 
distinguish between freedom as the absence of constraint and freedom as 
the possibility of choice. 
In recent years some have argued that freedom is a social relation 
(Kristjánsson 1996, Kramer 2003) by which they argue that there is a 
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difference in being unable to do certain things and being unfree. Being 
unable to do things due to natural causes (men cannot give birth, blind 
cannot see) is not being unfree. However this view of looking at freedom or 
lack of freedom as dependent upon human acts is troublesome in relation to 
computer software. The underlying assumption is that non–social causes of 
a lack of freedom fall outside the scope of interest of philosophers, 
becoming merely an engineering problem. 
However if we ignore discussing notions of freedom in relation to software, 
we seriously create risks for the future by creating an unfree infrastructure 
that potentially could be a major hindrance. Future users hence run the risk 
of being unable to contemplate a scenario where this lost freedom is even 
an option. This is much the same problem that Orwell (1990) presented 
where the only meaning of free is to be free from something. Therefore a 
dog could be free of fleas but the concept of human freedom is 
incomprehensible. Democratic freedom should not be limited to the 
possibility of doing things but it should guarantee the possibility of 
providing the possibility of carrying out acts once a rational well-informed 
decision has been reached.  
Analysis: Actors 
Writing about the importance of software is difficult without resorting to 
what seems to be empty hyperbole. However it is important to point out 
that software is rapidly becoming one of the most fundamental building 
blocks of human interaction and activity. Authors such as Negroponte 
(1996), Mitchell (1996), Castells (1996), and Balkin (1998) have tried to help 
us understand the way in which software is changing most aspects of our 
lives. Despite the work these authors there is a common misconception that 
software is a complex component which in some sense "lives" within 
computer hardware. By confining software to the inner workings of the 
computer most non–technical software users are unaware of the extent to 
which software permeates their lives. 
Moglen (1999) writes about computers being under our social skin but this 
seems to imply that there are computers everywhere. To most people the 
computer is still a very specific artefact which only affects their lives in 
specific, controllable situations. Talking less about the computers and more 
about software may help bring about an understanding of the omnipresence 
of software. Also, like most other things that surround us, this software 
belongs to someone. The software that fills our homes and our lives is, in 
almost all cases, the property of someone else and therefore we are 
DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGY 
 170 
dependent upon the property of others for our everyday lives to a much 
greater extent that we may previously have imagined. 
It was in part to counteract this that Richard Stallman wrote his original 
announcement for the GNU project in 1983. He wrote “Starting this 
Thanksgiving I am going to write a complete Unix–compatible software 
system called GNU (for Gnu’s Not Unix), and give it away free to everyone 
who can use it”. In 1985 Stallman launched the Free Software Foundation 
(FSF), an organisation whose goals it is to promote the computer users’ 
right to use, study, copy, modify, and redistribute computer programs. 
The term “Free Software” includes a philosophy, an understanding that 
software is an important building block in the information society and that 
the control of this infrastructure needs to remains accessible to all. This 
egalitarian principle demands that software remain outside the control of 
those who would limit its usage and only provide this necessary 
infrastructure at a price. “Free Software” refers not to price but to freedom 
and it is a deliberately confrontational term (Raymond 1999), an attitude 
designed to provoke actors with commercial interests in proprietary 
software. 
Stallman was to become the ideological father and leader of the Free 
Software movement and through this, one of the fundamental ideologists 
for open source. His views on software were dominant during 1983–1996, 
after which the focus on ideologically–correct software creation shifted to 
creating good software (Williams 2002). No longer was it necessary for 
software to be free to be considered good. 
“Open source” was proposed as an alternative to “Free Software”. The 
purpose of launching the term was an attempt to promote open source as a 
software development model acceptable to corporate developers, those who 
had been reluctant to adopt a methodology connected to the moniker “Free 
Software”. The definitions of open source were taken from the Debian Free 
Software Guidelines and adapted during June 1997 in relation to suggestions 
made during an e–mail conference. After revisions the definition was 
adopted by the Open Source Initiative (OSI) in February 1998. 
Despite the ideological differences between the Free Software and open 
source movements, Free Software and open source software are most 
clearly defined by the licences that are approved by the respective 
organisation (either FSF or OSI). While the purpose of this chapter is to 
look at the freedom debate, it is important to remain clear that both FSF 
and OSI refer to the same types of software products and licenses. 
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In his attempts to establish a software commons Stallman pushed for the 
creation of a freedom with limitations. While these limitations may be 
necessary for the creation of the commons they are most definitely 
limitations. This establishes the paradox at the heart of the Free Software 
debate which is then confused with notions of free. The use of the word 
free however is important to those within the FSF since it provides positive 
reinforcement for the ultimate goal of a commons. 
However the OSI have not necessarily chosen a better approach. By 
abandoning the established path laid out by Stallman, OSI may have 
appeased commercial interests but they have muddied the philosophical 
waters of the free/open software movement. Both groups (FSF and OSI) 
have suffered. Any gain, which may have been achieved by enticing 
economic cooperation, has occurred at the expense of the original notion of 
software freedom. While there may now be an increase in open source 
software, there are fewer debates over some basic philosophical issues. In 
translating this debate into terms, which are easily comprehensible to 
commercial actors, we have lost the most important element of the debate 
— who should own the most fundamental elements of our infrastructure? 
Critics of the term “Free Software” argue that the term has many 
weaknesses and that these weaknesses prevent the movement from gaining 
the widespread acceptance it both needs and deserves. Their primary 
concern is over the misleading meanings in the word “free”. The word, 
according to them, in relation to software means “at no cost”. Despite the 
free speech/free beer clarification, the term “Free Software” equally applies 
to all software available at no cost, such as Microsoft Explorer. However 
both the Free Software Foundation and the Open Source Initiative agree 
that the Explorer browser is not free in that its code is not widely available. 
The problem therefore arises when one attempts to define what Free 
Software is to the world at large. In many cases computer users have not 
reflected upon the ownership of software. In relation to software such as 
Web browsers most computer users tend to consider such software as being 
free since it is freely available at no cost. In some cases there is no cost but 
the use of the software is either limited or connected with non–monetary 
payment (see, for example, Eudora Mail or Opera web browser sponsored 
mode). The many different financing models of computer software lead to a 
confusing diversity of software business models all that have the effect of 
obfuscating the concept of monetary cost for software users. 
The accusations of ambiguity have led the FSF to publicise additional 
material both defending their view and terminology as well as critiquing the 
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OSI for their lack of precision and for confusing the users (Stallman 2002). 
The choice of certain users within the Free Software community to start 
using the term open source was seen as a serious threat to the philosophical 
basis of Free Software. In 1998 Stallman (2002) wrote:  
The Free Software movement and the Open Source movement are today 
separate movements with different views and goals, although we can and do 
work together on some practical projects. (p 55). 
The rift between the movements was therefore not so great that they could 
not cooperate on certain projects but it was serious enough that they no 
longer could identify ideologically with each other. Both movements are in 
agreement upon their common enemy that they see as proprietary software. 
Therefore they share a common enemy but a fundamental difference in how 
they define themselves and both groups believe it to be important to protect 
their identity despite the fact that they share a common background. 
Stallman (2002) continues:  
We are not against the Open Source movement, but we don’t want to be lumped 
in with them. We acknowledge that they have contributed to our community, but 
we created this community, and we want people to know this. We want people to 
associate our achievements with our values and our philosophy, not with theirs. 
We want to be heard, not obscured behind a group with different views. (p 56). 
The OSI organisation and terminology was created to meet the needs both 
of those developers who were disenchanted with the view that software 
needed to be ideologically pure as opposed to functional and of those 
developers who were attempting to entice more traditional software 
manufacturers to join the Free Software/Open Source movements. 
However, Stallman understood the OSI to be a weakening of a strong moral 
position in the debate; he appealed to developers not to accept this easy 
compromise (Williams 2002). Despite Stallman’s warnings, the growth and 
development — both economic and political — of open source has been 
massive. The creation of the OSI has entailed the creation of an umbrella 
organisation that has attempted to subsume the FSF. Despite this, the FSF 
and the GPL still remain the more stringent and philosophically coherent 
organisation and license. 
Political Goals Make Political Artefacts 
Within the human rights tradition, it is almost taken for granted that the 
concept of property is a fundamental part of human freedom.36  However 
                                                           
36 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, articles 2 and 17. 
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the concept of property does not always easily co–exist with freedom. 
Anarchists, such as Proudhon (1994 [1840]), claim that all property is theft, 
meaning both that property is a prerequisite for theft and the accumulation 
of property amounts to theft since it deprives others. 
In law, the concept of property (for more on property see Chapter 7) refers 
to the legal relationships between persons in relation to things. These things 
may be tangible such as real estate or pencils or they may be intangible such 
as stocks, patents, or software. As in many other areas, the protection 
offered by the law and the way in which it is offered varies greatly. The law 
in relation to property exists in every legal system but the scope and manner 
in which protection is created and enforced depends very much on the 
culture, both where and when, in which the legal system was created. 
Common amongst the concept of property law is that it deals with the 
accumulation, protection, use, and limitation of wealth and therefore has 
serious repercussions on many other aspects of society. A characteristic of 
the core European legal systems is the predominance of private ownership. 
Western legal systems regard individual ownership as the norm, derogations 
from which must be explained. The legal concept of property in the West is 
characterized by a tendency to agglomerate in a single legal person, 
preferably the one who is currently in possession of the thing in question, 
the exclusive right to possess, privilege to use, and power to convey the 
thing. 
As discussed earlier in chapter seven property is not a static condition but 
should be understood as a relationship between the person (or persons) 
who owns, that which is owned, and actions affected by ownership. The 
concept of ownership refers to a bundle of rights that overlap each other 
and grant the owner the authority to legitimately enforce conditions. 
In addition to this, the owner may grant others the right to enjoy that which 
is owned. This permission may be connected to conditions and fees. Under 
the law today most tangible things may be owned, but there are exceptions 
(for example hazardous goods, narcotics, wild animals, important 
waterways) that limit full property rights through specific rules. Intangibles 
are more complicated under the law. This is not due to any lack of historical 
or traditional intangible ownership (Sherman & Bently 1999) but is due to 
the focus on the concept of possession. Despite this, today the concepts of 
property have been extended to cover many forms of intangibles. These 
intangible include software, even though this extension is not without its 
critics. Moglen (1999) noted that treating software as property has the effect 
of creating bad software. 
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Property theory is deceptively easy. Property today implies exclusive 
privilege of the thing in question. Despite the difficulties in attributing 
property rights to intangible objects, the legal institutes of copyright and 
patents have been created to create exclusive property–like relationships and 
grant property rights on certain symbols, images, and intangible matter. This 
has led to the expansion of property to encompass a larger sphere. That 
which is owned is no longer simply the item itself but the privileges that it 
provides to the owner (Harris 1996). 
Copyright prevents the use of a copyrightable object without permission. 
That which is copyrighted cannot be reproduced in any form. Copyright 
does not only ensure the owner has exclusive rights to enjoy a property but 
also ensures that the property cannot be re–created by anyone else — even 
if this recreation does not diminish the copyright holder’s enjoyment. This 
sentiment was criticised by Thomas Jefferson (1903 [1813]) when he wrote: 
If nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all others of exclusive 
property, it is the action of the thinking power called an idea, which an individual 
may exclusively possess as long as he keeps it to himself; but the moment it is 
divulged, it forces itself into the possession of every one, and the receiver cannot 
dispossess himself of it. Its peculiar character, too, is that no one possesses the 
less, because every other possesses the whole of it. He who receives an idea from 
me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who lights his 
taper at mine, receives light without darkening me. That ideas should freely 
spread from one to another over the globe, for the moral and mutual instruction 
of man, and improvement of his condition, seems to have been peculiarly and 
benevolently designed by nature, when she made them, like fire, expansible over 
all space, without lessening their density in any point, and like the air in which we 
breathe, move, and have our physical being, incapable of confinement or 
exclusive appropriation. Inventions then cannot, in nature, be a subject of 
property. (p 333). 
Intellectual property moves beyond control of the physical object that is in 
itself only the manifestation of that which is protected. Intellectual property 
controls the way in which property may be used insomuch as it controls all 
forms of use, even those that do not enrich or harm the original owner. In 
relation to software this problem becomes more acute since it does not take 
into consideration the needs of stakeholders such as users and other 
developers. 
The western view of property has led to an increase in the privatisation of 
commodities, which traditionally were held in a commons. Natural 
resources necessary for the survival of all within a society have become 
privatised. An example of this can be seen in the most basic of 
commodities: water. Traditional and older legal sources hold access to water 
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to be a common right; with the development of more efficient technology, 
water has become a commodity (Shiva 2002). 
The quest of the Free Software Foundation is to create a software 
commons. This is not about the recreation of something that was free but is 
now lost but instead the realisation that software is becoming an essential 
element of the modern world. To lose control of software and to become 
dependent on the private property of others is tantamount to the loss of 
water rights, becoming dependent upon the goodwill of others. 
The disappearance of the European commons occurred during the 17th 
century with the enclosure movements. These movements were legitimised 
by philosophies and property theories such as those put forward by Locke 
(1960 [1690]), whose view that idle nature was wasteful and the adding of 
labour to land was enough to create property. With this the stage was set for 
the commodifiction of nature. Philosopher such as Locke have since then 
been used to legitimise the creation of new property rights in both tangibles 
and intangibles.37  
Today the concept of commons is associated with inefficient and wasteful 
usage of property - Hardin (1968) goes so far as to ask us to view the 
commons as a tragic waste of resources. The commons, from Hardin’s 
perspective, are pastures, free for all to use, where cattle graze freely. Under 
economic theory, individual cattle owners will all strive to maximise their 
own stock and this will lead to the destruction of the pastures. Hardin sees 
the commons as a place without rules (legal or social) where all actors strive 
to maximise their own economic wealth. However, for Hardin’s tragedy to 
occur several assumptions about the commons must be made (Shiva 2002). 
Hardin assumes that all human interaction is based upon competition and 
not cooperation and that property held in commons is unregulated. 
Communities dependent upon the commons do not have social regulations 
and that group ownership is an inferior solution. 
Analysis: Structures 
The structures of interest in this case are two sets of structures. The reason 
for describing them as two separate regulatory structures is that they both 
regulate different areas of this disruptive form of software development and 
dissemination and are controlled by different groups. The first regulatory 
structures are the licensing agreements under which the Free Software is 
                                                           
37 For more on property justification see Scarcity, Distribution & Justification page 142 et seq. 
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disseminated. This regulatory structure is politics made manifest and since it 
is set down in a more permanent form and accepted as such it is an actor 
created form of regulatory structure (Giddens 1986). The second form of 
structure, which will be briefly discussed here, is the manner in which 
technology policies are used within state organisations and the way in which 
such policies form a regulatory bias against political software in favour of 
commercial software.  
Licensing freedom 
Licenses are a form of contract, often seen as standard form contracts not 
requiring parties to actively read and agree with each detail to be valid and 
enforceable. Licenses are commonly used to grant the licensee the freedom 
or permission to do something, which without the existence of the license 
would be wrongful or illegal. Licenses trace their origins in property where 
the license amounts to permission to enter the land owned by another; 
additionally they could also grant permission to hunt or remove items from 
the property. Bare or gratuitous licenses are revocable at the pleasure of the 
licensor (i.e., the owner of the property who grants the permission). 
Contractual licenses may be coupled with an interest and may through this 
interest grant the licensee the ability to enforce the license should the 
licensor attempt to revoke it. This ability depends upon the terms of the 
license.38 
When looking at software licenses it may be of interest to notice the licenses 
for software often fall into different types: proprietary, academic, reciprocal, 
standards, and content licenses (Rosen 2004). Proprietary licenses are 
possibly the most restrictive of all licenses and are commonly used in most 
commercial software when the source code is not made available. No 
distribution is permitted for original or derivative works, no license is 
granted for the user to view, attempt to view, or recreate the code. The term 
proprietary license is however not exact and variations on what is permitted 
regularly occur. Despite this, the term has come to reflect the antithesis of 
software freedom. Academic licenses recognize that many Free 
Software/open source projects were developed within academia where the 
main drive was to spread their use. Therefore the users were granted full 
freedom, provided that they attributed the original to a given academic 
organisation. The reciprocal license allows the users to use and modify the 
software provided that all derivatives grant the same freedom to its future 
                                                           
38 For more on licensing see Spyware: Legal Position page 127 et seq. 
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users.39 Standards licenses attempt to develop and maintain industry 
standards and require that deviations from industry standards be made 
public. Content licenses are concerned with ensuring that copyrightable 
subject matter be made freely available. 
The concept of Free Software as envisioned by the Free Software 
Foundation was not created in a vacuum. The General Public License 
(GPL) was based upon the concept of reciprocity. The goal of forcing 
developers to maintain the same amount of freedom has had the effect of 
creating “free” software that enables future users to continue to develop and 
expand the amount of software available. 
Section 2b of the GPL (version 2) reads “You must cause any work that you 
distribute or publish, that in whole or in part contains or is derived from the 
Program or any part thereof, to be licensed as a whole at no charge to all 
third parties under the terms of this License.” This means that any software 
created from the GPL must continue to be offered under the same terms. 
Moglen (1999) maintains that this clause ensures users always have the best 
available software. Critics claim that this means that widespread commercial 
development cannot take place, nor will commercial companies dare to use 
any part of GPL software in their products. The latter critique has led the 
GPL to be seen as largely anti–commercial. 
Rosen (2004) defines reciprocity as the “…mutual interchange of favors or 
privileges. Something is reciprocal when it is performed, experienced, or felt 
on both sides.” Both sides of the GPL (licensor and licensee) both use the 
GPL. However it is interesting to note that the GPL constricts the user 
since any derivative works must be licensed under the same terms. In a 
sense the developer is forced to contribute to the commons.40 The 
contributor does not contribute freely. If all developers wanted to 
contribute in this manner to the commons they would not be doing so 
freely. 
The license therefore is a fundamental element of the creation of a 
commons where software is available. The goal, as stated by Stallman in his 
original announcement, is to create and expand a software commons. The 
expansion of the commons is, however, not compatible with the 
terminology of freedom used both in the name of the organisation and in 
                                                           
39 Those who dislike the practice term this the viral effect while those who support it 
prefer the term the vaccination effect. 
40 Alternatively not spreading it at all. 
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the rhetoric it espouses. The freedom created by the GPL has limitations in 
relation to price (§2b), patents (§7) and authorship (§10). While many of 
these limitations are not experienced as limitations since they are part of the 
Free Software developer’s ethos it is important to note that they are 
limitations. In discussing freedom, we must be careful about confusing 
freedom with happiness. An unfree person may be happy as easily as a free 
person is unhappy. 
Technology Policies 
FOSS is often hailed as being a panacea to especially in reports on its 
benefits to developing nations three advantages are often cited (Ghosh et al 
2002), these are low barriers to entry, its advantages as a training system and 
its role as de facto standard. Often these claims are undisputed when they 
are applied to developing nations. However there has been a great deal of 
resistance when attempting to claim the benefits of FOSS to the developed 
nations of the world (Rejås 2006). The need for commercially developed 
software to maintain and increase market share leads to a harsh competition 
for the presentation of facts surrounding software costs.  
There are a growing number of national and regional organisations that are 
becoming interested in promoting the dissemination of FOSS within their 
organisations. These efforts have often met with resistance and regulators 
have come to realise that if the implementation of FOSS within 
governmental bodies is to succeed there is a need to create policies which 
are either neutral to, or positively discriminate, FOSS. The motivations for 
such policies vary however the motivation of the Danish Board of 
Technology (2002) is indicative  
Ordinary market conditions for standard software will tend towards a very small 
number of suppliers or a monopoly. It will only be possible to achieve 
competition in such a situation by taking political decisions that assist new 
market participants in entering the market. (p 5). 
The need to be more active towards the promotion of FOSS is not only the 
economic and market inequalities faced by those who wish to promote 
FOSS within government. The existing legacy systems are entrenched within 
the information system environments formal organisation and mindset of 
the organisations therefore implementing software based upon a new 
ideology demands an active effort.  
When approaching FOSS on a policy level Ghosh et al (2002) have 
identified four approaches (i) Mandating FOSS, (ii) Preferring FOSS, (iii) 
Mandating Open Standards, and (iv) Best Value. Mandating FOSS is the 
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most radical approach and it has been partially carried out in Brazil and 
Thailand. Preferring FOSS is much less radical and is easier and less risky to 
implement. The approach, which has been implemented in South Africa, is 
flexible and allows case-by-case evaluations to be made. One of the main 
advantages of mandating open standards is that organisations with such 
policies can avoid seller lock-ins and path dependencies (David 2000, 
Hanseth et al 1996) enforced by closed standards. This approach breaks the 
regulatory power of standards and allows the evaluation of new systems. 
This latter approach has been adopted by the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts (USA) and is favoured by the EU. The least harsh policy 
approach is the best value policy that focuses on the economic calculations 
presented by sellers and attempts to meet them openly and objectively 
without prejudice to previous experience.  
Sweden has yet to take specific policy decisions but has conducted studies 
and arrived at the conclusion that the best approach for Sweden would be 
the use of open standards (Statskontoret 2004). While the Norwegian 
approach has been much more specific and they have stated that proprietary 
formats will no longer be acceptable in communication between citizens and 
government. The eNorway 2009 report states: “Public sector agencies shall 
apply open standards in their ICT and information systems. Non-adherence 
to this must be well-founded” and the main goal is that by 2009, “all new 
ICT and information systems in the public sector shall use open standards” 
(Ministry of Modernisation 2005). 
Discussion 
Politically motivated production such as FOSS presents a disruptive mode 
of software production. Traditional assumptions on the method, motivation 
and organisation of the production of software are questioned and in this 
sense the technology represented by FOSS is disruptive. In addition to this 
FOSS represents many of the core values in the participatory democracy 
since its ideology, mode of development and product are based on openness 
and transparency.  
The ideological attitudes, which underpin the production of artefacts within 
a society, are a key element in forming the outcome of these products. 
Therefore when the ideological base of production is changes it is not 
surprising that the outcome will also change. Changing the ideological base 
and creating a disruptive force to change the products does not 
automatically amount to the acceptance of the new products. Fortier (2001) 
wrote: 
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As the technology continues to evolve rapidly, new technical, organizational, 
political and legal tools will be needed to bypass and confront the restrictions and 
agendas on hardware, software and information flows that dominant groups and 
state authorities are now successfully imposing. (p 106). 
The artefacts, which have been produced, need to overcome a long list of 
resistance to implementation such as lock-in effects and path dependencies 
(David 2000, Hanseth et al 1996), buyer/user tradition or habit, 
organisational inertia and political strategies. Many governmental 
organisations have realised the value of FOSS and are attempting to develop 
strategies to counteract the resistance by implementing policies with goals 
stretching from the recommending to making FOSS a basic requirement. 
The commonly cited rationales for governmental interest in FOSS is 
economic however there are a growing development within policy 
discussion to go beyond economics and refer to the ideological values 
inherent in the application of FOSS within government.  
The openness with which our political systems are operated is one of the 
most important instruments of control within a participatory democracy. 
Sweden has a long tradition of openness through its Offentlighetsprincipen 
(Freedom of Information) which guarantees citizens access to government 
information similar instruments whereby actors are legitimised to control 
the regulatory structures exist in other states but they usually take similar 
forms since without access to information control is ephemeral. Similar 
systems of control are being discussed and implemented within the EU as a 
method for ensuring democratic control.  
The importance of the ability to review the activities of public authorities 
must not be underestimated. The fact that this ability is seldom practiced by 
the broader public is not important. This regulatory tool works to ensure 
that public authorities conform to the rules is twofold. Firstly, the fact that 
people may look goes some way in assuring public administrations self-
regulate in a Foucauldian manner (1980) since they are unaware when they 
may be watched. Secondly there are groups that take an active interest in 
implementing these rights. Special interest groups and journalists actively 
use the principles of openness to review the activities of public authority.  
As we have previously stated in this work the basic communications 
infrastructure today is built in computer code. Since it is computer code that 
creates the infrastructure it is also the underlying principles that form the 
products and in turn the products form the way in which we interpret and 
interact with reality (Winner 1985, Latour 1992). Therefore there is a 
growing public interest in being able to have the ability to control the way in 
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which computer based public decisions are made. This is particularly 
relevant in situations where legal rules are interpreted through the logical 
parameters and software code of computer programs – in other words in 
areas were the public decision making process has become automated 
(Magnusson Sjöberg 1992). 
When applying a functional equivalent approach to the principles of 
openness there is need to see the basis and methodologies involved in 
decision making and resource use within public authorities. Therefore, to 
ensure that the possibility for public review of government activity remains 
relevant, it is important that policy decisions not be encoded in closed 
formats and proprietary software.  
The Norwegian policy position (above) shows an attempt by public 
authorities to rid itself proprietary standards and it is presented in a manner 
which reflects a political and ideological approach to the fundamental 
understanding of the information infrastructure (Hanseth 1996). The 
declaration that communications between state and citizen within a 
participatory democracy illustrate a desire for an open unfettered and non-
discriminatory channel of communication which enables a increased access 
to the information infrastructure controlled by public authorities.  
The effects of a lack of political will to efficiently create policies for open 
standards can be illustrated with an example of a non-critical system based 
upon non-open standards. The Swedish public service television broadcaster 
- Sveriges Television (SVT) and the public service radio broadcaster – 
Sveriges Radio (SR) are separate companies owned by a foundation and 
entirely funded by licence fees. To ensure impartiality within the public 
service advertising is not permitted. Due to the position of SVT and SR they 
contain a wealth of archival material, which is constantly being updated. 
There has been a great deal of interest in harnessing the communicative 
power of ICT both in allowing access to archival material and making news 
and other content accessible online.  
In their attempts to achieve this goal the public service in Sweden has 
chosen to use non-open standards and effectively locked-in themselves and 
their users to the commercial formats. This creates a discriminatory effect 
against alternative formats. This technical policy has a far-reaching 
regulatory effect. The actions of the public service in Sweden are one of 
marketing and promoting commercial products to the end users, the viewers 
and listeners. To be able to obtain access to the information infrastructure 
stored and created by the Swedish public service, the user must use 
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software, which has been developed with a commercial goal and is 
prevented from using ideologically developed software.  
Conclusion 
In this case study we have seen that the disruptive effect of technology can 
have its roots in the development ideology behind the software 
development. This ideology carries through and affects the finished product, 
which in turn has effects on the social structures in which the software is 
implemented. The way in which the software affects the social structures of 
the environment in which it is implemented created new patterns of use 
among those dependent upon the information infrastructure. The two 
forms of regulation seen in this chapter are community-based and design-based 
(Murray & Scott 2001) regulation. The community-based regulators can be seen 
in the force of the policy decisions and mindsets of those making 
technology investments while the design-based regulators are the effects of 
the lock-in and path dependencies caused by the installed software base. 
While these may seem to be “soft” regulators in comparison with markets 
and hierarchies they remain surprisingly resilient and difficult to overcome 
(Hanseth et al 1996).  
This case study has concerned itself with the two main ideological software 
development paradigms – the commercial model and the free model, where 
the free model represents a disruptive approach to traditional software 
development. Within FOSS, Stallman’s position in the freedom debate arises 
from a realisation about the necessity of a software commons. However 
Stallman shares Hardin’s flawed views of the commons. The position that 
freedom is good may be acceptable but freedom cannot be enforced and 
limited in the way in which the FSF attempts to do. Since users are 
controlled by the GPL and they are reliant on licenses any freedom that they 
may have or experience is on the whole illusory. True freedom would allow 
all to do as they pleased. However, Stallman shares Hardin’s view that 
uncontrolled freedom inevitably leads to ruin. Therefore the commons he 
creates is not a free one. It offers only limited freedom maintained and 
controlled by an elite.41 However this control is not absolute since the 
individual developer creating the software has the choice to use the license 
or not.  
                                                           
41 The GPL is controlled by an elite since only a limited number have the power to affect 
changes to the GPL. 
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The way in which we interact in a participatory democracy controls the 
manner in which the democracy is shaped and develops. Therefore the 
ability to freely access the infrastructure of communication and interaction 
in a democracy is vital. This freedom must include the freedom to access in 
the way one chooses and through the equipment of ones own choice. These 
decisions are often removed from the traditional discussions of democracy 
since they are seen as being merely of a technical nature. However as this 
case, and this thesis, has shown this is to gravely underestimate the 
importance of technology and the ability of the actors. As the simple 
example of public service broadcasting in Sweden illustrated, this issue 
illustrates the root of this thesis: technical regulation is the regulation of 
democracy. 
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Autonomy 
Self-determination, the autonomy of the individual, asserts itself in the right to race his 
automobile, to handle his power tools, to buy a gun, to communicate to mass audiences his 
opinion, no matter how ignorant, how aggressive, it may be. 
Herbert Marcuse 
Introduction 
The final core democratic value studied in this work is autonomy (Harrison 
1995). In study six the control and censorship of online information is 
studied. The study looks at the more blatant forms of information control 
carried out by governments who use technical and social means to openly 
limit information flows. In addition to this the study also looks at the more 
subtle forms of controlling online information. The latter are more 
commonly implemented within less openly repressive governments and can 
be seen as a delegation of regulatory practices to the service provider. The 
rationale for the limitation of online communications can be seen in the re-
occurring moral panics (Thompson 1998) surrounding technology. 
Structural regulation of communications through the persistence of 
paternalistic information policies results in the loss of user autonomy in 
relation to the online environment. This in turn results in the discrimination 
of the online communications medium.  
Freedom of expression is often pointed to as being a fundamental building 
block in a democracy (Dahl 1998); therefore the ability to communicate is 
the basis upon which the democracy is built. This position has been 
uncontested by most nations for a long time. For most individuals actually 
communicating with a larger group of people was not practical. Traditional 
avenues into mass communication are not available to most individuals. 
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With the advent of ICT the cost of mass communication plummeted. With 
the growing use of the technology the state position on freedom of 
communication has been put to the test and many nations are failing this 
test and not only the ones who traditionally did not support free speech.  
Censorship is often a matter of perspectives. The legitimising motivations 
behind controlling flows of information often lie in paternalistic desires to 
protect weaker individuals whether they are children or adults. The problem 
of perspectives is one of cultural relativism in the sense that “we” limit 
access to information in an effort to defend important cultural values, social 
stability or avoid harmful content. “They”, on the other hand, maliciously 
prevent individuals from accessing information in an attempt to protect and 
maintain their own power and position (Esler 2005).  
The purpose of this chapter is to present censorship theory and practice in relation to the 
debate of Internet regulation. The chapter will also present the results of some empirical 
censorship research and look at the growing anti-censorship movement. 
Theory 
The concept of autonomy refers to the individual’s capacity for self-
regulating in practice this includes elements of self-esteem, self-awareness, 
self-acceptance, self-responsibility, and self-assertion. Against the value of 
autonomy there are various forms of social paternalism, regulatory 
structures and outside intervention. 
Autonomy is accepted as a core democratic value and it is often argued that 
in the absence of a compelling evidence to the contrary, everyone should be 
treated as the best judge of his or her own good or interests (Scanlon 1977, 
Dahl 1998). Dahl’s motivation for defending this point of view is based 
upon two arguments. First, individuals are the best judges and defenders of 
their own interests due to epistemic and motivational reasons. In other 
words, not only do they have the greatest interest in this work but they are 
also in the unique position of being best able to judge what is best for them. 
Second is the argument for the interest in self-determination since this 
involves allowing the actor to be active in following the regulation of his 
own choosing. This latter argument has a moral strength and also includes a 
large measure of self-development since it includes the ability to make 
autonomous decisions, being personally responsible for the outcomes and it 
requires that the actor engage in free and open discussions with others and 
thus increases the level of participation in social and regulatory decisions.  
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The importance of autonomy can be seen in the role and responsibility of 
the individual to take part in public life and participating actively in the 
democratic decision making process. Without the ability or inclination to 
autonomy and self-rule the individual must rely on the technocratic expert 
(Giddens 1990, Beck 1992) and this reliance undoes the fundament of the 
participatory democracy. Contemporary philosophical discussions often 
concern themselves with autonomy in both its theoretical approach and 
public policy applications (Taylor 1999b). One important area of practical 
autonomy has been the field of medical ethics where recent changes in the 
field of patient autonomy have redefined many fundamental medical 
practices in general and patient doctor communication in particular 
(Dworkin 1988).  
Taylor (1999b) posits two reasons for the central role autonomy plays in 
contemporary debates. Firstly autonomy becomes the way in which “we 
structure the world around us” and therefore it becomes fundamental to our 
understanding of the world and our place within it. Taylor’s second reason 
builds upon the recognition that contemporary western society is morally 
pluralistic and therefore autonomy becomes the way in which society can 
ensure that certain groups do not attempt to impose their moral or political 
views on others. Taylor concludes that this latter argument “…will also, of 
course, fit well with views that hold pluralism _as such_ to be a good in 
itself.” 
In attempting to define the concept of autonomy we are often presented 
with the problem that the term is used in a manner of ways. Dworkin 
reflects (1988) that the concept of autonomy is…  
…used sometimes as an equivalent of liberty (positive or negative in Berlin's 
terminology), sometimes as equivalent to self-rule or sovereignty, sometimes as 
identical to freedom of the will... It is identified with self-assertion, with critical 
reflection, with freedom from obligation, with absence of external causation, with 
knowledge of one's own interests. (p 6). 
Dworkin (1988) qualifies the concept of autonomy by listing six criteria 
which a  “satisfactory theory of autonomy” should include (logical 
consistency, empirical possibility, value conditions, ideological neutrality, 
normative relevance and judgmental relevance). Autonomy is a complex 
term and it is possible, according to Dworkin (1988) that no concept of 
autonomy is rigorous enough to satisfy them all. Dworkin concludes that 
the abstract concept of autonomy is not one single concept but rather a 
collective concept of several versions of the idea.  
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Autonomy can be further problematised by the basic concept of someone 
being in charge of her life. It is enough, using this argument, that the 
autonomous person is self-directing or self-governing. In such a limited 
understanding of autonomy, as a person who acts in accordance with her 
preferences, does not do justice to the concept (Taylor 1999b).  Taylor 
(1999b) gives the example of the bank teller who under duress gives the 
banks money to the armed bank robber. This act, in accordance to the 
person’s preferences, is not autonomous. If this was an adequate definition 
states could coerce their citizens while maintaining the resemblance of 
autonomy by letting them act according to preferences. One such way of 
doing this is providing Internet access and the semblance of choice while 
filtering out unacceptable material before it reaches the user. Therefore 
acting according to preferences is a too narrow description of autonomy.  
Taylor (1999b) presents the concept of autonomy in part as “a person’s 
desire is autonomous if she decides to treat it as being giving her a reason to 
act, and if she is satisfied with this decision.” However he continues, that 
this may be an incomplete decision since “…person’s desires--and their 
decisions about their desires, and even their feelings of satisfaction 
concerning them--are susceptible to manipulation.” The problem of 
manipulation must be taken very seriously and can include both the external 
limitations of choice, the use of marketing and the rewarding of conditioned 
desires. Therefore it is important to establish the criteria required for an act 
to be autonomous. Scanlon (1977) pointed out the importance defining 
criteria for autonomous acts when he argued that autonomous acts in 
accordance to a persons desire are very similar to being autonomous under 
coercion. Therefore to be able to discuss what makes a person’s acts 
autonomous one must be able to deal with the autonomy of a person’s 
desire. It is tempting to understand the autonomous act as an act which 
flows from autonomous desire. Acts are not autonomous simply because 
they emanate from autonomous desires (Taylor 1999b). Acts under duress 
or acts where the desire or context has been manipulated cannot be 
autonomous – even if they in some cases may be perceived as such by the 
actor. 
The main requirement for individual autonomy to be implemented is the 
ability to communicate. This ability should not be understood to be a one-
sided form of communication but it must also include the right and ability 
to freely receive information. Without the ability to receive information the 
ability to make decision based upon the facts cannot take place and 
therefore there will be no real autonomy. To this end the freedom of access 
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to information must occur without the involvement of government since 
any such involvement affects the information received.  
The history of censorship is long and tangled however there are two 
philosophers which should be addressed in the theory of censorship and 
these are Milton and Mill. In 1643 the English Parliament issued a law aimed 
at bringing publishing under government control by creating a number of 
official censors to whom authors would submit their work for approval 
prior to publication. In response to this Milton (1979 [1644]) wrote and 
published his speech Areopagitica without presenting it to the censors, it is 
unlicensed, unregistered, and without name of printer or publisher.  The 
book carries this maxim on the front page 
This is true liberty, when free-born men,  
Having to advise the public, may speak free,  
Which he who can, and will, deserves high praise;  
Who neither can, nor will, may hold his peace:  
What can be juster in a state than this?  
Milton’s (1979 [1644]) text remains the classic statement of the arguments 
against censorship, particularly in the form of previous restraint. Milton 
conceded that criminal prosecutions might, perhaps even should, follow 
upon the publication of certain writings. He insisted, however, that such 
works must not be suppressed before publication.  
The second work of importance (chronologically) to this all to brief look at 
censorship theory is On Liberty by Mill (1980 [1859]). In this work Mill 
presented four arguments for allowing free speech and censorship:  
1. Perhaps the opinion we would suppress is true 
2. Perhaps the opinion we would suppress is partly true 
3. We need the false opinion in order to make sure the true opinion is not held as a 
mere uncontested prejudice 
4. We need the false opinion in order to bring home to ourselves the meaning of the 
true opinion 
The basic premise of Mill’s argument is that only through discussion could 
truth emerge and therefore both the individual and society would benefit 
when many participated in open discussions. The purpose of Mill’s 
arguments were derived from his belief that if there was enough discussion 
the truth would eventually emerge and therefore it was fundamentally wrong 
to prevent the expression of ideas even if these ideas were wrong.  
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Analysis: Actors 
In an early work on Internet censorship Varlejs (1998) discussed which 
actors were carrying out Internet censorship and for which purposes. Listing 
actors involved in censorship as governments, academic institutions, 
religious groups, corporations, media and libraries Varlejs (1998) notes that 
these actors censor different types of information, for different methods 
and motivate it through different reasons. However the end result was that 
online censorship was a common feature.  
The concept of censorship is most often concerned with activities carried 
out by the censor after the text has been written but prior to its 
dissemination. This limitation however fails to take into account both the 
self-censorship often carried out by those who are too intimidated by threat 
of legal sanction or social exclusion. Nor does it take into account the 
activities of a state after the information has been widely disseminated. 
These two areas are important methods of information control since they 
act in concert to limit information flows within a society.  
The focus of this work is on Internet content and the limitation or control 
of the free flow of information it is important to be aware of the 
technologies of information control available to the controller. The first 
important difference between the traditional censor and Internet-based 
censorship is that the information in question has usually already been 
disseminated. Therefore the focus is not on what may be disseminated but 
rather how to prevent groups from accessing this information. The main 
process involved in this activity is one of filtering. The term is aptly chosen 
since the activity involves allowing the free flow of acceptable material while 
preventing the harmful content from being accessed.  
The evasion of censorship has always been a popular topic. One can almost 
see this as an escalating race of technology. For every move the censor 
carries out to implement new forms of censorship technologies and 
techniques there is a rapid move towards new and better forms of hidden 
communication. The advent of the Internet has increased the amount of 
cheap international communications being carried out. The race to censor 
and to beat the censor has been going on for some time but it is still in its 
infancy.  
More or less comprehensive information on how to avoid or evade 
censorship is easily found online. Much of this information also focuses on 
the use of pseudonyms and maintaining a level of secrecy to ensure that if 
communications are intercepted the communicants will not be able to be 
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identified and punished. There are, naturally, two sides to these arguments. 
The use of such techniques by those who cause harm is abhorrent while the 
use of these techniques by those who bravely fight for freedom is 
praiseworthy. However the question then becomes one of degree and 
definition. Which user causes harm and which users are actually 
praiseworthy? Much of the activities we deplore today were historically 
acceptable and vice versa. There is no reason to think that these decisions 
have been, or ever will be fixed.  
Therefore censorship becomes a point of view. Those who are against and 
those who are for are solely demonstrating differences of opinion and it is 
only serendipity that puts us on one side of the barrier or the other. This 
argument from cultural relativism is not an adequate argument to prevent 
activity on both sides of the fence. Since the concept of censorship can be 
taken as a point of view several actors have been moving towards creating 
technical anti-censorship devices. The object of these is to help avoid state 
censorship without being detected. One example of such a system is 
Freenet. 
Freenet (Clarke & Sandberg 2005) is software designed to enable the 
publication and retrieval of Internet-based information without fear of 
censorship and distributed at no cost. This is done by creating a completely 
decentralised network where information about publishers and consumers 
of information is anonymous and not stored. The advantages of 
decentralisation is that no single point controls the network and the 
advantage of anonymity is that users can depend on the network for 
communications without fear of advance censorship or post-publishing 
reprisals. In addition to being encrypted communications are routed 
through several nodes to make tracking the information requester more 
complex. According to the project site the software has been downloaded 
several million times and used in countries with comprehensive censorship 
systems.  
In addition to the development of technical anti-censorship technologies 
there have been social actions developed to help with censorship evasion. 
These have taken the form of publications with the activist as a target 
audience. The goal is to provide readily available information about 
censorship and how to avoid or mitigate its effects. 
The online civil rights organisation Electronic Freedom Frontier (EFF) has 
produced a guide to ensuring blogging safety which is aimed at ensuring that 
those who create online information do not meet with negative 
consequences from employers or state censors. Their advice includes (EFF 
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2005) using pseudonyms and limiting the use of identifiable information, 
promoting the use of anonymizing technologies, using ping servers to 
publish information then quickly removing it (the effect is that the 
information remains on other servers but not on the publishers site), 
limiting audiences through password protected sites, avoiding being 
included in search engines and registering domain names anonymously.  
The EFF has a strong reputation for civil liberties work and has been active 
online since 1990. They have a large audience and deal with a wide range of 
issues pertaining to online civil liberties. Their motivations for producing 
such documents are to ensure that the individual can act autonomously in 
providing and receiving information without fear of outside coercion. They 
write:  
…we offer a few simple precautions to help you maintain control of your 
personal privacy so that you can express yourself without facing unjust 
retaliation. If followed correctly, these protections can save you from 
embarrassment or just plain weirdness in from of your friends and coworkers. 
(EFF 2005). 
The underlying belief is therefore that the individual should have the choice 
to publish information but this choice or desire is limited by the potential 
threats the individual faces if such activities are carried out. The EFF 
publishes several documents of this nature on their website ranging from 
legal to technical advice intended to empower the individual and provide 
tools to ensure individual informed choice. In addition, documents such as 
this, also fulfil a political purpose by sustaining and contributing to a larger 
debate on online freedom.  
Providing censorship circumvention advice is not limited to organisations. 
Individuals such as Freerk (2005) maintain sites which describe different 
forms of online censorship methods and also discusses technologies and 
provides techniques for circumventing censorship. Freerk is more focused 
on local censorship (schools, libraries etc) however also discusses 
circumvention of state censorship. The work is a “tutorial on how to bypass 
Internet Censorship using Proxies, Shells, JAP” and is intended to be a way 
in which “to beat the filtering in schools, countries or companies (blocked 
ports e.t.c).” Freerk (2005) provides no motivation for providing this 
information. 
While the EFF takes the civil liberties stance and individual actors provide 
information without attempting to place their work in a larger ideological 
context there have also been moves from traditional (non-Internet) 
organisations to help circumvent online censorship. One such organisation 
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is Reporters Sans Frontiers (Reporters without borders – RSF). This French 
organisation focuses on freedom of the press but has also developed an 
interest in protecting a larger group, namely the non-professional reporter 
using the Internet to publish and disseminate information online. To this 
end RSF have published the Handbook for Bloggers and Cyber-Dissidents (Pain 
2005), an anthology which includes introductory texts on information 
activism with information on topics such as how to get started, which are 
the best tools and what ethics bloggers should have. In addition to this the 
handbook gives example cases of what bloggers have been able to achieve 
before offering concrete advice on anonymous blogging (Zuckerman 2005) 
and censorship circumvention (Villeneuve 2005).  
Zuckerman (2005) discusses social safety precautions similar to those seen 
above (EFF 2005) i.e. using pseudonyms, public computers and anonymous 
proxies before moving on to the more advanced precautions such as union-
routing and using anonymous blog services involving encryption, re-routing 
and anonymous re-mailers. The main point Zuckerman (2005) is attempting 
to make is that anonymity is possible however for each step there is a cost in 
time or learning required to be able to use the tools. The trade-off therefore 
becomes a factor of risk evaluation, knowledge and time. Depending upon 
the risk being undertaken it may become worthwhile to invest time and 
energy in learning to use the available tools. Villeneuve’s (2005) focus is on 
circumventing online filters, therefore after a brief introduction to filtering 
he presents a spectrum of circumventing technologies and a methodology 
for the user in determining the right balance between the users needs and 
capacities. The results of such an evaluation determine the course of action 
and the focus needed for developing circumvention methods and avoiding 
detection. The choice of circumvention method will be based upon factors, 
such as, number of users, bandwidth availability, point of access, levels of 
expertise and the risks being undertaken. Once this has been determined 
Villenueve (2005) presents an array of web-based circumventors, 
circumvention through proxy servers, tunnelling and the wide-scale 
anonymous communications systems.  
These examples of instructional texts for activists are by no means 
exhaustive. Their purpose is to be indicative and demonstrate that the 
regulatory activities of the censors is being met as a challenge and this has 
created an interest among actors to aid each other in the evasion of 
censorship in online environments. 
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Analysis: Structures 
Internet content filtering is the process of preventing user access to 
information on the Internet. Most filtering systems focus on access to the 
World Wide Web by software placed between the user and her Internet 
connection (Zittrain & Edelman 2003). For the most part filtering is 
dependent upon one of three techniques. However the different techniques 
can be used in combination to achieve the desired effect. The processes are 
known as blacklisting, whitelisting and content analysis. Blacklisting refers to the 
process whereby lists of unacceptable websites are collected. Once the 
filtering software is installed the software will first check to make sure any 
website requested does not occur on the list of websites collected on the 
blacklist.  
Filter Function 
Filter Types The standalone filter - an all-in-one package supplied by a single vendor. A 
standalone filter makes all filtering decisions; although there may be a facility 
to let some users override decisions or ban more sites. 
The protocol-based filter – provides alternative types of rating systems (e.g. 
from the American Civil Liberties Union or the Family Research Council) 
and lets users choose between them. 
Filtering 
Mechanisms 
A rating mechanism that makes value judgments categorizing a web site’s 
content. 
A filtering mechanism which grants access to a web site only after 
comparison with lists of allowed/disallowed web sites or words 
Filtering 
Techniques 
Blocking - uses particular router combinations to deny access to specific 
Internet Protocol (IP) addresses or services that run on specific port 
numbers 
Content analysis - the controlling of information based on the analysis of 
specific keywords within web pages or URLs. 
‘Parsing mechanisms’ sift through these keywords and block access 
accordingly. Web sites with forbidden keywords or other specified criteria 
are blocked from the user 
Table 6: Internet Filters adapted from Hamilton (2004). 
The use of blacklists entails handing over power and decision making 
capacity to another agent. Commercial blacklisting products have received a 
fair amount of criticism for their tendencies to overblock, i.e. to block more 
access to more information than necessary. A recent study found that in 
school blocking software “for every web page correctly blocked as 
advertised, one or more was blocked incorrectly” this was seen as the result 
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of the Children's Internet Protection Act (CIPA) which requires all schools 
and libraries who receive federal funds or discounts to install and use a 
technology for blocking visual depictions that are obscene, child 
pornography or harmful to minors (EFF & OPG 2003). Blacklisting is a 
commonly used method in many countries. In the UK Operation Cleanfeed 
(Anonymous 2004, Fagelman 2004) is an attempt among broadband 
suppliers to self-regulate by blocking access to child-pornography. This 
project has inspired similar action in Norway and debate in Sweden on the 
responsibility of the ISP (Eneman 2005).  
Blacklisting raises many questions and fears. To avoid creating an interest in 
the information which is intended to be controlled publicity surrounding the 
lists is kept to a minimum. It is important to ensure that blacklisting is not 
used as a methodology to prevent access to acceptable material. The 
question therefore becomes: If blacklisting is to be used as a legitimate form 
of information control how can the controlled society ensure that the 
material being blocked is correct. Blacklisting also creates the need for 
constant vigilance since the censor is required to keep the blacklists up to 
date and in line with the growing sources of information to be blocked. This 
is a daunting, if not impossible, task.  
Whitelisting is also, as the name indicates, a process of allowing access to 
material which has been checked in advance. Instead of creating lists of 
unacceptable material, whitelisting entails the creation of acceptable 
material. Users are therefore only permitted access to that which has been 
approved in advance. This method is infinitely more cost efficient in terms 
of limiting user access to unwanted information. It also is prone to 
overblocking, in other words the efficient use of whitelists prevent users 
from accessing too large amounts of information and thus mitigating the 
potential of the communications technology. 
Seen as a hindrance to access information whitelisting is a much more 
serious impediment to the free flow of information. If looked at benignly 
the concept is based upon trust. The information one is allowed to access is 
in some form “officially approved” by the censor and therefore is reliable, 
non-harmful and will not lead to negative consequences.  
The third form of filtering is content analysis. The concept behind this 
system is to avoid predefined lists (irrespective of whether they are black or 
white) and to focus on the actual content of what is viewed. Content 
analysis works by setting predefined characteristics of the material, which is 
to be avoided, and allowing software to scan the information for this 
content prior to delivering it to the user.  
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If the software is programmed to recognise sexually explicit language and 
the user attempts to view a page which such content, access to the page will 
be denied. This system has obvious appeal since it avoids the pitfalls of 
white & blacklisting (most of over and underblocking respectively). 
However, the system brings with it problems of its own. Content analysis is 
not a substitute for understanding information in context. If keywords are 
used then sites, which have no connection with the words, may be 
inadvertently affected. For example the city of Scunthorpe has been blocked 
since the word contains within it a four-letter word. Swedish blocking sites 
have inadvertently blocked Spanish sites containing the word hora (hour) 
because the term means prostitute in Swedish. Other content analysis 
systems intended to block sexually explicit images have been based upon the 
large amounts of skin-coloured pixels in such images. However these 
systems have been known to block close up pictures of a non-sexual nature 
(such as head shots) since the bulk of the image consists of skin-coloured 
pixels.  
State of the art filtering software usually attempt to use a mixture of these 
three systems and also include a level of human activity to “teach” the filters 
what to block and what to accept. However as these examples have shown 
there is no such thing as a system which will not either over- or underblock. 
Therefore systems will always be either tools of conscious and inadvertent 
censorship or less than 100% efficient.  
In a study conducted by Deibert & Villeneuve (2005) they show online 
censorship activities being carried out by 22 states. They divide these 
censorship activities into three categories (1) comprehensive censorship, (2) 
distributed censorship, and (3) limited censorship. Comprehensive entails a 
large-scale censorship activity, distributed censorship refers to a significant 
amount of censorship being carried out, and usually the actual act of 
censorship is delegated to the ISP. Limited censorship refers to, as the name 
implies, small amounts of censorship.  
While there is a great deal of concern about the states who traditionally 
censor the Internet such as China, Cuba, Myanmar & Turkey etc there are 
other states which appear on the list which are traditionally not understood 
to be censorship states. Such states include the USA, France and Germany. 
These states rarely receive the same amount of bad publicity for their 
censorship since it is commonly understood that these states are for 
freedom of information. However it is easy to see how this stance becomes 
problematic since even these states censor access to information online.  
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There seems to be two main approaches among States implementing 
comprehensive censorship practices. Myanmar and Cuba limit access to 
Internet by ensuring that only limited numbers of individuals can go online 
and even those who can may only see approved material – the rest is filtered 
(Deibert & Villeneuve 2005). China, Saudi Arabia and Turkey are more 
permissive when it comes to allowing individual’s access to the Internet but 
the content they are allowed to view is heavily filtered (Deibert & Villeneuve 
2005). Additionally these countries attempt to register those who access the 
Internet through Internet Cafés.  
Among those who are less ambitious in their filtering activities we find that 
ISP’s, or in the case of the USA libraries, are required to filter different types 
of content in an effort to protect certain cultural values. Often the filtering 
is heavily focused on, but not limited to, preventing pornography. The 
filtering of dissident and human rights sites follows this in a close second 
place (Deibert & Villeneuve 2005). Those who filter least, according to 
Deibert & Villeneuve (2005) are countries like France where courts have 
ordered Yahoo! to block access to Nazi auction sites, Germany in which 
certain states require ISPs to block Nazi sites and Jordan which blocks the 
site of arabtimes.com at a national level (Deibert & Villeneuve 2005). 
What Deibert & Villeneuve’s (2005) study clearly shows is that it has 
become increasingly difficult to speak of censorship in terms of them and 
us. Many states, traditionally accepted as pro-free-speech, censor to a lesser 
or greater degree. That the more traditionally censorship-friendly states such 
as: Turkey, Cuba and China filter information is not a great surprise. It is 
important in all these cases to remember that no matter how well planned 
and organised the system of censorship is – there is no such thing as a 
perfect system.  
Privatised Censorship 
While much of the censorship being carried out can be relatively easily 
understood in terms of a central power controlling the flows of information 
in the attempt to achieve certain political goals, not all Internet censorship 
follows this pattern. Two main areas of concern, which fall into the category 
of private censorship, are the role of the Internet Service Provider (ISP) and 
legislation with a chilling effect  (Boyle 1996).  
Censorship by ISP can take many forms, but most generally fall into one of 
two categories. Either the censorship is carried out as part of a 
governmental recommendation or requirement or the censorship is 
undertaken as part of corporate policy – which may in turn be a part of 
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industry self-regulation or simply an individual corporation policy. One 
example of such as policy is the Public Pledge of Self-Regulation & Professional 
Ethics for China Internet Industry, which states that the principles of self-
regulation and the Internet industry’s professional ethics include 
“…patriotic observance of law, equitableness, trustworthiness and honesty” 
(Article 3).  These duties are further expanded in Article 9 of the Public 
Pledge, which states: 
We Internet information service providers pledge to abide by the state 
regulations on Internet information service management conscientiously and 
shall fulfill the following disciplinary obligations in respect of Internet 
information service: 
1. Refraining from producing, posting or disseminating pernicious information 
that may jeopardize state security and disrupt social stability, contravene laws and 
regulations and spread superstition and obscenity. Monitor the information 
publicized by users on websites according to law and remove the harmful 
information promptly; 
2. Refraining from establishing links to the websites that contain harmful 
information so as to ensure that the content of the network information is lawful 
and healthy; 
… 
4. Encouraging people to use the Internet in an ethical way, to enhance the 
Internet ethical sense and reject the spread of harmful information on the 
Internet. 
5. If the Internet service provider discovers information which is inconsistent 
with the law on its website, it will remove it. 
The public pledge is written as a one-sided declaration from the corporate 
actor. This creates the image that the corporate actor has the choice to 
refrain from signing the document, declaring support for it or implementing 
it in any manner. However, the non-implementation of the document is 
understood to bring with it additional difficulties for companies intending to 
enter the Chinese Internet market. Therefore companies follow the Public 
Pledge, which results in the inspecting and monitoring of national and 
international sites and blocking access to harmful content as stated by 
Article 10 of the Public Pledge. 
We…pledge to inspect and monitor information on domestic and foreign 
websites…and refuse access to those websites that disseminate harmful 
information. (Article 10). 
In the case of China many companies are eager to take part in what 
promises to be a large and potentially profitable market. Therefore many 
companies are prepared to sign the Public Pledge to gain access to the 
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Chinese market, among the more notable signatories is the company 
Yahoo!.  
In a recent case at the Changsha Intermediate People’s Court of Hunan 
Province Yahoo! provided information that classified documents where sent 
via a Yahoo! email account to be posted online on the “Democracy Forum” 
which was then reposted “…on other foreign web sites such as…’China 
Democracy & Justice Party’” (Changsha 2005). The court verdict includes 
the information provided by Yahoo!: 
Account holder information furnished by Yahoo Holdings (Hong Kong) Ltd., 
which confirms that for IP address 218.76.8.201 at 11:32:17 p.m. on Aprl 20, 
2004, the corresponding user information was as follows: user telephone number: 
0731-4376362 located at the Contemporary Business News office in Hunan; 
address: 2F, Building 88, Jianxiang New Village, Kaifu Disrict, Changsha. 
(Changsha 2005).  
The information, which was sent by the account holder was “…the text of 
an internal message which the authorities had sent to his newspaper warning 
journalists of the dangers of social destabilisation and risks resulting from 
the return of certain dissidents on the 15th anniversary of the Tiananmen 
Square massacre.” (RSF 2005). The defendant was sentenced to 10 years 
imprisonment and two years subsequent deprivation of political rights for 
illegally providing state secrets to foreign entities (Changsha 2005).  
According to RSF (2006) Yahoo! has actively helped jail cyberdissidents by 
providing Chinese courts with evidence. In a case in 2003 an ex-civil servant 
from Dazhou was sentenced to eight years in prison in December 10, 2003 
for “inciting subversion” the case relied on information provided by 
Yahoo!. In an article the RSF (2006) call for Yahoo! to provide a list of all 
cyberdissidents it has provided data on. The RSF are particularly interested 
in the 81 dissidents whose release they are campaigning for. Paradoxically, 
when Yahoo! was compelled by the French Courts to prevent access of 
French Internet users to auction sites for Nazi memorabilia Yahoo! argued 
that such censorship was unconstitutional (Reidenberg 2001, Vick 2005).  
In January 2006 Google launched a local version of its online search engine 
for China (Google.cn). This version will block “subversive” content from 
the Chinese users and therefore help Chinese officials to filter Internet 
content. Especially since to large degree today any website not listed by 
search-engines has little chance of being found by users. This addition to the 
Chinese censorship technology has the effect that even sites which are not 
caught by the Chinese firewalls (Zittrain & Edelman 2003) can now be 
excluded since they are not part of the material that can be found when 
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using the search engine. Google made several statements in response to the 
protests over their actions. 
…by launching Google.cn, our website for the People's Republic of China. In 
order to do so, we have agreed to remove certain sensitive information from our 
search results. We know that many people are upset about this decision, and 
frankly, we understand their point of view. This wasn't an easy choice, but in the 
end, we believe the course of action we've chosen will prove to be the right one.  
Launching a Google domain that restricts information in any way isn't a step we 
took lightly. For several years, we've debated whether entering the Chinese 
market at this point in history could be consistent with our mission and 
values….We ultimately reached our decision by asking ourselves which course 
would most effectively further Google's mission to organize the world's 
information and make it universally useful and accessible. Or, put simply: how 
can we provide the greatest access to information to the greatest number of 
people? (McLaughlin 2006). 
The threat to the participatory democracy presented by the privatised 
censorship of the service providers should not be underestimated. Today 
the online search engines have become the de facto standard for finding 
online information and online navigation. However these search engines are 
not a form of public good. Many consider the search engine as a technology 
and as such neutral. However this view omits the fact that the technology 
exists in a corporate context with a duty to create profit (Friedman 1993 
[1970]). Despite the search engines role as fundamental infrastructure they 
are driven by profit motives and therefore no obligation to ensure equal 
access to information. The effects of privatised censorship are that a greater 
amount of information becomes unavailable. Once the opposing views are 
made unavailable what remains online is a form of consensus of opinion. 
This makes it even more difficult for anyone harbouring an opposing view 
to speak out. In addition to this the harm of privatised censorship is made 
more grave by the fact that there is little or no information about the 
censorship rules, therefore the ordinary user cannot be aware of what is 
censored and therefore cannot realise when she should attempt to 
circumvent the censorship.   
Another example of voluntary self-regulation can be seen in the UK Project 
Cleanfeed Initiative (Anonymous 2004, Fagelman 2004). This project 
involves the largest broadband provider in the UK and entails a process of 
filtering to prevent access to child pornography sites. These actions have led 
other countries to follow suit or to discuss similar action (Eneman 2005). 
Often these forms of self-regulation are an attempt to anticipate actual state 
legislation in the field.  
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The second category of private censorship is the case of regulation with so 
called chilling effects, in other words the stated purpose of the regulation is 
not to limit a certain action (such as free speech) but has that as a negative 
side effect. This may sometimes fall outside the strict definition of 
censorship, however the effect of legislation, which prevents the ability of 
communication, it results in the lessened flows of free information. While it 
is important to mention this topic here, due to space constraints it is not 
possible to give the topic the attention it truly deserves. Many different 
bodies of legislative rules may affect the way in which communication is 
carried out. Those that are most common are privacy (Taylor 2002a), 
defamation (Dent & Kenyon 2004), copyrights (Heins 2003) and trademarks 
(Dogan & Lemley 2004). The importance of bringing up the topic of the 
chilling effects of legislation is to underline the difficulties that the 
communicator faces. The problem is not in the rules but in their 
interpretation and implementation. When taken at face value the regulations 
do not vary greatly. However their implementation can easily be 
implemented in such a manner as to entirely prevent or cause a chilling 
effect on the actors.   
Discussion 
Once again (see chapter 8) the concept of the public sphere must be 
addressed. To briefly recap the concept as developed by Habermas (1989) 
the public sphere is the realm of interaction and discussion by private 
individuals on matters of public interest. The key feature of the public 
sphere is universal access which means that there shall be no control or 
manipulation of the individual’s ability to enter or exit the public sphere. 
The autonomous individual must be able to freely participate and 
communicate to be able to be considered an autonomous individual 
(Habermas 1974).  
As presented earlier in this work the components defining access to public 
sphere include (i) physical access, (ii) social access, (iii) access to discussions, 
and (iv) access to information (Carr et al 1992). Castells (1996) presents the 
idea that the public sphere has, to all intents and purposes, moved from the 
physical world to the network. Therefore it is important to look to those 
writers who claim that the Internet is the public sphere and then to attempt 
to understand whether or not the same rules apply to the autonomous 
participant.  
Part of the criticism towards Habermas’ idea of the public sphere is that 
during the period upon which his study was based a large part of the 
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population was excluded from entry into the public sphere. The sphere was 
dominated by white, property owning males and western ideals (Schuler 
2000). A discussion within the Computer Science discipline, which is 
directed at alleviating this problem, has come to be known as the digital 
divide. Within this field there is an idea that technology can provide the 
means for leveling the playing field and allowing previously 
communications-weak actors access to the public sphere. With this access 
they have the opportunity of fulfilling the goal to becoming autonomous. 
However if this level of autonomy is to be reached there is a need for the 
individuals to have an unrestricted, and therefore unbiased, access to this 
public sphere. This is not the case since many individuals access to the 
Internet is effected by state interference (Boas & Kalathil 2003, Zittrain & 
Edelman 2002, 2003). 
For the control and limitation of information ICT is a disruptive 
technology. The studies seen in this chapter have shown that many 
countries are prepared to move directly to regulate citizen communication. 
This regulation has created a reaction from the actors in that they are 
creating technical and social systems aimed at circumventing or mitigating 
the effects of Internet censorship.  
The interaction between the regulatory structure and the actor can be 
understood as a series of actions and reactions. The first stage is the 
implementation of ICT as a form of communication. At an early stage this is 
uncontroversial since the number of users is relatively low and social control 
can be maintained. The increased dissemination of communications 
technology leads to a perceived threat of what this communications can 
entail. Real or imagined threats create a need to protect certain values such 
as local culture and citizens; decrease foreign influence; protect political 
stability; maintain security, protect secrets, morals and religion (Varlejs 
1998).  
Certain actors will perceive the censorship as paternalistic and a threat to 
their autonomy and therefore strive to counteract it in some form. It is at 
this stage we can see the development of a clear interaction between the 
regulatory structure and the disaffected actor. Actors will actively counteract 
the regulatory structure and force it to maintain a high level of vigilance to 
enable it to function. The effect will be a constant move to develop socio-
technical systems of more adequate policing and intervention.   
This is the continued negotiation between regulation and technology. This 
may deal with the adaptation of social behaviour (or implementation of 
technologies) to coincide with regulation or attempts to evade the 
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effects/sanctions prescribed by regulation or the behaviour of following the 
wording of the legislation while ignoring its substance. These negotiated 
socio-technical solutions attempt to either circumvent regulation completely 
or at least to cushion its effects. 
One of the direct effects of the terror attacks of 9/11 has been the direct 
limitation of online civil liberties. Since then several governments have 
moved to implement and extend anti-terror regulation. Hamilton (2003) 
defines three main areas were these activities are taking place (1) the creation 
of a data retention structure, both at national levels and also through 
international co-operation. This entails the mandatory requirement that 
Internet Service Providers (ISP) store all user data for specific periods of 
time. (2) Online surveillance – regulation in this area is making surveillance 
technically possible and formally easier. (3) Direct censorship – on the 
grounds that “terrorists should not be able freely access sensitive 
information…” (Hamilton 2004, p 185).  
Conclusion 
ICT carries with it many promises for democracy. Early voices hailed it as 
the ultimate tool of freedom. However technology is also being 
implemented to limit the scope of freedom of expression among ICT users. 
The theoretical approach to the concept of regulating Internet is developing 
from a polarised into a nuanced understanding of the complexity of Internet 
regulation.  
In this case we see three regulators interacting to control user access to 
information. These are design-based, community-based and hierarchical regulators. 
The design-based regulators refer to the filtering software employed to 
block user access, the community-based regulators are the “soft” voluntary 
policy documents which corporate entities choose to enforce while the 
hierarchical regulators are the legal actions with both intended and unintended 
consequences.  
The present situation is one where many parties are conducting the 
regulation of online communications – the states are attempting to maintain 
traditional control structures while users are helping each other 
communicate and circumvent controls that prevent communication. The 
most efficient state strategy remains one of controlling access to the 
technology in general and open communication via the Internet in 
particular.  
AUTONOMY 
 
203 
The issue is one of user autonomy in online environments. The ability to act 
without coercion or manipulation is vital to democratic participation. This is 
true even in the online environment. By implementing direct control over 
Internet content through online content filtering or implementing 
regulations through industry codes of conducts which require such filtering 
to be carried out by private actors directly impacts online autonomy. The 
same can be said of the actions of search engines such as the case of 
Google.cn, mentioned above, since removing information from the search 
engines effectively makes the information invisible to the larger public. If 
the information is not available through search engines it is, for all intents 
and purposes, not there at all. Without the ability to locate and gather 
information the individual cannot acquire the adequate information 
necessary to make autonomous decisions based upon the facts. Therefore 
through manipulation the public information sphere cannot function.  
In addition to this there is a large degree of coercion evident in the examples 
of search engines and other ISP’s facilitating for regulators by providing 
evidence of technology use. Without the ability to use the technology 
necessary to enter the public sphere users cannot participate as autonomous 
individuals in the public sphere. This therefore creates a system of 
imbalance where the online technological world is discriminated against.  
The promise of efficient communications and the development of the 
Internet into a public sphere without the limitations inherent in Habermas’ 
model have quickly been proven to be false hopes. Reactions to censorship 
have caused many to both protest and react towards the threats against 
online autonomy. These reactions come both in technical solutions and in 
attempts to educate users on the importance of security and risk awareness 
to prevent autonomy loss.  
This chapter has presented a brief overview of censorship and regulation 
theory. It has identified the roles of some of the main actors involved in the 
online censorship discourse. ICT has become a disruptive technology with 
an un-stabilising effect on the status quo of state controlled information 
flows. In response to this, states have reacted to ensure that the balance of 
power remains in their favour. In the meantime the user-based response 
ensures that state activity will not be unhampered nor take place outside the 
sphere of public knowledge. This chapter has also addressed the role of 
censorship conducted by private actors (Internet Service Providers) showing 
how their regulatory actions present a serious threat to the online autonomy 
and the participatory democracy.   
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Discussion 
Our Age of Anxiety is, in great part, the result of trying to do today’s jobs with 
yesterday’s tools. 
Marshall McLuhan 
 
The purpose of studying the democratic effects of the regulation of 
disruptive technology is not to provide a list of woes. The purpose is rather 
to provide a body of work from which positive implications can be drawn. 
It is important neither to neglect nor to belittle these consequences. In those 
cases where the unintended effects are small one should consider the 
cumulative effect upon democracy of several small consequences.  
To these ends the data collected in the cases in this work have been 
collected into multiple case studies. This allows an in-depth examination of 
a single area of interest. This approach provides a systematic way of looking 
at the phenomena of regulation of Internet-based behaviour by collecting 
and analyzing data, reporting results and providing conclusions. The end 
result of this work, through the use of multiple case studies is to arrive at an 
understanding of the studied phenomena. 
The contributions of this work are aimed at the e-democracy, regulation and 
disruptive technology research fields, in particular to the specific discussions 
on the role, methods and effects of regulation disruptive technology and its 
effects on e-democracy. The topic of the regulation of Internet-based 
activity is growing in importance, as is the field of e-democracy, this is due 
in part to the growth of online interaction in addition to participation 
mediated by other forms of technology. To understand how the regulation 
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of technology affects the regulation of IT-based participatory democracy 
this thesis has studied the regulatory activities of the regulator and the 
reactions of those being regulated. The driving force is the understanding of 
the effect of technological change upon social institutions. This work 
examines the technological challenges to central social institutions and 
shows that the technological change has far outpaced the evolution of the 
social concepts in these areas; a result is that technology can be viewed as 
being a disruptive force in society. The understanding of the concept of 
disruption within this work is important. Disruption is a force of change in 
society. Change is a semi-autonomous driving force in society brought 
about by disruption. Change is semi-autonomous since it rarely can be 
ignored or avoided. It is however only semi-autonomous since it is driven 
by technical, social, political, etc developments for which we are responsible 
(Winner 1978). Therefore, disruption is a motor of change, change is what 
pushes, or pulls, society forward.  
However the understanding of the role of ICT in the development of 
society is anything but straightforward. Almost in direct opposition to 
Winner (1978) Beniger puts forward the self-described “unfashionable 
opinion” in 1986 that there was nothing fundamentally new about ICT. It 
was only a logical continuation of the “control revolution” (Beniger 1986). 
This revolution is  
…a complex of rapid changes in the technological and economic arrangements 
by which information is collected, stored, processed, and communicated, and 
through which formal or programmed decisions might effect societal control. 
From its origins in the last decades of the nineteenth century, the Control 
Revolution has continued unabated, and recently it has been accelerated by the 
development of microprocessing technologies. (Beniger 1986, p 427). 
Understood in this manner the changes being experienced are not 
unexpected but merely a progression for a complex society’s need to control 
its environments. Therefore it is not technology that develops but society 
and with it a need for more suitable technology. Beniger’s (1986) answer 
remains centralisation and control through bureaucracy. An advantage of 
Beniger’s approach is that society should not need to treat new technology 
any differently from existing technology.  
McLuhan (1964) criticised approaches such as Beniger’s (1986) as being 
rear-view mirror approaches to understanding technology. This is the 
attempt to understand the future by looking at the past. Such approaches 
would claim that the light bulb is simply a better candle or a car is simply a 
better horse-and-carriage. The rear-view mirror approach fails to take into 
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consideration the social changes brought about by the technology. Even if 
we can see similarities between the old and the new, the sheer scale of 
adoption of Internet-based technology ensures that even if the differences 
between old and new were small – these differences are magnified through 
the scale of use in society.  
In an attempt to bring about social debate on the democratic impact of 
technological advances Winner (1986) sees a need for the creation of wider 
discussion arenas that would be employed prior to the development of 
technological systems. The discussion of technological merits would no 
longer be focused solely on the economically profitable or technologically 
expedient but would include democratic considerations.  
Winner (1986) argues for this view since technological systems create and 
form social orders that constitute the limits that facilitate and control the 
way in which social behaviour may take place. From this position Winner 
(1986) puts forward the thought that since technical systems play an 
important role in social life they should be studied not only by technicians.  
What I am suggesting is a process of technological change disciplined by the 
political wisdom of democracy. It would require qualities of judiciousness in the 
populace that have rarely been applied to the judgement of 
instrumental/functional affairs. It would, presumably, produce results sometimes 
much different from those recommended by the rules of technical and economic 
efficiency. Other social and political norms, articulated by a democratic process, 
would gain renewed prominence. Faced with any proposal for a new 
technological system, citizens or their representatives would examine the social 
contract implied by building that system in a particular form. They would ask, 
How well do proposed conditions match our best sense of who we are and what 
we want society to be? Who gains and who loses power in the proposed change? 
Are the conditions produced by the change compatible with equality, social 
justice, and the common good?. (Winner 1986, p 55). 
As attractive as this proposal may be it is dependent upon a relatively 
planned approach to technological development where the parties may 
gather and decide to build a technological system. This planned approach to 
technological development does not take into account the manner in which 
innovation is understood to function in the present state of communication 
and organisation (von Hippel 2005). It does not take into account that 
technological advance can be incremental and disruptive at the same time.  
The definition of disruptive ICT adhered to in this work is a technical 
development of the technological base that has a radical and pervasive 
impact on the use of the technology in social interaction (Lyytinen & Rose 
2003b). This neither is, or is not, a form of technological determinism. 
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Technical change regularly affects the way in which we behave and, in some 
cases, leaves actors with little choice for free choice. This is not the same as 
saying that there is no level of human choice or control on the changes 
brought about by technology. While Lyytinen and Rose (2003a) refer to the 
effects of disruptive technology by using the metaphor of the earthquake 
they are referring to the human perception of the changes as they occur. 
Once a technological change has taken place and begun to disseminate in 
society the changes felt by the members in that society may be akin to an 
earthquake. This is not to say that technological change occurs without 
human awareness of the change. Even in situations where humans have 
ignored or underestimated the impact of a new technology, this should not 
be understood to be a force beyond their control albeit that the change 
might be experienced as such (Winner 1978).  
A much more complex issue is the level of understanding which we can 
have about the impact of technological change and the unintended 
consequences of such change (Beck 1992, Kallinikos 2005, Rolland 2002, 
Tenner 1997). This not only includes the future development of technology 
by developers but also the knowledge of how users will adopt and change 
their technology in the future.  
This thesis explores an issue close to the problem of unintended 
consequences of technological change. This thesis explores how attempts to 
regulate disruptive technology affect Internet-based participatory 
democracy. This may be seen as the study of the unintended consequences 
of attempts to regulate disruptive technology and the anti-democratic 
consequences of such regulation. It is anti-democratic in the sense of not 
adequately promoting or supporting the active role of the citizen within a 
democracy.  
This work began by reviewing alternative regulatory theory from Fuller 
(1964) to Murray (2006). The main point of this review was to show that the 
simplistic model of command and control regulation (Black 2002) has never 
been an adequate metaphor with which to explain the regulation of complex 
environments. With the beginning of the discussion on the regulation of 
Internet-based activities the command and control model has received 
additional critics. This work has therefore taken the definition of regulation 
as the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of external 
controls whether state or non-state, intended or unintended (Fuller 1964, 
Baldwin et al 1998). The advantage of this definition is that it recognises that 
there is more than one regulatory structure in place simultaneously. The 
more obvious drawback of this model, from the point of view of the 
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potential regulator, is that it opens regulation to a larger degree of 
complexity. This complexity is commonly referred to as a polycentric (Fuller 
1964) model of regulation since it is regulation originating from many 
sources. Therefore this thesis presents the development of traditional 
regulatory theory from the traditional ideological origins of command and 
control regulation to the more subtle and complex regulatory structures, 
which regulatory theorists understand regulation to be at present.  
Regulation of the online world brings with it additional complexity due to 
the ease in which certain regulatory regimes can be circumvented (Johnson 
& Post 1996). Another important difference is the malleability of the 
physical rules where regulation takes place. Since the online environment is 
created by code the fundamental rules and laws that govern it can be more 
easily adapted to suit the purpose of the regulator or the actor. This is 
because the online world not only is influenced by the regulatory modalities 
(Murray & Scott 2001, Murray 2006) of hierarchy, competition and community but 
is also highly susceptible to design-based regulation. This flexibility brings 
additional challenges to the task of regulation and to regulatory theorists 
attempting to apply their knowledge to this environment. At the centre of 
online regulatory theory are the debates between Lessig (1999) and his 
critics such as Murray (2006). As described in the section on regulating 
technology (page 30 et seq), Lessig was the first to deliver a book-length 
application of regulatory theory to the online environment. Today most 
regulatory theorists agree that his theories are showing serious logical flaws.  
Regulation has, on several occasions, as the case studies in this work have 
shown, led to a regulatory over-reaction when dealing with disruptive 
technology. As explained in the outset of this work the concept of 
regulatory over-reaction is the measure of whether a technology has been 
regulated or overregulated. Whether a technology is adequately regulated, or 
not, will depend upon the democratic effects of the regulation. If the 
implemented regulation tends to not only regulate undesirable behaviour 
but regularly criminalises or frustrates many types of legitimate behaviour, 
causes a negative democratic effect, then the situation is one of 
overregulation.  
The specific contribution of this thesis is the development of an expanded 
understanding of the way in which we regulate disruptive technology. This 
understanding helps us to better regulate that which is new and which 
threatens that which is established. The results of such a study can then be 
applied to all domains where regulation of disruptive technology may occur. 
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The Murray approach to the regulation of Internet-based activity provides a 
lens with which we can study this type of regulation. His approach should 
be understood as an application of adapted structuration theory (DeSanctis 
& Poole 1994, Giddens 1984, Orlikowski 2000, Orlikowski & Robey 1991) 
with its interest in the interaction between actors, structures and technology. 
The case studies conducted within the framework of this work take as their 
theoretical starting point the regulatory model expounded above. They show 
the complexity of the regulation of Internet-based activities and the 
interaction between the regulatory structures and the actors that it attempts 
to regulate.  
The Cases 
The six case studies presented in this work have investigated different, but 
interconnected, contemporary phenomena. The use of the multiple case 
studies has enabled the study of these seemingly different but 
interconnected phenomena. The common ground between these cases is 
their ability to illustrate and bring forward the way in which disruptive 
technology is regulated within the IT-based participatory democracy and the 
effects of such regulation on the latter.  
 Regulator Effect on Actor Democratic Effect 
Participation Hierarchical  Unable to fully participate Loss of opposing voice 
Communication Hierarchical 
Design 
Limited forms of 
communication 
Loss of alternate 
communications forms 
Integrity Design 
Competition  
Diminished incentive to 
participate since actor must 
protect herself 
Uncertainty & insecurity 
among participants 
Property Design 
Hierarchical 
Diminished incentive to 
participate due to property 
“loss” 
Uncertainty among 
participants  
Access Design 
Community  
Excluded from access to 
infrastructure 
Rule of incumbent  
Autonomy Design 
Hierarchical 
Community 
Non-autonomous actor Loss of opposition & 
Incumbent rule 
Table 7: Democratic Core Value, Regulatory Modality and Effects 
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Table 7 provides an overview of the cases with a focus on the regulatory 
elements based upon the Lessigian (1999) modalities of regulation: 
architecture, law, markets and norms. These have been further developed by 
Murray and Scott (2001) and in Murray (2006) to the more adequate terms 
design-based control, hierarchical control, competition-based control and community-
based control.42 In these studies the regulator is to be understood in the 
broadest terms, as Fuller (1964) described i.e. regulation is every force or 
external controls exerted upon those to be regulated. The regulatory 
modalities need little further elucidation beyond the Lessig-Murray 
discussion,43 but a brief overview may assist the reader at this stage. Design-
based control refers to software, hierarchical control refers to the actions of 
legislation and courts, competition-based control refers to solutions which arise 
when actors rise to meet consumer demand and community-based control refer 
to the social rules which arise in different contexts some of which are 
codified in written form. 
The first case entitled Participation (online civil disobedience, Chapter 4) 
studied the way in which participation in civil disobedience was being 
conducted in online environments. The disruptive effects discussed here are 
the use of Internet-based technologies for the purpose of civil disobedience 
practices. The results show a definite lack of “space” in which acts of civil 
disobedience can occur. This lack of “space” leads to a discrimination of 
ICT as a medium of communication in the form of civil disobedience. This 
in turn leads to a lessening of the use of ICT for democratic participation.  
The case refers to both the conflicts between regulatory structures and the 
actors’ activities and the internal conflicts between the actors. As the case 
shows, the present trend in regulation by states is the move towards the 
criminalisation of all activities that these specific actors consider to be 
legitimate forms of civil disobedience. The main democratic issue at stake 
here is the concept of participation that is being severely threatened through 
hierarchically based regulation and the re-interpretation of essentially 
nuisance acts into acts of terrorism (CDT & EFF 2003, Akdeniz 2005).  
What makes up the regulatory structures of the environment in this case is 
the right to define the actions of the actors. While the actors argue for their 
actions in terms of civil disobedience and the right to protest, the regulatory 
structure uses its right of interpretation to define the actions as criminal, 
                                                           
42 For more on this see section Regulating Technology page 30 et seq. 
43 Ibid. 
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bordering on terrorism. The effects of such interpretative control are to 
remove the effective right to communicate by ensuring that there is no place 
within Internet-based communication for such activities.  
Such a reaction to the acceptability of civil disobedience creates an uneven 
level between what is permissible online compared to what is permissible 
offline. With the application of the concept of functional equivalency, as 
described in the section Theoretical Focus (page 38 et seq), it becomes apparent 
that online communication is not being treated in a manner equivalent to 
the regulatory structure that is applied to offline communication. The lack 
of tolerance towards online protest forms seriously hampers the 
development of democratic interaction in the online environment. This is 
made possible, to a large extent, by the lack of public space when dealing 
with online environments. The offline world contains many traditionally 
acceptable public spaces where communication may take place in a more-or-
less unhampered manner. However since online communication is wholly 
dependent upon contractual relations (for example between the user and the 
ISP) the common street corners can easily be regulated and therefore the 
ability to participate in social interaction without fear of reprisal is limited in 
comparison to offline interaction.  
The use of hierarchical controls as regulation leads to the prohibition of all 
forms of online disobedience irrespective of motives, costs and possible 
damages. Such a blanket prohibition has the effect of making online 
disobedience impossible and as such, removes the technical realm beyond 
the means of the would-be technical disobedient. These actions create a 
discrimination against the online behaviour in so much as behaviour, which 
would be socially acceptable offline, becomes impossible online. This 
creates a diminished ability to use technology to criticise incumbent power 
and therefore it leads to the lessening of the democratic potential of the 
Internet. 
The second case entitled Communication (viruses, Chapter 5) in some ways 
follows in the footsteps of the previous case in that it explores a 
phenomenon that tends to be generally condemned. The purpose of this 
study is to explore the role of structural regulation vis-à-vis computer 
viruses. The general regulatory trend is to criminalise the computer virus in 
all forms despite the lack of an adequate definition of the concept. By 
criminalising and providing harsh penalties for those who create or spread 
computer viruses the regulatory structure intends to create a better online 
environment for the users. Since the concept of the computer virus is a 
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relatively unexplored area such legislation carries with it negative side effects 
on the right to communicate.  
The validity of this paternalistic (Lessig 1999, Murray 2006) approach of 
general criminalisation without paying attention to the possible positive uses 
of virus-like software is questioned in this case. This therefore decreases the 
level of freedom of expression within the online environment as the 
regulatory structures have demanded that no positive communication can 
come in the form of virus-like software. The case study shows that there are 
a number of non-harmful uses for virus-like software and that the regulatory 
structures threaten to make these uses into criminal acts and therefore 
seriously hampering the communication rights of those involved in such 
activities.  
By presenting legitimate uses of computer viruses the case shows that the 
blanket criminalization of viruses negatively affects the freedom of 
communication for those actors who are involved in the making of 
legitimate viruses. Such regulation therefore prevents users from using the 
equipment in their possession and thus constitutes a limitation of the 
freedom to act.  
Even in this case a large part of the regulatory structure is concerned with 
the interpretation of a term or metaphor. This interpretation carries with it 
serious consequences for the IT-based participatory democracy and yet it is 
not seen as a democratic question but rather as a technical question. By 
referring to the discussion as a technical rather than a democratic one the 
larger popular debate is avoided (Beck 1992, Giddens 1990, Kallinikos 
2005). Despite attempts to regulate the virus, it remains badly defined and 
subject to the interpretation of the regulator. This creates an uncertain 
situation for users hoping to use harmless or helpful viruses. Once again 
what is created is an imbalance between the freedoms that exist in the online 
and offline worlds were the online world is being discriminated against. This 
discrimination is subsequently being enforced by the uneasy dependence the 
user has upon the service provider. Using a functional equivalency approach 
to analyze the situation with computer viruses, we see that the regulatory 
structure overreaches itself by attempting to regulate software instead of 
attempting to regulate harmful behaviour carried out with the aid of 
software.  
The regulatory modalities of communication are the hierarchical control 
mechanisms that, in many jurisdictions, act as a blanket prohibition against 
viruses irrespective of their potential damage or political content. In 
addition to this there is a secondary regulation through design-based controls 
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and competition-based controls in that the software intended to prevent 
harmful viruses from damaging computer equipment does not attempt to 
discriminate between harmful or harmless viruses. The effect of the 
regulation of viruses through the hierarchical controls and design-based controls 
is a limitation of the modes of communication for the actor. This in turn 
may create less communication within the participatory democracy. This 
lessening of communication is particularly important since it entails the loss 
of alternative forms of communication, which therefore means that 
permissible communication within a participatory democracy becomes more 
uniform, which lessens the possibility of innovation as innovation comes 
not from conventional usage but from exploring unconventional sources 
(von Hippel 2005). Additionally the area of online communication is 
therefore discriminated against through the structures preference of the 
offline forms of communication.  
The third case entitled Integrity (spyware, Chapter 6) begins the study of the 
relationship between the users and their equipment. The ability to 
participate in a democracy by using technology requires that the users can 
trust the technological infrastructure upon which they depend (Klang 2001, 
Awad & Fitzgerald 2005). It is important to note that even though we are 
part of a technological society (Balkin 1998, Castells 1996, Mitchell 1996, 
Negroponte 1996) this does not mean that the users in this society are able 
to understand how the technology works. Therefore the users are required 
to rely upon technical experts that provide their technology and the 
regulators that provide the environment within which they move. Spyware, 
and indeed every form of covert surveillance, threaten the actors’ integrity 
and through this, actors’ ability to freely participate in the participatory 
democracy without fear of being observed.  
The conflict demonstrated in the integrity case represents the conflict that 
occurs when user trust in technology is compromised by a new threat 
created by a disruptive technology. The technology in this case is such that it 
compromises the infrastructural trust (Klang 2001, Awad & Fitzgerald 2005) 
upon which communication within the IT-based participatory democracy 
depends. The conflict arises from the interpretation of the software 
involved. While actors who dislike the effects of spyware attempt to discuss 
the phenomenon in relation to privacy regulation, found in human rights 
documents. The regulatory structures find it difficult to apply the more 
abstract privacy terminology and arguments found in human rights 
documents and national legislation and are more comfortable with applying 
contract law. This choice of the structural regulation favours the 
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manufacturers and operators of spyware and therefore leaves concerned 
actors without adequate protection.  
This creates a surveillance society where the user internalises the surveillance 
(Foucault 1979) and controls her own actions. This restricts the freedom of 
action within the online environment, as the actor is never aware of the 
privacy of her actions. In an attempt to counteract what the actors perceive 
as the failure of the regulatory structure to protect privacy values a 
competition-based solution has arisen. This solution takes the form of both 
software and social solutions. The software consists of programs that 
counteract spyware by removing the threatening software from the system. 
The social solutions consist of online discussions aimed at determining 
whether a piece of software should be understood to be spyware.   
These competition-based solutions provide an example of actor-driven 
regulation that arises when the regulatory structures controlled by the state 
fail to provide the actors with the protection they perceive to need. The 
development of actor-controlled regulation is based upon technological 
solutions, as opposed to the political regulation of the state, since these are 
the tools that are at the actor’s disposal. The efficiency of software tools as a 
form of regulation is due to the malleability of the software environment. By 
installing technological means at each computer regulation of a kind can be 
achieved.  
The case also illustrates an important aspect of the surveillance theory that 
claims that individuals under surveillance will adapt their behaviour to 
reflect the fact that they are potentially being watched (Foucault 1979). The 
development here is that most of the users under surveillance are unaware 
of it and therefore do not change their behaviour.  
The modalities of regulation observed in this study are competition-based and 
design-based control. The importance of competition as a regulatory modality 
arises from the weakness or inefficiency of other forms of regulation. The 
perceived need of users for integrity protecting mechanisms have created a 
wide market for these products, which now appear both as stand alone 
software and are being incorporated in larger software packages such as 
operating systems or anti-virus software. This competition-based regulation is 
however inefficient without the additional modality of design-based control. 
Here the software-based threats of software are counteracted by the 
software-based solutions of anti-spyware software. Through this consumer 
demand the regulation of spyware is affected by the wider implementation 
of anti-spyware software that changes the conditions for the producers of 
these products. The lack of concern with integrity issues from the part of 
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the more established regulators leads to this need for individuals to protect 
themselves that in turn makes open participation more arduous. This in turn 
decreases the incentive and interest to participate in online activities. The 
uncertainty surrounding integrity protection is a serious concern for online 
participation in democracy since anything, which negatively affects the will 
to participate within the democratic public sphere directly, affects the 
democracy.  
The fourth case entitled Property (MMORPG, Chapter 7) studies the 
importance of property in a democracy. Without the ability to be assured 
that an individual’s property is adequately protected there will be a low level 
of trust and interaction. This study looks at the role of the users’ 
perceptions of property in online environments. This study takes its starting 
point from the growing phenomenon of large-scale online role-playing 
games, the so-called MMORPG. The growth and popularity of these online 
environments are responsible for bringing into focus specific online/offline 
relationships. The ability to interact with others in online environments has 
challenged many of the assumptions we hold about our social dealings with 
others. The purpose of this case study was to describe the early process of a 
social re-evaluation of assumptions created in the offline world.  
The case deals with the creation of property and value in the virtual 
environment. At first glance, applying traditional tools, assigning property 
rights to that which is created within virtual environments is perfectly 
straightforward. Since the virtual environment is a created world each aspect 
of it is the basis of human decision. There is no real natural evolution. 
Therefore the basic control and design of the virtual environment rests 
firmly in the hands of those who create or permit others to use the 
environment.  
From the point of view of those who create and provide the online 
environment the permissions and rights of the users are regulated by the 
contractual obligations that exist between the users and the controllers. In 
this way the controller takes the role of the structural regulator. This 
position is reinforced by (1) the physical control of the virtual environment, 
(2) actor access to it and (3) supported by the legal system in the offline 
world. However, those being regulated are questioning this straightforward 
position. Actors within MMORPG are claiming that the time and effort 
applied in the virtual environment grants them property rights in the fruits 
of their labour. They argue that the control of the environment does not 
grant the regulator the automatic right to that which is created within the 
environment.  
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The economic and philosophical importance of this debate should not be 
underestimated because what is happening does not occur in the “real” 
world. The economic value created within a virtual environment is akin to 
the economic value created on a stock exchange, both are intangible values 
created by speculation. There have been several studies carried out in the 
economics of virtual environments (Castronova 2001, 2003) and some 
speculative investments within online environments have become news in 
the offline environment. One such example is the purchase of an island 
within an online virtual environment. The island was purchased for $26 500 
as an investment for the purpose of property development (Krotoski 2005). 
Beyond the economics of this phenomenon the question of property in 
virtual environments has wider implications for online interaction.  
The question concerns the right to create and enforce rules in relation to 
those who are affected by the rules created. At present the rule making and 
enforcing processes favour the status quo, which in this case is the creator 
and/or maintainer of the virtual environment. The question arising from 
this autocratic approach is what degree of freedom could the users of the 
environment obtain. If we take our starting point from the users there is 
evidence that they are dissatisfied with some aspects of the autocratic 
approach.  
Whereas there are few who would argue that there are no grounds for the 
maintainers right to control her property, the question is one of the level of 
this control when a conflict of interest between the controller and the user 
occurs. At this stage the controller points to the contractual relationship that 
creates the users rights to enter the environment. This relationship takes the 
appearance of a social contract (Gauthier 1986) and many similar arguments 
for and against the social contract can be seen mirrored in the discussions 
between the controller and the users. One point stands out more clearly 
than others.  While there is a right for the controller to maintain and control 
her property, if the property is used for social interaction an argument based 
upon the concept of participatory democracy can be made in the relation to 
the rules and regulations which affect the participants (Pateman 1970). The 
fact that the users were required to enter into a contractual relationship 
prior to joining the virtual environment does not prohibit them from 
attempting to re-negotiate the terms of the original agreement.  
This re-negotiation is one-sided since there is no arena for negotiation 
where the controllers and users meet and freely interact. At the same time 
interaction within the environment among peers creates social rules and 
accepted common practices. This behaviour also additionally reinforces the 
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acceptability of these practices (Pargman 2000). The rules created within the 
virtual environments, among the users are strong since they are internalised 
by the users. When these rules come into conflict with the controller’s 
regulations the users tend to feel morally less obliged to follow the 
controller’s rules and attempt to circumvent the controller’s rules. This 
therefore creates a situation of re-negotiation. The controller must either 
attempt to more stringently enforce the rules and take the costs of such 
enforcement or attempt to meet the desires of the users.  
This case has shown the movement within virtual online environment that 
are causing a re-interpretation of the understanding of virtual property. This 
re-interpretation causes those involved to use a mixture of technical 
measures and philosophical arguments in an attempt to establish and prove 
their standpoints. The traditional legal infrastructure is occasionally used to 
reinforce a position, however this is not done on a large scale. In this case 
study we can see that a core social value is being re-evaluated and re-
interpreted to suit a new environment and that this discussion is taking place 
outside the traditional channels for such development. It is also interesting 
to note that the groups conducting this process are to a large degree those 
who are most affected by the regulation of property. The re-negotiations 
being carried out by these groups are then being brought into the more 
mainstream process of social understanding or creation of the term (or 
value) of property.  
In the property case the modalities of regulation are hierarchical control and 
design-based control. Attempting to redefine the manner in which property is 
understood is complex and demands a re-appraisal of the traditional 
understanding of property. Without this the result is that legal regulation 
protects the status quo. This regulation is enhanced by the control elements 
inherent in the virtual environment and these are the ability to exclude users 
or items that have not been created or transferred in accordance with the 
platform owner’s regulation. Therefore regulation by design-based control is a 
powerful tool in online environments. The result is a disincentive to interact 
within online virtual environments and a lack of ability to actively control 
individual property rights. The lack of certainty in this area therefore is a 
disincentive that negatively impacts democratic participation in online 
environments.  
The fifth case entitled Access (software, Chapter 8) deals with the conflicts 
arising from two different forms of production ideologies (commercial and 
non-commercial software production ideologies) and the ways in which 
these ideologies are embraced or rejected by public authorities. Instead of 
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relegating the discussion of software standards to a technical realm this 
study explores democratic roles inherent in the choices involved in software 
standards and their relevance to democratic participation. The choices of 
government bodies to implement a software standard carry with them 
democratic implications. This is particularly true if such choices have the 
effect of granting exclusive rights to proprietary software standards. The 
question of whether to adopt certain types of proprietary software standards 
and software packages therefore are more than technical decisions – they are 
decisions that directly effect the freedom to communicate and therefore play 
an important role in democratic participation. 
The question of concern is the manner in which communication between 
the regulatory structure and the actor can be conducted. In this case study, 
the regulatory structure is represented by the technical standards and policy 
decisions adopted by state organisations. There technical choices have a 
direct effect upon the way in which the actors, represented by the clients of 
the organisations, communicate with the state.  
In addition to creating barriers to free communication the choice of 
proprietary standards by government also creates the situation where the 
state actively becomes the advocate for a specific companies products and 
therefore disadvantages those citizens who wish to participate, but wish to 
use alternative products in their participation in the democratic process. In 
cases where the technology controller is a private organisation the actor or 
customer has a choice to refuse to communicate, however in the case of the 
state few actors are able to makes such a choice.  
Within the case study on access the regulatory modalities are community-
based and design-based controls. The community-based controls take the form of 
buyer habit and policy, which create a barrier to the acceptance of 
alternatives to commercially produced software. The design-based controls 
regulators function by the use of proprietary standards. Since the software 
need not be compatible with each other commercial producers can create 
path dependencies and lock-in effects (David 2000, Hanseth et al 1996) to 
limit the use of alternative software packages either as complements or as 
replacements to existing software. The regulation in this manner has serious 
implications within a participatory democracy since the participants are 
unable to participate in the manner of their own choosing but must do so in 
limited forms. In addition to this the limitation of forms of interaction also 
lead to a reduction of innovative experimentation (von Hippel 2005). The 
result becomes the non-questioning acceptance of the incumbent’s position 
and role within the democracy.  
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The sixth case entitled Autonomy (censorship, Chapter 9) deals with the 
control of online information and the effects of such control on actor 
autonomy and democratic participation. On the one side we see the actions 
of states attempting to maintain control over the Internet-based 
communications by employing a wide range of technical and social means. 
This structural regulation is intended to control the information access and 
dissemination of the actors within their control. These are usually defined by 
the physical borders of the real-world jurisdictions. The limitations imposed 
on the actors’ freedom to communicate lead the actors to take counter 
measures to ensure that they maintain the ability to communicate.  
This case presents censorship measures employed by the regulatory 
structures and views them in accordance to censorship theory. In addition 
to this the case also studies the methods with which the actors attempt to 
circumvent the limitations placed on their communication by employing 
counter-censorship technologies. While the foundation of the forms of 
censorship and counter-censorship are based in technological measures, this 
case also shows that social control plays a large part in the way in which 
information is controlled. This case presents an example of the difficulties 
with regulating disruptive technologies in that the attempts to regulate are 
often circumvented by implementing more technology. This amounts to a 
technological regulatory arms race between those involved where the 
regulatory structure is constantly involved in implementing more technology 
to ensure that the regulatory structure is not eroded by those who wish to 
evade it.  
The regulatory modalities seen in this case are community-based, design-based 
and hierarchical control. The use of software to control the amount of 
information that is available to groups of users is a widespread practice 
(Deibert & Villeneuve 2005). This is in turn compounded by the threat of 
traditional legal force exercised against those who make information 
available to others. These two modalities are powerful regulators when used 
in combination in this manner however the regulation is made all the more 
extreme with the use of community-based controls. As the use of the Chinese 
Public Pledge example illustrates, companies eager to enter into the Chinese 
Internet market actively ensure the implementation of community-based 
controls as described in the document. Corporate limitation of online 
information includes any and all information that the other regulatory 
modalities may or may not include in their regulation. Therefore by 
including a private regulatory actor and giving guidelines the Chinese state 
has enabled the regulation of online behaviour to a much harsher degree 
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and at a much cheaper cost than possible with the modalities of design-based 
and hierarchical control.  
Since all online communication depends upon relationships with 
corporations the potential regulatory power of these institutions must not 
be underestimated. The loss of the ability to find online information is 
devastating to the autonomy of the individual since it becomes impossible 
for her to be able to make autonomous decisions without access to the 
facts. The effects on participatory democracy are, if this process goes too 
far, the negation of democracy since without the information necessary 
autonomous decisions cannot be made and without autonomous decisions 
by individuals being made there cannot be a rule by the people and 
therefore no democracy.  
Understanding Disruptive Technology 
This work began with a simple definition of technology as both the 
purposeful activity and results of the transformation or manipulation of 
natural resources and environments in order to satisfy human needs or goals 
(Kroes 1998). To this we can add the words of Hughes (2004, p 1): 
Technology is messy and complex. It is difficult to define and to understand. In 
its variety, it is full of contradictions, laden with human folly, saved by occasional 
benign deeds, rich with unintended consequences. Yet today most people in the 
industrialized world reduce technology’s complexity, ignore its contradictions, 
and see it as little more than gadgets and as a handmaiden of commercial 
capitalism and the military.  
Hughes not only views technology as complex but he brings the additional 
idea that it is often simplified or purposefully misunderstood. This 
simplification is important since it obfuscates our understanding of 
technology by demanding that technology either be simple so that everyone 
can understand it or else it is too complex and must be left to the experts 
(Beck 1992). While a technological result may seem complex most 
technologies develop through incremental steps (Kallinikos 2002). These 
steps are less innovative than they at first may seem since they need to 
encompass requirements such as technological compatibility and 
interoperability (Hanseth 2000, Hughes 1987, Kallinikos 2002, Kling 1992).  
Despite these incremental steps and the need for technology to be able to 
interact with earlier technology the concept of disruptive technology has 
been recognised. The concept of disruptive technology within this work has 
taken as its starting point the conceptual and terminological developments 
carried out primarily by Lyytinen and Rose (2003a, 2003b). 
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Amongst their criteria for disruptive technology (Lyytinen and Rose 2003a, 
2003b), which they have based upon the analysis of several studies, we find, 
firstly radical changes in technical performance “pushed” by developers (as 
opposed to “pulled” by user demand) followed by rapidly increasing 
adoption and finally the overwhelming of metaphors. This latter element is 
consistent with the idea of the metaphor as a conceptual construction 
(Lakoff & Johnson 1980) in that they form our understanding of the 
technology around us. The cumulative social and organisational effect of 
these criteria have been described by Lyytinen and Rose (2003a & 2003b) as 
an earthquake. 
The disruptive technology described by Lyytinen and Rose (2003a & 2003b) 
is focused on the development and innovation of technology even if the 
effects are described in their earthquake metaphor. The result is a 
description of disruptive technology which functions within the confines of 
organisational theory but is less exact when attempting to apply beyond the 
confines of the organisational setting.  
The studies presented within this work have all been carried out beyond the 
confines of the organisation. From these settings certain adaptations need to 
be made to our understanding of disruptive technology in order to better 
understand its nature.  
Radical Technological Change: Lyytinen and Rose write that disruptive 
technology requires the rapid development of new technology. When 
studying this claim in this work we notice that this is both true and false. On 
a general level the interconnectedness of information systems is not a new 
phenomenon. What is new is the scale and variety of participation and 
participants. In each of the different studies presented in this work the 
problem stems not wholly from the use of innovative technology but rather 
from the innovative use of technology (e.g. cases property/MMORPG, 
access/software).  
Rapidly increasing adoption: As the studies in this work have shown rapidly 
increasing adoption is not a necessary requirement for a disruptive 
technology. On the one hand mass-adoption of new technology amounts to 
a disruptive technology since it is noticeable, but a less widely adopted 
technology can also be seen as being disruptive (e.g. cases 
participation/disobedience, communication/virus). The innovation lays not so much 
in the technology but rather in its adoption. This can be either the sheer 
scale of users or the innovative use of technology that makes the 
technological interaction radically different from the past. 
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Overwhelming of metaphors: The final stage is the triumph of new mental 
models over their predecessors. This final stage is problematic not only 
because such a process is difficult to measure outside the organisational 
boundary but also because it also requires there to be a grand or superior 
metaphor to overwhelm. In particular beyond the organisational barrier it is 
difficult to find such grand metaphors (Lakoff 2004).    
To Lyytinen and Rose (2003a, 2003b) the effect of disruptive technology is 
the unstoppable earthquake. The idea being similar to Christensen’s (1997) 
that not acknowledging, or fighting, technological innovation will inevitably 
lead to the downfall of the organisation. If this is seen at the level of state 
regulation (e.g. case autonomy/censorship) this conclusion is not necessarily 
true. The negative effects of preventing or regulating disruptive technology 
cannot be conclusively proven. But, as argued here, from the perspective of 
autonomy striving against disruptive technology by attempting to regulate it 
counteracts the autonomy of the individual and through this negatively 
affects the democratic participation. 
Disruptive Technology Regulation 
Pateman (1970) expounds the goal of participatory democratic theory as the 
attempt to include the maximum participation from the public. This 
participation is not limited to policies (decisions) but also the development 
of the social and political capacities of the individuals involved in the 
process. Participatory democratic theory takes its starting point from two 
important assumptions. Firstly, that people are capable of understanding, 
expressing, and finding solutions for their problems. Secondly, effective 
solutions require the participation of the people who will be affected by 
them, without necessarily being dependent on authorities and experts 
(Oppenheimer 1971, Giddens 1990, Beck 1992).  
Changes in the technological infrastructure, the cultural environment and 
the regulatory system are constantly with us. The whole concept of social 
evolution and progress is the measurement of these types of changes 
(Latour 1991). Society should therefore have learnt to accept, or even 
welcome, change. Unfortunately this is rarely so. Change is rarely welcomed 
since it creates a level of uncertainty for those involved and uncertainty is 
not an aspect society welcomes. Despite the social resistance to change 
society has long dealt with major and minor changes in technology, society 
and regulation without the need for further deliberation on the manner in 
which this change should be accepted and incorporated into the social 
infrastructure.  
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The alternative environments, such as the Internet, have the advantage that 
they offer their inhabitants (for the want of a better word) the possibility to 
interact in ways that are not limited by the traditional social structures 
existing within, and enforced by, the nation state. The creation and 
regulation of a society is often explained in grand theoretical terms. To the 
unsuspecting reader it may seem that the designers and maintainers of the 
social order have a theoretical framework to which they apply their methods 
and actions.  
In the world of engineering and project management there are definitely 
both theories espoused and methodological approaches praised. However, 
in this realm researchers have become more aware of the actual process of 
creation and management. It does not follow the lofty processes of theory 
and design but rather tends to be a constant process of tinkering, amending 
and short term fixes. This involves the re-combination of individual 
application elements into new arrangements, a process of “bricolage” 
(Ciborra 1992) leading to the invention of new applications riding the 
existing infrastructure. Engineers have also been required to understand the 
difference between espoused theories and what actually takes place (Argyris 
& Schön 1974). Within social design the complexity of the problem allows 
for too many variables and the success or failure of a project is hard to 
predict or explain. The same is often true of technical design but there is an 
easier unit of measurement in the actual concept of failure. If the finished 
product does not meet its design specifications there is a strong supposition 
that something has gone wrong. This connection between design and 
finished product is not easily made in social design. The realisation to be 
faced is that the regulator must grow accustomed to having less control over 
a complex reality.  
Internet technology allows, to a much greater degree, attempts to practically 
implement abstract ideas (e.g. Participation, Communication, Integrity, Access and 
Autonomy) related to democracy. By making such a thing technically possible, 
this thesis shows that, the focus of regulatory discussion turns to whether 
the practical implementation of these abstract ideas is a desirable thing. Such 
abstract philosophical ideas pre-date Internet-based technology and have to 
a large degree never needed to be implemented since it was impossible or 
impracticable. Therefore the technological changes are presently challenging 
our grand theories of democracy – through empirical study. The removal of 
the technological limitations therefore is bringing a re-examination of the 
democratic values. This thesis has observed the role of the regulator. While 
it cannot be said that the regulator (in this work) is following a pre-defined 
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plan, the analysis of actions provided in this work seem to show that 
generally the regulator prefers to enforce the status quo and maintaining 
control as opposed to establishing democratic ideals in practice.   
To be able to understand social change, even such change as brought about 
by technology, it is not enough to study technology. Therefore this 
investigation has looked at the regulation of technology. Regulation has 
been chosen as a focus since it has a long established tradition of being an 
agent of social control and change. In addition to this, regulation provides 
the researcher with an abundance of empirical evidence to be examined.  
It is also important to recognize a criticism directed towards the reliance of 
design-based control. Brownsword (2005) writes about the “regulatory pitch”, 
which could be understood as the legitimacy offered by the regulator for the 
regulatory acts. Hierarchical regulation requires a larger degree of 
transparency and accountability between the regulator and the regulated 
while design-based regulation requires less transparency and accountability 
(Brownsword 2005).  
The bottom line, however, should not be blurred: a fully techno-regulated 
community is no longer an operative moral community. (Brownsword 2005, p 
19).  
The question Brownsword raises is an important one. When we lose the 
possibility to do the wrong thing and are only capable of doing the right 
thing we also lose our ability to make meaningful moral choices and 
therefore no longer act in a moral way – even if we do no wrong. This 
important issue deserves a more serious consideration than is possible in 
this work.  
The main forms of regulation carried out in cases 1 (Participation) and 2 
(Communication) were mainly traditional forms of command and control44 the 
results of such traditional forms of regulation have been blanket 
prohibitions which are over-inclusive and therefore also prohibit legitimate, 
non-harmful activities. This therefore causes limitations in the participatory 
democracy as legitimate forms of participation and communication are 
frustrated by regulations. The main forms of regulation carried out in cases 
3 (Integrity), 4 (Property) and 5 (Access) are exhibited in the preference to 
protect traditional values. This lack of regulatory adaptability leads to a 
growth of actor dissatisfaction with the regulatory structures. Such 
dissatisfaction can even take the form of direct action to circumvent or 
                                                           
44 Section entitled Regulation page 26 et seq.  
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evade regulations. The final case (Autonomy) shows the regulatory activities 
of command and control backed up by design-based and community-based 
controls. This potent mixture of regulation is efficient and yet there is 
evidence of user dissatisfaction with the regulatory regime. Again the 
dissatisfaction shows itself in the collaboration of actors in attempts to 
circumvent regulation.  
The cases in this study show the interaction between technology and 
regulation. What emerges from these studies is the concept of competition 
of regulative forces. This competition shows the disruptive force of 
technology upon established social norms and agreements. Technology is 
not only a passive artefact but plays an important role in enabling and 
regulating the users of technology and in this way traditional forms of 
regulation are facing competition.  
The problem at hand is therefore our ability to deal with social dilemmas 
brought about by technology. This work has attempted to demystify the 
structures of both society and technology. This process of demystification 
takes place by observing that social control is a Foucauldian (1980) power 
struggle and that technology is not something we can chose to accept or 
not. We exist in a technological state.  
Regulation also carries with it costs, both open and hidden, and 
consequences both intended and unintended. The fact that something can 
be regulated is not enough. For a regulation to be successful i.e. its 
implementation should manage to fulfil the desired goal at a minimum of 
cost and unintended consequences it must take into consideration the 
behaviour and desires of those affected by the legislation. Therefore to be 
able to legislate efficiently requires a cognitive ability to be able to 
understand the effects of a decision on the lives of those it affects. 
Regulating disruptive technology deals with the attempt to share a common 
space, and use it for different purposes – this demands regulation. That 
which is regulated is the different needs of the technology users. Actors 
proceed to use the technology in a manner that provides added value, in 
some way, to their lives. This may not always be in accordance with the 
ideals or goals of the regulatory structure. This conflict involves the 
interplay of many levels of rules, values, technology and social norms.  
The attempts at regulation do not always lead to the desired effects and in 
many cases the regulation itself becomes part of a new, unintended problem. 
Occasionally the problem caused by the solution can be more harmful than 
the initial problem.  
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This work exemplifies ways in which regulatory structures are attempting to 
deal with the problems they face by new technology. While declaring the 
technology to be a democratic asset in that it facilitates social interaction, 
few regulatory structures are comfortable with implementing a democratic 
participatory approach to communication with the actors. This approach is 
however not particularly cost efficient since actors tend to work together to 
find forms of circumvention in relation to structural regulation that prevents 
their interests. The result is that the regulator must improve its regulatory 
forms so as to solicit the agreement of those regulated. Such an approach 
will reduce the costs of enforcing regulation. This approach, however, 
entails a negotiation between the regulatory structure and the actors and 
may also have the effect that those representing regulation must also 
compromise their power.  
The recognition of the need to share power is not an easy one to accept. 
However, by proceeding to attempt to enclose the citizens of a state by 
invoking geographical borders is becoming less cost effective and nor is this 
approach in line with the needs and wants of the users involved in the 
system. It is therefore time to move ahead and to attempt to base the 
legislation and control closer to the needs of the users who will be affected 
by the regulation. This entails the revitalisation of the concept of the social 
contract based upon the Rawlsian (1999) visions of setting basic rules upon 
which groups of users can agree. This has seemed to be an all too utopian a 
vision to turn into a practical reality in the diversity of the nation state. 
However, creating legislation based upon the needs of those who will be 
primarily affected by the legislation is not impossible. 
The process of legislation and control must, in a much greater part, involve 
the needs of the users. The users are at the centre of most other design 
processes since it is the users who will eventually become those who are 
involved to the largest extent in the acceptance of the finished product. This 
is an issue which regulatory structures have long managed to avoid and in 
the place of the user it has implemented a system of representatives. Their 
role has been to act in the interests of the users. Unfortunately this system is 
not adequate in a diverse a world and therefore the representatives become 
an elite whose main goal is to preserve and consolidate power instead of 
presenting solutions for the users.  
The technological infrastructure today has enabled the creation of a-national 
places, or places where nationality is questionable, and the carrying out of 
discussions outside the control of the traditional boundaries of the nation 
state. With this system the number of social discourses available to the 
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individual has increased exponentially. These developments create a 
situation where the individual is able to better choose the discourse of her 
choice and is no longer dependant upon traditional information sources.  
To achieve a greater level of adequate control to deal with the effects of 
disruptive technologies the regulation and enforcement must be based, to a 
much greater degree, on the needs and desires of the users. Therefore if we 
agree that the technology is unable to be limited by the national borders 
then any discussion on the control or legislation of that technology cannot 
be carried out on a suitable level if it remains within the national borders. 
To enhance the control of a technology, which has the ability to avoid 
legislative control from the nation state, this control must be based upon 
something other than the concept of the nation state as the lowest common 
denominator of a base of power.  
To be able to achieve this, the state must come to the realisation that it is no 
longer the adequate forum to discuss and regulate these technological 
questions. Neither is it enough to enter into discussions between states. The 
base of power must be better connected to those who are affected by the 
decisions and regulations of the power structure. Only in this way can we 
speak of a true democratic implementation of power.  
However there is an important issue that must be dealt with here and that is 
the insight that those taking part in the discussion must become aware of 
the way in which they are part of their own myths. To truly achieve the level 
of democratic control and organisation of disruptive technology the 
discussion must progress with the knowledge that nothing can be beyond 
discussion.  
Involving users in systems development has a long tradition (Asaro 2000, 
Ehn 1989) the method has a recognised effect of decreasing conflicts 
between those implementing the system and the end-user (Franz & Robey 
1984, Lyytinen 1987, Newman & Noble 1990). Involving the user has a 
societal equivalent in the proposals of equitable regulation proposed by 
Habermas (1984). Habermas suggests that to be acceptable regulation 
requires the participation, in the decision making process, of those social 
members affected by a decision.  
Habermas’ ideas are no strangers to IS theory (Lyytinen & Hirschheim 1988, 
Alvesson & Willmott 1992, Ngwenyama & Lee 1997). His work has been 
used to create theoretical models as well as more practical applications of his 
theories. The more theoretical work has been the interpretation of 
Habermas’ theories into conceptual framework for the understanding and 
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creation of information systems (Hirschheim & Klein 1989, Lyytinen & 
Klein 1985, Lyytinen & Hirschheim 1988) while the more practical 
application of Habermas theories in the study of communications richness 
(Ngwenyama & Lee 1997) or the use of communicative theory to construct 
a context aware electronic forum on the web (Heng & de Moor 2003). 
In his Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas’ (1984) presents a discourse 
ethics that assumes that the world is pluralist and consists of competing 
ideals and values where only a few are articulated publicly. Most have been 
silenced by institutional and language barriers. These unarticulated ideas 
cannot be protected and are therefore repressed. This represents an 
injustice. To attempt to correct this rules should never be contained in 
closed systems but should be in plain view under the review of society and 
not hidden behind representative bodies.  
The discussion of regulation must take place among the communities most 
affected by the discussions and the resulting regulatory changes. The 
combination of ICT and society is making reality more complex and we are 
becoming aware that there can be no universal, political experts (Giddens 
1990, Beck 1992) to whom society can defer the hard choices to. This role 
must, as some (Beck 1992, Fiorino 1990, O’Neil Lane 2005) have already 
argued, therefore be fulfilled by the users most affected by the technology 
and the changes in society it creates and not delegated to experts. It is 
important to understand that while the regulation of disruptive technology is 
a question concerning technology it is ultimately a question of democracy. 
This should be taken as a legitimising factor which grants the users rights 
over the decision making process in relation to their technology.    
The establishment of an IT-based participatory democracy demands 
fundamental features such as infrastructure and accessibility questions. 
These are often discussed and included in traditional plans and strategies for 
developing electronic government (eEurope 2000, eEurope 2002). In 
addition to this there is the need for a sustained investment in time and 
education in helping the user to adapt and use IT-based systems (Grönlund 
et al 2003, Ranerup 2001). The argument put forward in this thesis is that 
beyond these there are more aspects necessary to create a thriving IT-based 
participatory democracy. These are:  
1. The ability of the regulator to seriously adopt the functional equivalency approach to 
ensure that users of online interaction and communication are not discriminated 
against.  
2. The active participation of the users within the participatory democracy without 
deferring tough choices to experts. 
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3. The will of the regulator to accept user participation in the regulatory process.  
4. The tolerance of non-conventional uses of technology. 
Whether we like it or not, our technology is changing fundamental parts of 
our society. These changes create conflicts between the traditionally 
accepted social institutions and the way in which technology allows 
individuals to behave. Simple use of force to attempt to ensure the survival 
of traditionally accepted solutions is a short sighted, costly affair that cannot 
succeed. The technology of today requires that societies attempt to elicit the 
help and participation of the technology users to a much greater degree in 
the decision making process. The creation of new, or adaptation of 
outdated, socially acceptable institutions cannot be done by a political elite. 
This is true both on an organisational level and on a national level.  
When attempting to understand regulation it is important to attempt to 
understand the collective actions of individuals. Regulation itself is often the 
result of formalized processes and therefore to a higher degree reflects the 
structures within a social organisation. The actions and reactions of online 
actors are mainly conducted via the mediation of communications 
technology. This mediated communication has the effect that it is seldom 
possible to be “present” when communication is taking place to attempt to 
ascertain the physical context within which the communication is taking 
place. However this mediation has the positive effect that it remains 
available within a context. Both this availability and the context can 
favourably be studied to understand the motivations and goals of the actor.  
In this work the study is on the limitations faced by those who would use 
the Internet as an infrastructure for their forays into the IT-based 
participatory democracy. What are studied are the different attempts to 
regulate technology, which disrupts traditional forms of communication and 
interaction. This regulation may be carried out with noble and good 
intentions but has the negative effects of limiting the practical possibility of 
conducting communication and interaction in an ongoing IT-based 
participatory democracy. Through this limiting effect the online 
participatory democracy is discriminated against and its potential beneficial 
effects are lost. While many of the studies, which have been carried out in 
the field of IT democracy, have been concerned with the democratic effects 
of the implementation of technological systems. This work hopes to provide 
a starting point for continued work on the study of the unintended negative 
effects for democracy created by the regulation of technology. 
This thesis has shown that the regulation of technology is the regulation of 
democracy. Such a conclusion has its implications. The foremost of 
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implications is how this should affect the way in which we regulate 
technology. As this thesis has also shown we should not limit our 
understanding of the concept of regulation but we must broaden our minds 
and see regulation for the wide web of causes and effects that surround us, 
it is the structures that we create and maintain. It is the systems within 
which we interact with others.   
One important finding within this thesis is that the regulation of technology 
is the regulation of democracy. This finding is particularly relevant to the 
way in which we address the issue of regulation of technology within 
society. To a large degree the question of technology regulation is left to the 
domain of the experts. This is perhaps natural, as their competence is 
understood to be a fundamental requirement for entering into the 
discussion of technology. The negative effect of this is that the discussion is 
left to the realm of experts and the actors who will be affected by the choice 
and decisions of the experts are largely ignored. By focusing on the 
regulation of democracy this work hopes to show that the regulation of 
technology is not a discourse for and between experts but it is one where all 
citizens can and should be involved.  
Therefore this work has used traditional regulatory theory and its current 
applications to better understand the way in which regulation functions as a 
form of social interaction between the regulator and the regulated actor. 
This regulatory theory is placed within a wider concept of structuration 
theory, which attempts to bridge the concept of individuals as either acted 
upon (as elements within a structural context) or as autonomous agents. 
Applying this approach entails focusing on social practices ordered across 
space and time and adopting a balanced position, attempting to treat 
influences of structure (which inherently includes culture) and agency 
equally. 
Regulatory theory applied together with structuration theory entailed the 
study of the regulatory structures, the regulated actors and the interaction 
between them. To this end this thesis has chosen to view regulation in the 
widest sense of the term and to study online activities that affect actors, 
regulatory structures and the participatory democracy. Many studies on the 
IT democracy have shown the possibilities the technology has to offer. 
Additionally many studies problematise this area and show that technology 
on its own will not create a strong IT democracy. Supplying broadband to 
everyone does not create an IT society. The focus of most studies has been 
on the technological relationship between the user and the state. The results 
of these studies have often been to question the optimistic, and occasionally 
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unrealistic, political goals that have been inadequately funded, thought 
through or established with the end users (Grönlund et al 2003). This study 
attempts to look not at specific applied sites or IT systems intended for 
citizen-state communication but focuses on the technology in general usage 
and the regulation of the online public sphere.  
This research forms a part of the ongoing research into the role played by 
technology in the democratic public sphere while focusing on the regulation 
of such technology, in particular, to the side effects of that regulation. When 
dealing with technology there is a tendency to call in experts. The experts 
are trusted to resolve technical problems. This trust goes so far that often 
the experts need no longer explain what is happening and what the effects 
of their actions are. They are experts and therefore they are trusted.  
There is a different approach when an issue arises with democracy. Then 
everyone is expected to participate. The complexity of the social system is 
seldom an acceptable excuse for anyone not to participate in the democracy 
and nor should the lack of formal training be understood as a drawback 
when the democracy is discussed.  
Therefore when the two areas merge an interesting issue arises. Is it a 
question for the populous or is it a question for the experts? If society 
regulates technical problems or a democratic nature to the experts then the 
society will no longer be a democracy. Only if the society demands that the 
populous participates in the regulation of technology can the society remain 
a democracy. This is the implication of the realisation that the regulation of 
technology is the regulation of democracy.   
The main result of this study has been to show the implications of 
technology regulation upon the participatory democracy. Each of the six 
case studies serve to exemplify how the regulation of technology carries far 
reaching negative effects to the development and use of online 
communication for the participatory democracy. There are two results that 
are seen in all the case studies. The first is the lack of functional equivalency, 
which creates an unnecessary burden upon the technology. Stated basically 
this means that we demand that our online communications not only 
function on par with offline communications but we place much higher 
demands. The second is a general discrimination against the use of online 
communication. In part this is due to the functional equivalency argument 
but it is also a result in itself. All things being equal the choice of 
communication remains offline communication. Offline communication is 
given preferential treatment in relation to online communication. In 
addition to these general results the case studies show the implications of 
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regulating technology within specific areas. The effects range from 
disincentives to direct challenges to the use of information technology in 
areas concerning Participation, Communication, Integrity, Property, Access and 
Autonomy within a participatory democracy. 
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Conclusion 
Begin at the beginning and go on until you come to the end; then stop. 
Lewis Carroll 
 
Technology is making the practical implementation of theoretical 
democratic ideas practicable. This is stretching our current understanding of 
democracy in practice. As demonstrated in this thesis, the regulator is 
working to cope with these changes. The general conclusion of this thesis is 
that the level of Participation, Communication, Integrity, Property, Access and 
Autonomy are negatively affected by the implementation of regulation of 
technology. This negative effect is judged by the disincentive for the use of 
technology in the participatory democracy.  
As this work has shown, attempts to regulate disruptive technology are 
tantamount to attempting to standardise the forms in which the disruptive 
technology can be used. This can be seen as a form of limitation of the non-
conformist, and maybe innovative, uses that technology are put to by 
groups using the technology.  
Our technological systems create and form social orders that both enable 
and control the way in which social behaviour may take place. When such 
technological systems enable users to interact in new ways they also have an 
effect of disrupting established social interactional norms. In the case of 
participatory democracy this work has observed that technological systems 
are in position to allow a greater amount of participation to a larger group of 
users than ever before.  
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By allowing a greater amount of users to participate via technological 
systems the technology provides the infrastructure upon which democratic 
ideals may be put into a practice. This work argues that the understanding of 
democratic values of Participation, Communication, Integrity, Property, Access and 
Autonomy are being challenged by the fact that technological systems are 
allowing their implementation in new ways.  
Because of this increased citizen activity in the democracy, regulators are 
faced with the task of re-appraising the democratic core values that are the 
basis for much of our social understanding of society. The situation is a 
complex one. If the democratic values are to be upheld then the regulator 
must accept both the positive and negative effects. If the negative effects of 
disruptive technology lead to the conclusion that the democratic values 
cannot be fully accepted this must then be interpreted as a rejection of 
participatory democracy ideal on ideological, not on technical grounds. 
Much of the regulation of disruptive technology thus far has been a 
compromise where the rhetoric of democracy is maintained while its 
substance is denied.  
The desire of states to implement ICT has been to a large extent driven by 
the desire to reduce communications costs between the state and citizen. 
This therefore means that the goal does not necessarily include a variety of 
forms of interaction and communication but rather the goal is one of 
standardisation. Standardisation is not a fertile field where individualism or 
innovation easily grows.  
In closing, the question must be asked – what does it all mean? The arrival 
of new technology whether the printing press or the Internet disrupts the 
traditional manner in which society arranges and negotiates established 
social institutions. The early period of a new technology causes little 
problems since the technology is relatively new, has a low impact, and the 
user group is more easily regulated due to its homogenous nature. The 
desire for regulation does not occur prior to the advent of the socially 
disruptive effects of the technology. Additionally, as seen in these cases 
studies, technology does not appear to disruptive before larger groups of 
users begin to adopt the technology. Once the realisation that this new 
disruptive technology requires regulation appears there seems to be a 
corresponding desire to overregulate. To a large extent this is due to the fact 
that the need and basis of this regulation is insufficiently explored and 
usually based upon specialised lobby groups or wider moral panics within 
society.   
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To counteract the negative effects of regulation of disruptive technology 
described in this thesis it is necessary that the regulator and, to a larger 
extent, society act in such a way as to stop the discrimination against online 
participation in the participatory democracy. The regulator must understand 
that participation in the online democracy is no longer, if it ever has been, a 
matter of citizens communicating online with authorities. The participatory 
democracy is a form of social interaction similar, but also vastly different to, 
the newspaper, social club, television, school, workplace etc.  
To be able to stop this discrimination the regulator must come to accept a 
certain level of disorder. Most of us are condition to accept order as a 
positive value and disorder as a negative value. This is an oversimplification. 
Offline interaction contains large elements of disorganisation and so must 
online interaction. Without the space for disorder the online interaction will 
not be able to develop successfully and grow into its potential benefit to the 
participatory democracy. This includes the unorthodox or unconventional 
use of technology. Using technology in an unorthodox manner should not 
be seen as a negative use of technology. By allowing the unorthodox use of 
technology the regulator not only allows the users to explore and develop 
themselves but the regulator also provides a fruitful testing ground for new 
developments within the socio-technical field.   
Therefore the practical conclusions of this thesis are as follows: (1) the 
regulator must learn to accept alternative uses of technology. This entails the 
adoption of an unbiased or functional equivalency attitude towards 
technology. (2) Citizens should be encouraged to participate in difficult 
technical decisions rather than referring tough questions to experts. (3) The 
regulator must accept users participating directly in the regulatory process. 
(4) Both regulators and users must develop a tolerance towards 
unconventional uses of technology. 
These four recommendations (non-discrimination, citizen participation, 
regulator-citizen cooperation in regulation, tolerance towards 
unconventional technology uses) are to be understood in such a way as to 
inform the regulatory structure and enable the development of regulation, 
which treats online environments in a manner that is functionally equivalent 
to their offline relations.  
The future role of information technology within the participatory 
democracy is not under question in this thesis. It is clear that this technology 
is being used for social interaction on a wide scale and that it will not cease 
to do so even if the regulation of its use is seriously curtailed. The question 
is what role this disruptive technology will continue to play in the 
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participatory democracy? Whether the regulatory structures will embrace the 
technology as an important source of interaction and development or 
whether the technology will be discarded? Embracing the disruptive 
technology requires that the state becomes more tolerant to the technology 
and permit wider uses beyond those specified in the present day policy 
documents. Discarding the technology entails a limited, regulated use but 
will fail to recognise the full potential of disruptive technologies as an agent 
of change within the participatory democracy.  
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There is no pain, you are receding. 
A distant ships smoke on the horizon. 
You are only coming through in waves. 
Your lips move but I cant hear what youre sayin. 
When I was a child I had a fever. 
My hands felt just like two balloons. 
Now I got that feeling once again. 
I cant explain, you would not understand. 
This is not how I am. 
I have become comfortably numb. 
 
 
David Gilmour & Roger Waters 
